



GEORGIA'S ENERGY SECTOR WITHOUT WESTERN SUPPORT:

A ROAD TO RUSSIAN DEPENDENCE

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFD	The French Development Agency
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
E5P	Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environmental Partnership Fund
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Commission
EIB	European Investment Bank
ENIP	Energy Network Improvement Project
EU	European Union
NIP	European Union Neighbourhood Investment Platform
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KfW	Credit Institute for Reconstruction
kV	Kilovolt
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
OHL	Overhead Transmission Line
SS	Substation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
NEFCO	NEFCO



GEORGIA'S ENERGY SECTOR WITHOUT WESTERN SUPPORT: A ROAD TO RUSSIAN DEPENDENCE

From the very beginning of its independence, Georgia's unwavering national interest has been integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Since 1991, the country has stood on its own feet, strengthened its statehood, and developed its institutions with the consistent support of its Western partners.

For more than three decades, Euro-Atlantic integration has been Georgia's primary foreign policy objective, seen as the only viable path to reinforcing sovereignty, ensuring national prosperity, and safeguarding the homeland against internal and external threats. On this path, Georgia has been one of the leading countries within the EU's Eastern Partnership, earning numerous privileges in its relations with the EU, including visa-free travel, a free trade agreement, preferential loans and grants, and more.



Amid mass protests and significant public pressure, the ruling Georgian Dream party [applied](#) for EU membership on March 3, 2022. However, in June 2022, the European Commission, instead of granting candidate status, issued a 12-point recommendation outlining priority reforms and offered Georgia a “European perspective” (see European Council Conclusions). In contrast, Ukraine and Moldova were granted candidate status at that time.

EUROPEAN

COUNCIL

CONCLUSIONS,

JUNE 24, 2022:

“The European Council recognises the European perspective of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, and Georgia. The future of these countries and their citizens lies within the European Union.”

“The European Council is ready to grant the status of candidate country to Georgia once the priorities specified in the Commission’s opinion on Georgia’s membership application have been addressed.”

Despite major external challenges, and largely due to the persistent efforts of the Georgian people, the European Commission [recommended](#) granting Georgia candidate status on November 8, 2023, even though the Georgian Dream government had fully met only 3 of the 12 required reforms. The recommendation was conditional upon fulfilling the remaining 9 priorities. On December 14, 2023, Georgia was officially granted candidate status for EU membership.

However, instead of leveraging this historic opportunity, the government under Bidzina Ivanishvili has reversed Georgia’s pro-European foreign policy course, pushing the country toward increasing isolation. Since gaining candidate status, Georgia has faced sanctions, frozen aid programs, and stalled negotiations, rather than advancing toward closer integration with the EU. Under Ivanishvili’s leadership, Georgia risks losing not only its EU accession prospects but also its path to democratic development.

The government’s anti-Western orientation became official on November 28, 2024, just one month after the rigged parliamentary elections, when Georgian Dream’s Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze publicly [declared](#) that Georgia would suspend negotiations with the European Union and reject EU grants.



Today, we have decided not to put the issue of opening negotiations with the European Union on the agenda until the end of 2028. We are also refusing any budget grants from the EU until the end of 2028.

We intend not to enter the EU begging and standing on one leg, but to join the EU with dignity, with a functioning democratic system and a strong economy.

With this statement, the Georgian Dream government seeks to downplay the vital role that Western institutions have played in Georgia’s political, economic, educational, and infrastructural development. In reality, by rejecting EU assistance, the government is not only jeopardizing Georgia’s future in the EU’s political and economic structures but also undermining the country’s opportunity to develop in line with European standards.


To illustrate this, the report analyzes the European Union’s contribution to Georgia’s energy independence. It is based on both quantitative and qualitative assessments of energy-related projects implemented between 2013 and 2024¹. Stay tuned for upcoming reports on EU assistance in agriculture, education, and other key sectors.

FUNDS RECEIVED BY GOVERNMENT THROUGH GRANTS AND LOANS (2013-2024)

Research Findings

From 2013 to 2024, the total amount of grants provided by Western institutions, as recorded in the state budget (according to Article 5 of the Budget Law), amounted to 3,535,364,000 GEL² (see **Chart #1**).

Chart #1: Grants Indicated in the State Budget (Million GEL)



The volume of grants in the state budget peaked between 2017 and 2020. Notably, in 2020, the European Union allocated a grant of 279 million GEL to Georgia (see **Chart #2**). However, following the increasingly anti-democratic governance of the Georgian Dream party, this figure has sharply declined.


1. The period of the coalition and later the party “Georgian Dream” being in power.

2. According to the “Treasury Account Registered Grants (Various Donors)” data, between 2013 and 2023, the Government of Georgia received grants totaling 792,971,000 GEL from “various donors,” which accounts for 23.4% of the total grants received during that period. The identities of these donors are not specified in the Law on the State Budget.

The planned grant amount in the 2025 state budget is 59,909,000 GEL, which is approximately four times less than the amount in 2013.

EU grants have decreased even more significantly, falling to just 7 million GEL, which is 11 times less than the 2013 level.


Chart #2: Grants Indicated in the State Budget by Year (Million GEL)



Between 2013 and 2024, 59% of grants awarded by Western institutions were provided by the European Union (see **Chart #3**).

The top five grant donors to Georgia during this period were: MCC (13%), USAID (13%), KfW (8%), and E5P (2%) (see **Chart #3**).

Chart #3: Funding Received in the Form of Grants by Donors, 2013–2024 (Million GEL)



From 2013 to 2024, the total amount of loans received from international financial institutions amounted to 24,138,000,000 GEL.


Georgia's main creditors include: ADB, WB, EIB, EBRD, AIIB, IMF, EU, IFAD, CEB, NEFCO (see Chart #4).

Chart #4: Projected Upper Limit of Georgia's Public Debt under the 2025 State Budget Law

Creditor	Projected balance (31.12.2025) (Million GEL)
Asian Development Bank (ADB)	6,268.86
World Bank (WB)	6,139.45
European Investment Bank (EIB)	3,331.89
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	694.07
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)	591.30
International Monetary Fund (IMF)	397.88
European Union (EU)	385.67
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	103.28
The Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB)	40.42
The Nordic Green Bank (NEFCO)	16.10

In total, the volume of grants and loans received by the state from 2013 to 2024 exceeds the amount of budget funds planned in the 2025 state budget (see **Chart #5**).

Chart #5: Comparison of Total Grants and Loans (2013–2024) with the 2025 State Budget (Million GEL)



ENERGY

ENERGY SECTOR AFTER THE “DARK” 1990S

Since gaining independence, Georgia’s energy sector has faced significant challenges. The country’s energy infrastructure was severely damaged by the civil war and political instability of the 1990s. During that period, there were several attacks on critical energy facilities (notably in 1993, 1995, and 2002), leaving the country’s largest power plant, Enguri HPP, out of service.

The paralysis of the energy sector naturally increased Georgia’s dependence on its neighbors, particularly Russia. However, due to constant crises, a large part of the population lacked purchasing power, and the political elite was corrupt. As a result, the so-called “energy mafia” emerged, re-exporting imported electricity for profit. Consequently, the population often had no access to electricity for hours, and at times for days.

Despite this crisis, Georgia was able to emerge from the “darkness” of the 1990s largely due to the support of international financial institutions. Between 1995 and 2000 alone, Georgia received approximately USD 591 million in grants and soft loans for the rehabilitation of its energy facilities. **Today, the country’s energy independence is a direct result of this targeted and systematic assistance from Western institutions.** At the same time, international donors continue to actively finance strategic projects in the sector.


The important role of Georgia’s Western partners in the development of its energy sector is further illustrated by the fact that the Ministry of Energy of Georgia, which operated as a separate entity from 2013 to 2017, was largely funded through Western grants and loans. Specifically:

Between 2013 and 2017, only 27.4% of the Ministry’s budget came from state funds³ In total, the Ministry received 544 million GEL in grants and loans during this period.

Since 2018, the Ministry of Energy has been merged with the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development. Foreign grants and loans account for approximately 18% of this merged ministry’s total budget (equivalent to 806 million GEL).

3. Budgetary funds – revenues contributed to the state budget by the Georgian population.

Graph #6. Electricity imports and Russia's share (2009–2024)



Despite the progress made, part of Georgia's electricity supply still comes from neighboring countries: Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, and Armenia. Particularly concerning is the fact that Georgia continues to receive a significant portion of its electricity from Russia, with this trend increasing in recent years (see **Graph #6**). As shown, since 2021, the share of electricity imported from Russia has grown substantially. In 2024, approximately 50% of Georgia's imported electricity came from Russia. Although this figure remains lower than the levels of the 1990s, minimizing energy dependence on Russia remains a strategic priority for Georgia, closely tied to increasing domestic electricity production.

LOCAL ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION

A significant portion of Georgia's electricity demand is met by local generation facilities. More specifically, approximately 70% of electricity is [generated](#) by hydroelectric power plants (HPPs), while thermal power plants account for around 20%. As of 2020, Georgia [operates](#) a total of 98 hydroelectric power plants, approximately 3,550 km of transmission lines, and 93 substations.


Among these HPPs, Enguri HPP and Vardnili HPP are particularly important for electricity production (see **Chart #7**). The rehabilitation of both plants was [carried out](#) with Western funding.

Chart #7:⁴ Top 10 HPPs in Georgia

No	HPP	River	Reservoir	Capacity, MW	Type of Regulation	Commissioning Year
1	Enguri HPP	Enguri	Jvari	1,300	regulatory	1978
2	Vardnili HPP	Enguri		220	regulatory	1971
3	Vartsikhe HPP	Rioni		184	seasonal	1976-1977
4	Shuakhevi HPP	Ajaristskali		179	seasonal	2017
5	Zhinvali HPP	Aragvi	Zhinvali	130	regulatory	1984
6	Lajanuri HPP	Lajanuri	Lajanuri	114	seasonal	1960
7	Khrami 1	Khrami	Tsalka	113	regulatory	1947
8	Khrami 2	Khrami	Tsalka	110	regulatory	1963
9	Dariali	Tergi		108	seasonal	2016
10	Paravani HPP	Paravani		87	seasonal	2014

It is an undisputed fact that international financial institutions and European donors provide a significant share of the financing for Georgia's main energy infrastructure projects. Notably, the rehabilitation projects for Enguri and Vardnili HPPs, as well as the Black Sea Power Transmission Network project, were implemented entirely with Western financing (see **Chart #8**).

Chart #8: Energy Infrastructure Financing 2013–2024 (Million GEL)



4. The Source: [Georgia's Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategy 2050](#).

In total, approximately 884 million GEL was spent on the construction and rehabilitation of power transmission lines and substations in Georgia between 2013 and 2024. Of this amount, only 106.65 million GEL (12%) was financed by the Georgian state budget, while 87% of the project costs were covered by Georgia's international partners (see **Chart #9**).





Chart #9: Ratio of Western Grants and Loans in the Systemically Important Electricity Transmission Grid Development Project

Thus, the development of Georgia's systemically important electricity transmission network was financed by Western international financial institutions. The main donors in this sector were the EU-NIF, KfW, EIB, EBRD, WB, EC, IBRD, and ADB (see **Chart #10**).

Chart #10: Share of Western Donors in the Systemic Electricity Transmission Grid Development Project



NEW REGIONAL ENERGY FACILITIES

Regarding the improvement of existing energy infrastructure in the regions and the construction of new facilities, the majority of financing in this direction has again been provided by international financial institutions, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and KfW. Within the framework of the Regional Power Transmission Enhancement Project, only 16.1% of the project expenses were covered by the Georgian state, while the remaining 83.9% was financed by international donors (see **Chart #11**).




Chart #11: Share of Western Grants and Credits in the Regional Power Transmission Enhancement Project (2013–2024)

Overall, the Regional Power Transmission Enhancement Project, with a total investment of 392 million GEL, [includes](#) the following sub-projects:

Tskaltubo–Akhaltsikhe–Tortumi Power Line (financed by the EU and KfW)

Northern Ring Project (financed by EBRD)

Namakhvani–Tskaltubo–Lajanuri Project (financed by EBRD and KfW)

Jvari–Tskaltubo Transmission Line Project (financed by the World Bank)

Guria Power Transmission Lines Infrastructure Enhancement (financed by KfW)

Kakheti Infrastructure Improvement Project (financed by KfW)


Kheledula–Lajanuri–Oni Power Transmission Line Project (financed by KfW)

STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

REHABILITATION OF ENGURI AND VARDNILI HPPS

The Enguri hydroelectric power station is the [largest](#) generating facility in the South Caucasus. Constructed between 1961 and 1978, the Enguri system includes both the Enguri HPP and the Vardnili HPP cascade. The Vardnili cascade itself consists of four hydroelectric power stations: Vardnili HPP 1, Vardnili HPP 2, Vardnili HPP 3, and Vardnili HPP 4. During the 1990s, three of the Vardnili HPP cascade's power stations were [looted](#), leaving only Vardnili HPP 1 operational today. The resources required for rehabilitating the remaining three stations are estimated at approximately USD 80–85 million.

Since the 1990s, international financial institutions have been providing preferential loans (see **Chart #12**) and grants (see **Chart #13**) to rehabilitate the damaged Enguri hydroelectric system. The main donors for these rehabilitation projects have been the EU, EIB, and EBRD.



European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD):

1998 (Phase One): Provided a loan of USD 38.7 million for the first phase of Enguri HPP rehabilitation.

2006 (Phase Two): Additional USD 10 million loan.

2010 (Phase Three): Additional EUR 20 million loan.

2023 (Phase Four): Total project cost was EUR 45 million, with EUR 38 million financed by an EBRD loan.

In total, the EBRD has [provided](#) approximately EUR 205 million in loans for the rehabilitation of the Enguri Hydropower Plants.

European Investment Bank (EIB):

2010: [Provided](#) EUR 20 million for the Vardnili and Enguri rehabilitation project.

2017: [Allocated](#) an additional EUR 3.5 million.

European Union (EU):


1999: The European Commission [provided](#) a grant of EUR 9.4 million for Enguri HPP rehabilitation.

2006: An additional [grant](#) of USD 2 million for the second phase.

EU Neighbourhood Investment Platform (EU-NIP): [Provided](#) a grant of EUR 5 million as part of the EIB-financed rehabilitation project.

2023: EU-NIP [co-financed](#) the EBRD-funded project with a grant of EUR 7.05 million.

Chart #14: Vardnili and Enguri Hydropower Plant Rehabilitation Project (EIB, EU, EBRD, EC) (Million GEL)




Thus, the construction and rehabilitation projects for the Enguri and Vardnili HPPs have been financed entirely through foreign grants and loans (see **Chart #14**).

In total, between 2013 and 2024 alone, 20 million GEL was allocated as grants and 102 million GEL as loans for the rehabilitation and construction projects within the Enguri system.

BLACK SEA TRANSMISSION NETWORK PROJECT (BSTN)


The €270 million Black Sea Transmission Network Project was [implemented](#) with funding from international donors, including the EU-NIP, EBRD, EIB, and KfW. The project aimed to enhance the sustainability of Georgia's power grid and facilitate electricity transmission between Georgia and other South Caucasus countries.

Completed in 2013, the project significantly [improved](#) the stability of Georgia's domestic electricity grid and increased the country's potential for electricity exports. Prior to the project, only one power transmission line (Imereti–Kartli 2 to Kartli 1) connected eastern and western Georgia. Consequently, any failure along this line would have caused a complete system shutdown in eastern Georgia, leading to severe electricity shortages. Additionally, since the main sources of electricity generation were located in the north of the country, Georgia lacked the capacity to export electricity to its southern neighbors.



THE BLACK SEA SUBMARINE CABLE PROJECT

is an international initiative designed to connect the power systems of the South Caucasus and Europe via an underwater transmission network. The project aims to export renewable energy from the South Caucasus to the European Union through a 1,195 km submarine cable linking the ports of Anaklia (Georgia) and Constanta (Romania). The participating countries in the project are Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary.



The first agreement on the initiative was signed in 2022, and in 2024, the parties [signed](#) an agreement establishing a joint company, the Green Energy Corridor Power Company ([GECO Power Company](#)), to implement the project. Completion is [planned](#) for 2029.

The project has received positive evaluations and substantial financing from the European Union. The European Commission has [allocated](#) €2.5 billion for the initiative, and in 2024, the World Bank approved a loan of USD 35 million for the first phase. This initial phase consists of three stages and includes improving Georgia's infrastructure capabilities and strengthening its transmission systems.



The project has been positively received by EU officials:



“The most important thing for me is the Black Sea electricity cable, which will bring green electricity from Georgia to Europe. I hope that this will immediately lead to investments in renewable energy sources in Georgia – hydro, solar, and other directions – and Georgia will become an exporter of clean energy.” - EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, [Oliver Varhelyi](#), 15/11/2022.

“The Black Sea electric cable is a new transmission route full of opportunities. This project could bring Georgia, a country with a European destiny, great benefits as well. It could transform the country into an electricity hub and integrate it into the EU internal electricity market. Finally, the Black Sea electric cable could also help bring electricity to our neighbours in Moldova and the Western Balkans, and of course to Ukraine.” - President of the European Commission, [Ursula von der Leyen](#), 17/12/2022.

ENERGY NETWORK IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMME (ENIP)

The Georgian Energy Network Improvement Programme (ENIP) is a large-scale investment [initiative](#) with a total budget of EUR 270 million. The programme is being implemented with financial support from Western institutions, including KfW, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the EU Neighborhood Investment Platform (EU NIP). Launched in 2021, ENIP encompasses a series of infrastructure projects across the Imereti, Guria, Racha, Svaneti, and Kakheti regions.

This EUR 270 million programme involves extensive construction and rehabilitation of energy infrastructure throughout Georgia's regions, supported by funding from Western partners.

In 2019, a loan agreement of EUR 100 million [was signed](#) between KfW and the Government of Georgia, as part of KfW's total approved financing of EUR 120 million for the programme.

In 2019, the EBRD [allocated](#) a loan of EUR 90 million to support ENIP.

Additionally, Georgia [secured](#) a grant of EUR 9.9 million for the programme under the EU Neighborhood Investment Platform.

ENIP Includes Four Sub-Projects:

1. Construction of Overhead Transmission Lines: Tskaltubo–Akhaltsikhe and Akhaltsikhe–Tortum Project

This project began in 2022 and is being implemented with financial support from KfW and the EU Neighborhood Investment Facility (EU-NIF). The total investment for this sub-project amounts to EUR 62 million.

Project Components:

P.9.1: Construction of a 400 kV overhead transmission line (OHL) from **Akhaltsikhe to Tortum**, with a total length of 150 km (33 km within Georgia to the border) and a capacity of 1,850 MW.

P.9.2: Extension of the 500 kV **Akhaltsikhe substation** (SS) and installation of a new bay to connect the 400 kV OHL **Akhaltsikhe–Tortum**.

P.9.3: Construction of a third back-to-back link at **Akhaltsikhe substation**, rated at 350 MW and 500/400 kV.

The project includes the construction of the Tskaltubo–Akhaltsikhe transmission line and the development of a Georgia–Turkey power system interconnection. Its primary objective is to strengthen Georgia’s electricity connectivity with both Turkey and the broader European power grid.

2. Northern Ring: Namakhvani–Tskaltubo–Lajanuri Project

The Northern Ring is a systemically important energy infrastructure project with a total investment of approximately EUR 144 million. It is being implemented with financial support from the EBRD and KfW and is scheduled for completion by 2028.

Project Components:

P.7.1: Construction of a new 220/110 kV substation **Lajanuri**, with a capacity of 250 MW.

P.7.2: Construction of a 500 kV overhead transmission line (OHL) **Lajanuri–Tskaltubo**, 49 km in length.

P.7.3: Construction of a 220 kV OHL **Lajanuri Substation–Lajanuri HPP**, 4 km in length.

P.7.4: Construction of a double-circuit 220 kV OHL **Oni–Lajanuri** 55 km in length.

P.7.5: Construction of a 500/220 kV substation **Nenskra**, with 2x501 MVA transformers.

P.7.6: Loop-in/loop-out connection of the 500 kV **Kavkasioni OHL** to/from substation **Nenskra**, with a total length of 2 km.

P.7.7: Construction of a double-circuit 220 kV OHL **Nenskra HPP–Nenskra SS**, 1 km in length.

P.7.8: Construction of a double-circuit 220 kV OHL **Kheledula–Lajanuri**, 45 km in length.

P.7.9: Extension of the 220/110 kV substation **Lajanuri** with the addition of a 500 kV switchyard, capacity 801 MVA.

P.7.10: Construction of a 500 kV OHL **Nenskra–Jvari**, 47 km in length.

P.7.11: Extension of the 500 kV substation **Jvari** to accommodate the connection of the 500 kV OHL **Jvari–Nenskra**.

P.7.12: Construction of a double-circuit 220 kV OHL **Nenskra–Mestia**, 57 km in length.

P.7.13: Loop-in/loop-out connection of the 500 kV OHL **Nenskra–Jvari** into the **Khudoni HPP**.

The primary objective of the project is to integrate electricity generated by hydropower plants located in the Racha-Lechkhumi and Mestia regions into the national grid. This includes power from the Nenskra HPP, Khudoni HPP, Tskhenistskali cascade HPPs, Khledula HPP, Oni HPPs, and other Racha region hydropower plants.

3. Power Grid Enhancement Project in Guria. Project Components:

P.8.1: Construction of a 220/110 kV substation **Ozurgeti** with an initial capacity of 250 MVA, with provisions for future capacity expansion.

P.8.2: Loop-in/loop-out connection of the 220 kV **Paliastomi-1 OHL** to/from the new 220/110 kV **Ozurgeti** substation.

P.8.3: Construction of a double-circuit 110 kV OHL **Ozurgeti–Zoti HPP**, 47 km in length, with a transfer capacity of 2x100 MW.

The primary goal of the project is to integrate upcoming hydropower plants in the Guria region into the national grid while enhancing the reliability and stability of power supply in the Guria–Batumi regions.

The project is being implemented with financial support from KfW and the EU Neighborhood Investment Platform (EU-NIP).




Figure #15: Power Line Infrastructure Enhancement in the Guria Region.

4. Infrastructure Enhancement Project in the Kakheti Region

The project is being implemented with the financial support of **KfW**. Its primary goal is to integrate prospective hydropower plants in the **Kakheti** region into the national grid and to enhance the reliability of power supply in the **Kakheti–Dusheti** regions.

Project Components:

P.14.1: Construction of a new 220/110/10 kV substation in **Telavi**.

P.14.2: Construction of a single-circuit 110 kV OHL Stori **HPP–New Telavi**, 41.5 km in length.

P.14.3: Construction of a double-circuit 220 kV OHL **Gurjaani–New Telavi**, 44.2 km in length.

P.14.4: Construction of a single-circuit 110 kV OHL **New Telavi–Akhmeta**, with a line dimensioned for 220 kV, 30.5 km in length.

P.14.5: Rehabilitation of the **Gurjaani substation (SS)**.

P.14.6: Reconstruction of the **Akhmeta 110 kV substation (SS)**.

P.14.7: Reconstruction and rehabilitation of the 35 kV **Tusheti** power infrastructure, covering 55 km.

P.14.8: Construction of a single-circuit 220 kV OHL **New Telavi–Jinvali**, 62.6 km in length.

P.14.9: Construction of a new 220/110 kV substation in **Jinvali**.

CONCLUSION

Western financial institutions, particularly the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the German Development Bank, have played a decisive role in the development of Georgia's energy sector.

The European Union's support is also evident in the Association Agreement, where energy is [identified](#) as a priority area of cooperation. Since 2017, Georgia has been a [member](#) of the Energy Community, a platform that fosters collaboration between the EU and its partner countries to promote energy security and sustainability. Given the strategic role of Western financial institutions in Georgia's energy landscape, the Georgian Dream party's increasingly anti-European foreign policy poses a significant threat to the sector's stability and progress.

In December 2024, the Thomas Edison Electric Power Community Center, a non-profit organization uniting professionals from the industry, issued a comprehensive [statement](#) warning of the long-term consequences of this policy shift:

“Georgia's electricity sector is not prepared to function independently of Western partners. In such a scenario, it faces either collapse, similar to the crisis of the 1990s, or absorption into the Russian energy system.”