The dynamics of international relations have been fundamentally altered by the global pandemic’s far-reaching impact and Russia’s full-scale conventional warfare in Ukraine. The common understanding stood that the post-coronavirus era would usher in a new world order, with the invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions against Russia further bolstering this contention. While the entire democratic world is concentrated on fighting one crisis after another, we also see the shifts in the behavior and positions of individual states, security alliances and international organizations.

International society is in the middle of significant transitions, revising goals and values and adjusting new policies toward the changing world order. It is the time to redefine the terms, mandates, search for new partners and new allies, and mark red lines. It is exactly the objective of this essay, to identify specific problems and policy shortcomings revealed amid recent global developments and the absolute necessity for the security alliances to consider, building resilience and boosting effective and timely cooperation with relevant parties aimed at rapid response and effective prevention of crises in the future.

The COVID-19 pandemic has become the most unprecedented global challenge the world has faced since World War II. The early alarms regarding the outbreak were elusive and unbelievable for all, resulting in the absence of prompt reactions and a number of political, economic, and health policy setbacks. In line with these obstacles, the virus has also shown the states their own insecurities. Countries acted spontaneously, and prioritized individual needs as opposed to collective strategies within the alliances to combat the virus jointly. The lack of solidarity at the initial stage negatively affected the mobilization, coordination, and allocation of necessary resources to combat the pandemic in the early phase. Together with uncoordinated action, unfamiliarity with the virus, the absence of sufficient medical equipment and treatments, and the shortages of vaccines caused total chaos in the world. In the early stage of fighting the pandemic EU and NATO missed the most important asset, unparalleled knowledge and strength available to them when joining forces and getting into collective action. Hence, the crisis instigated a severe blow to the world population and struck the global market as well, leaving long-term damaging consequences.

Timely assessment and recognition of failures and shortcomings brought by individual action strengthened democratic alliances and brought us to the strongest ever united democratic front against the unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine.

Why did this happen only now? It certainly is not the first demonstration of Russian aggression. The events of 2008 and 2014 have already exposed Russia to stirring up conflicts, occupying territories of independent states, and then using them as leverage to manipulate its neighbors, prevent progress, and their integration into the Western economic and security alliances. The democratic world united against Russia only after Kremlin turned the conflict that started in 2014 into a full-scale war in Ukraine, bringing back fear of war in Europe and reminding the largest and strongest alliances, the EU and NATO of their original mission to keep Europe united and in peace. The war in Europe facilitated rapid change in policies and caused an increase in defense spending and arms production.

Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, it is important to highlight two additional issues: the PRC and its role in the new world order and the threat of global nuclear conflict.

The Chinese factor is a common feature of the pandemic and the war since it is equally relevant in both cases. The PRC’s concealment of the covid outbreak, information manipulation, and subsequent wide-scale “covid diplomacy” led to the massive transmission of the virus, nurturing disastrous global economic and health crises. The Chinese factor is also noteworthy precisely because of the global game it has played so far, according to which, on the one hand, it calls itself the “peacemaker”, and on the other hand, as an authoritarian state, provides indirect economic and military support to another authoritarian state, Russia, against the Western security alliances.

The war in Ukraine also revived the concept of nuclear security as the risks of inadvertent nuclear escalation increased. It likewise highlighted the ineffectiveness of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, thereby raising doubts about the credibility of security alliances and the promises they have made, placing the onus on them to offer complete support to Ukraine. Therefore, as long as nuclear weapons are in the hands of authoritarian states, this issue should not lose its relevancy for security alliances, as mismanagement will have enormously irreversible results for the whole world.

The crisis of the last years brought the existing international world order under huge pressure. The experience of the pandemic proved that we could take nothing for granted and even the strongest alliances, united by the strongest bonds of common values, markets, and security dilemmas, might crumble against the invisible and unknown enemy. However, success is determined not only by how we react initially but, more importantly, by recognizing shortcomings, accurate assessment, and immediate action for improvement and eradication of causes of failures. Regardless of all the problems, democracies came out more robust from the covid crisis, even more, enchanted by the magic of unity and solidarity.

Rigorous and reliable cooperation under the umbrella of security alliances serves as vital mechanisms for collective action, fostering the consolidation of resources, expertise, and collaborative endeavors to effectively confront shared challenges while promoting global security and stability. Different from and learning from the mistakes of covid pandemic, Russia’s brutal aggression in Ukraine unified the democratic world and facilitated an even stronger commitment to peace and liberty based on respect for the sovereignty of the democratic states and freedom of choice over partnership and alliances. Faced by the brutality of conventional war in Europe, brought the alliances to look ahead and pay special attention to authoritarian states beyond Russia, creating leverage by initially reducing cooperation, and lowering economic/diplomatic dependence on them. With these means and united action, we aim at rapidly preventing future crises, the security alliances must never stop working to develop even more efficient universal policy directives for themselves and to share with the partner parties.

Ani Kintsurashvili – Author of the Article, Senior Researcher, Civic IDEA

From April 5-8, 2023, world’s media focused on Beijing, where French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen met with senior officials from the People’s Republic of China, including President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang. Given the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine and rising tensions in Sino-American relations, this state visit was thought-provoking. What were the main goals, issues, and outcomes of the visit? I will try to answer these and other questions in this blog.

Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to China started on April 5 with a large delegation including some ministers, lawmakers and nearly 60 CEOs of top French companies. Before leaving France, President Macron also asked the President of the European Commission for a joint visit to show China and the world that the European Union holds the same position on various topics. Ursula von der Leyen accepted the invitation and joined Macron’s state visit to China.

According to the Foreign affairs website of People’s Republic of China President Xi first met with Macron, then held trilateral talks with Macron and Ursula von der Leyen, before meeting with her bilaterally to discuss China-EU relations. Finally, the French president and Mr. Xi held an informal meeting in Guangzhou, focusing on Sino-French relations. In addition, the main topics discussed at the meetings were China-EU economic relations, the war between Russia and Ukraine and China’s role in resolving the conflict.

EU-China Relations and Europe’s Strategic autonomy

The visit was marked by very important and interesting messages from three leaders regarding EU-China relations. First of all, the messages of the Chinese president were not very different. He reiterated the need that “China-EU relations should not be aligned with, dependent on, or dictated by a third party.” It is clear, of course, that when Xi speaks of a third party, he means the United States and wants to strengthen the idea of “dividing” the West. He also criticized the “democracy versus authoritarianism” and the new Cold War era narratives, mentioning that “these only bring division and confrontation to the world.” He goes even further and calls on Europe to stand together with China against “Hegemonism and Unilateralism.“, again directed at the United States.

At the trilateral meeting, President Xi made the idea of exclusive cooperation between the EU and China very clear. While the United States is trying to “decouple” from his country, President Xi reaffirmed that “China supports Europe in achieving strategic autonomy.”

The idea of Europe’s strategic autonomy is not strange for President Macron. The term refers to the EU’s ability to act independently in areas of strategic importance. These areas include defense policy, the economy, technologies and much more. According to some EU leaders, especially in the field of defense, the European Union is very dependent on NATO and the United States. That is why Macron and some other leaders support the idea of strategic autonomy – they want to see the European Union as an independent and strong player on the world stage.

Europe’s strategic autonomy is attractive to China: it is in Beijing’s interest that Europe and the United States be less interconnected. The Chinese government sees this as an opportunity to improve its relationship with the EU. Given the rising economic tensions in Sino-US relations, this goal is especially crucial. That is why President Macron was welcomed by his Chinese counterpart with great pomp and respect. The informal meeting between Xi and Macron in Guangzhou over a cup of tea proved once again that the Chinese president is very interested in cooperation with France.

No to decoupling, yes to de-risking

But Europe’s strategic autonomy is also involving less dependence on China in several areas. On March 30, President von der Leyen gave a speech on EU-China relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre ahead of her visit to China. In her view, the EU should focus not on “decoupling” but on “de-risking” from China. This message was also repeated by her and shared by Macron in Beijing during the visit.

Where does the idea of “decoupling” come from ? This issue was first discussed in Washington as a response to the heavy economic dependence on China. In relations with Beijing, the United States has taken a tougher stance – since Trump, Washington has pursued a strategy of “decoupling” economic ties with China, and this process continues under the Biden administration. For Europe, it is not realistic to decouple completely from China, but European leaders also know that dependence on Beijing carries high risks. This is why the EU prefers the “de-risking” strategy, which, according to Ursula Von der Leyen, contains several specific ways to deal with the different risks, such as diversifying trade and investment relations, technology transfers, etc.

Russia-Ukraine War

The war between Russia and Ukraine was another central topic of the visit. In this regard, the European leaders stressed the importance of involving China, a member of the UN Security Council, in the “promotion of a just peace”, which respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Macron and Ursula wanted to convince XI to use its “special” relationship with Putin to stop Russian aggression against Ukraine, but there was no concrete promise from China in this sense. However, in the meeting with Macron, Xi and his French counterpart agreed that they are opposed to a nuclear war and to escalating the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in that direction.

Another key message sent by Europeans was about arming Russia. As we know, the Biden administration recently stated that China was considering providing lethal aid to Russia; Though It has already been proven that the PRC is only sending non-lethal aid to Russia, including helmets and body armor, but if it decides to send lethal aid as well, it would pose a serious threat to international security. That’s why after the meetings with Xi and Chinese Premier Li Qiang, the president of the European Commission told the media that she had warned China not to supply military equipment, directly or indirectly, to Russia. In addition, Ursula Von der Leyen made it clear that if Beijing decided to arm the aggressor, “this would significantly damage” relations between the EU and China. According to the French diplomat, after Mr. Macron asked Mr. Xi not to arm Russia, President Xi replied that “it was not his war.” When Emmanuel Macron and Ursula von der Leyen left China, the EU’s position on this issue was reaffirmed by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany – Annalena Baerbock. On April 14, during her visit to China and meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in Beijing, they discussed this issue and the Chinese minister said, “We do not and will not deliver weapons to the conflicting parties at a later date.”

It is clear that for the EU, any Chinese lethal aid for Russia in the war would be seen as crossing the line. In addition, European leaders are asking China to become actively involved in ending the war between Russia and Ukraine, as Beijing is the only country that still has influence over Russia. However, the only concrete consensus during Macron and Ursula’s visit on the Russia-Ukraine war was President Xi’s promise to call Zelensky when the conditions and timing are right.

Taiwan issue

The high-level EU-China state visit obviously did not take place without the issue of Taiwan. On this subject, the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, was more critical. Both she and Macron reaffirmed their loyalty to the “one-China policy”, but Macron tried to avoid discussing critical issues with Xi, such as Taiwan and China’s human rights violations, while Ursula, on the Taiwan issue, mentioned that “the threat to use force to change the status quo is unacceptable“.

On his departure from China, Emmanuel Macron took questions from the French press on the plane, and his answers on the issue of Taiwan were controversial. In particular, he told the media that Europe ran a “great risk” of being involved in crises “that are not ours,” which would make it more difficult to build the EU’s strategic autonomy. He goes even further and said that “The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this (Taiwan) topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction.” These statements became the main topic of the world’s media after China began large-scale military exercises around the island of Taiwan, just hours after the French president left Guangzhou to return to Paris. Macron’s views on Taiwan have been welcomed in China, but of course were criticized by some European policymakers. Annalena Baerbock’s statements on the issue show that Macron’s views are not shared by all European leaders. Indeed, during her visit to China on April 12, she condemned the recently launched military exercises around Taiwan and said Germany “cannot be indifferent” to the escalating tensions.

Other important results of the visit

While Emmanuel Macron was in China with CEOs of major French companies, it was clear from the beginning of the state visit that he was in Beijing to strengthen economic relations with China. Macron has signed several agreements for French companies in sectors such as pork, wind power, cosmetics and civil nuclear power. During this visit, France and PRC also issued a 51-point joint declaration on cooperation in various fields ranging from security to culture. The President of the European Commission also stressed the importance of continued cooperation between China and the EU on climate change and other common goals, but as she focused on “de-risking” for the EU economy, she did not sign a concrete agreement in Beijing.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can say that the joint visit of Macron and Leyen to China was an attempt by European leaders to show their unity with regard to the EU’s foreign policy towards Beijing. It is true that on some issues, Macron acted more like a “good cop”, while Ursula chose a “bad cop” stance and at times criticized Chinese policy on several issues, including Taiwan and human rights in the Xinjiang region. However, the two EU leaders did manage to agree on two key messages: On the Russia-Ukraine war, they told President Xi that arming Russia would significantly damage EU-China relations and China should be actively involved in ending the war. Regarding EU-China relations, their message was that the EU does not follow the U.S. strategy of “decoupling” and prefers to “de-risk” from China. Time will tell if this strategy is effective or not.

Giorgi Khachidze – Author of the Blog, Intern, Civic IDEA

On March 20, 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping embarked on his first visit to Russia since the beginning of the Ukraine war. The three-day visit conveyed significant signals to the international community and highlighted the burgeoning partnership between the two powers.

As the war in Ukraine persists, China has found itself balancing multiple objectives. On the one hand, it calls for an end to the hostilities, but on the other hand, it maintains a strong strategic partnership with Russia. Despite the ongoing war, trade between Beijing and Moscow continues to grow, and Chinese and Russian diplomats remain in frequent contact. Even military exercises between the two nations continue without interruption. While Chinese state media does not often directly endorse Russia’s territorial claims in Ukraine, it consistently blames NATO and the United States for the conflict. Prior to their recent meeting, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin had already met more than 40 times, cementing their bond as fellow autocrats who speak the language of power.

Here are some key takeaways from the meeting:

The meeting took place amidst some crucial international developments: the Japanese Prime Minister’s surprise visit to Kyiv, the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant issued for Vladimir Putin, and the U.S. warning China not to back Russia in the Ukraine war.

The warm meeting between the two leaders that took place despite these implications is a message in and of itself.

The Ukraine War

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the meeting hadn’t resulted in any progress toward resolving the war in Ukraine. Both sides emphasized the importance of decreasing tensions and not “prolonging the war in Ukraine”. However, the fact that Russia’s invasion was the initial cause of the war was not acknowledged.  Both countries have refused to call the Russian invasion “war”, instead calling on NATO to “respect the sovereignty” of other states.

The leaders also referenced the controversial 12-point peace proposal presented by the PRC last month that was supposed to deal with the ongoing war in Ukraine. The Chinese attempt to become the main negotiator in the conflict was criticized by the West, as it did not suggest Russia withdraw its forces. However, during the meeting, Putin stated that “he viewed China’s proposals for a resolution of the Ukraine conflict with respect.” On the other hand, Xi Jinping once again pointed out Beijing’s “neutral position” on the war in Ukraine and called for dialogue.

Economic and Energy Cooperation

Besides the clear political support, the visit also served as a clear reaffirmation of close economic ties between China and Russia. Both leaders mentioned that they “will build a closer energy partnership, supporting companies from both countries in advancing cooperation projects in oil, gas, coal, electricity and nuclear energy.” According to Putin, Russia welcomes Chinese businesses to replace the western companies that have left the country since the start of the war in Ukraine.

In the media statement, Putin mentioned that the possibility of expanding Russian gas exports to China was discussed, along with the potential development of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline through Mongolia. While Putin highlighted the pipeline as a replacement for the defunct Nord Stream 2 line delivering gas to Europe, Xi did not explicitly mention it during the briefing.

– The Power of Siberia, a cross-border pipeline carrying natural gas from Russia, was officially launched on December 2, 2019. It runs for 3,000 km through Siberia and extends through China’s eastern side, including the capital, to Shanghai. The final section is scheduled to commence delivering gas in 2025. Despite Russia’s $55 billion investment in the pipeline, only $3.81 billion worth of natural gas imports have been made through the pipeline since December 2019. Gas supply from the Power of Siberia 1 pipeline reached 10.4 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2021 and 15 bcm in 2022. For 2023, volumes are expected to reach 22 bcm. The second pipeline – The Power of Siberia 2 – could double gas exports from Russia to China, crossing through Mongolia and into the industrial regions near Beijing. Russia will deliver at least 98 bcm of gas to the PRC by 2030. The importance of the pipeline is growing as Moscow is looking for a way to replace European countries as its major gas importer – Moscow wants Power of Siberia 2 to replace the Nord Stream 2 pipeline (For comparison, the Nords Stream 2 pipeline was expected to deliver 5.6 bcm of Russian gas to Europe). However, according to experts, China will not need additional gas supply until 2030.

Cooperation in the energy sector has also been a crucial part of Sino-Russian relations after the war. As Europe has been taking steps to cut down its reliance on Moscow’s energy, China’s share of Russian energy exports has been growing astonishingly – Beijing’s spending on Russian crude oil, coal, and natural gas, shot up to $88 billion in the year through February, compared to $57 billion in the previous 12 months. However, Russia’s gas exports to the PRC are still a tiny fraction of the record 177 bcm it delivered to Europe in 2018-19.

It is worth mentioning that after the Western economic sanctions on Russia, it has been becoming increasingly dependent on growing economic relations with Beijing – trade between the countries has grown by nearly 20 percent this year, up from $190 billion in 2022.

Military

During the meeting, Moscow and Beijing committed to strengthening their military exchanges and cooperation while also conducting joint maritime and aerial patrols. Additionally, they expressed concerns about NATO’s growing military-security ties with Asia-Pacific countries and opposed external military forces undermining regional peace and stability. Ever since the start of the war in Ukraine, both nations have been actively participating in joint drills around the world. According to the joint statement, the partnership between the two countries had reached its highest level ever. However, the statement clarified that this partnership was not a military-political alliance and was not directed against any other country. It emphasized that the relationship between Russia and the PRC was not confrontational and not aimed at any third country, and it did not constitute a bloc.

“New Era of Cooperation”

During their talks at the Kremlin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a series of documents regarding “strategic cooperation” between their countries. Putin termed the talks as “successful and constructive.” According to Xi, one of the agreements he signed with Putin has ushered the relationship between the two countries into a “new era” of cooperation.

At the end of the state dinner on Tuesday evening, the Russian leader walked Xi Jinping out – there, in front of the cameras, Xi reiterated his belief that global power dynamics are changing. “Together, we should push forward these changes that have not happened for 100 years. Take care” – were the farewell words of the Chinese leader.

International Response

According to Washington, Xi’s visit suggested that Beijing was providing “diplomatic cover” to Moscow to commit more crimes, given the timing of the visit. The White House spokesperson John Kirby said that there are concerns that China might once again call for a ceasefire that permits Russian forces to remain in Ukrainian sovereign territory, allowing them to consolidate their positions and reignite the war when it is more advantageous for them. Although the PRC has attempted to remain neutral in the Ukraine conflict, the United States has suggested that China’s actions could be a “stalling tactic” to assist Moscow. Washington has accused Beijing of contemplating arms exports to Moscow, a claim that the PRC has vehemently refuted. China has strongly denied the US’s allegations that it is contemplating exporting weapons to Moscow.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia has clearly shown his support for Vladimir Putin and the strengthening partnership between the two countries. The meeting highlighted close economic ties and cooperation in the energy and military sectors, as well as shared concerns over NATO’s growing military-security relations with the Asia-Pacific region. The invitation extended by Xi to the Russian Prime Minister during the visit is also indicative of the deepening cooperation between the two nations.

The fact that the meeting took place against the backdrop of the ongoing Ukraine war further showcases that the PRC’s support towards Ukraine and its territorial integrity is a bluff. On the other hand, The Kremlin’s charm offensive with China is a testament to Russia’s growing isolation from the West and the need to bolster relations with its strategic partner. Finally, this meeting can also be perceived as a clear challenge to the West – China is “flexing its muscles” as it indicates that it can ignore the decisions of the international community and the only way of dealing with Russia actually goes through Beijing.

Nutsa Dzandzava – Author of the Blog, Intern, Civic IDEA

Establishing political background

In the 90s, since Central Asian nations declared their independence from the Soviet Union, China border negotiations were a priority and on the way. The China-Tajik agreement that was ratified in January 2011 and based on a prior accord between the two governments in 2002 that was reiterated in 2010—cedes about 1,000 square kilometers, or about one percent of Tajikistan, in the sparsely populated Pamir Mountains to China. Tajikistan is concerned that Chinese historians will raise ‘Chinese territories’ in Tajikistan Badakhshan Autonomous Region again as earlier. Tajikistan’s government defined this as a win-win because China previously claimed some 28,000 square kilometers and settled for only about three and a half percent of its claims. Then Presidential Center for Strategic Studies Director, late Suhrob Sharipov, said “if we hadn’t decided to transfer the land, we would not have been able to resist China’s pressure”. It is believed that this solves its border problems with China and ensures its political and economic stability “for decades to come”. Due to its considerable investment in the area, Tajikistan is becoming increasingly dependent on China economically. Tajikistan represents only the latest example of border rectifications in China’s relationships with Central Asia. Central Asian resentments about the border negotiations and uncertainty about Chinese intentions remain close to the surface. Meanwhile, its policy of non-support for Uyghur activities in China continued.

Warm Welcome of China ‘help’ in Central Asia

Central Asian states were initially excited about expanding relations with China. Central Asia welcomed China’s tech-driven approach to security by, for example, adopting Safe City’ development models and projects with hundreds of cameras in their large cities. They deployed facial and numberplate recognition technology, relying on Chinese software and hardware. Some projects, such as Dushanbe’s safe city traffic system, are implemented using official Chinese loans disbursed through the SCO mechanism to purchase Chinese products. While tools such as these are increasingly significant in major cities worldwide, the key question is where the collected data is stored and how it may be used for China’s national security.

Uzbekistan is no more in isolation

During the Karimov era, Uzbekistan stood directly against China’s regional economic initiatives and created direct blocks on some of the projects. Uzbekistan’s perspective was gradually changing. It sought to take advantage of the Chinese economic boom while retaining tight reins of control. This resulted in some illicit or grey trade, while the government slowly allowed China into some market sectors. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have always maintained a certain level of ambivalence, although they have tended more towards seeking to attract Chinese money. As poorer countries, they were grateful for any investment and economic attention, while on the other, they were wary of the unfettered flow of Chinese products.

Digitalization

All member states of the SCO recognize digitalization as an essential step to development. SCO member states have thus welcomed China’s eagerness to share and sell its tech-driven practices and insights. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has made digitalization one of his most urgent tasks and focused on emulating the Chinese model. Kazakhstan praised China’s success. Pointing to a specific Chinese company, Hikvision, he said the company’s techniques “have gone far ahead, they deeply digitalized all major cities. You click on the screen, the data on the person comes out, including literally everything. When he graduated from university, where he goes in his free time, and so on … We need to go in this direction. This is a global trend. I set this task just before our capital’s leadership”. Countries are set on a long-term path of reliance on Chinese technologies, with limited development of local capacity. In a worst-case scenario, this reliance – combined with a lack of local capacity – exposes Central Asian countries to deep potential national security problems, with the little domestic capability to manage these things themselves.

Green Finances

It is trendy in the age of digitization to move the economy to green color, investing more in green and self-sustaining development projects. For example, European countries are interested in investing in green energy, and Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic are rich in water resources and could self-sustain in the coming decades if investing in their development now. Overburdening developing countries with large loans as the Sri Lanka experiment showed, does not bring any good.

Umedjon Majidi – Author of the blog series, Expert/Research Consultant, Civic IDEA

The increased role of China and Xi Jinping

China’s impact and influence in the countries of Central Asia increased tremendously in recent years. “Its influence in Central Asia may now be reaching levels not seen since the period of Silk Road during the Tang dynasty, which ruled China from 618 to 907,” says William C. Kirby, a Harvard professor of Chinese history. A key role in Chinese impact and influence plays the secretary general of the China Communist Party, the President of China – Mr. Xi Jingping. He has many opponents as well, among them activists on the run.

Xi Jinping’s increased power—something reinforced by the rest of the Party Congress, which just solidified Xi as the “core” of the party in the (often modified and mostly symbolic) Chinese Constitution and where he has been front and center as he takes an unprecedented third term. Xi Jinping used harsh language in his opening work report to describe the situation within the party when he took over, speaking of a “slide toward weak, hollow, and watered-down party leadership in practice,” though without mentioning Hu or others by name.

20th National Congress of the China Communist Party held on 16-20 October 2022 in Beijing. The congress concluded by approving the members of the standing committee and politburo (2296 members-delegate) and, for the third term, approved the selection of the Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping, for the next five years.

Xi Jinping, in his long 104 minutes speech denouncing corruption (corruption on a scale unprecedented in our history) (referencing the chaotic situation in Taiwan and the peaceful reunification into mainland China will bring order and governance), showed a fighting spirit and advocated for common prosperity in mainland China, Hongkong and Taiwan. Xi Jinping Thoughts (Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era) incorporated as a special amendment to the CCP Constitution; even though it was mentioned in the previous 19^th CPC Congress, the focus on Jinping Thoughts moves into Chinese ideology derived from a speech titled “Some Questions on Maintaining and Developing Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”

Humiliation of predecessors

With reference to Belt and Road initiative, the increased role of China in global politics increased – the presence of China in infrastructure, loans to developing projects, extractive industries, etc. in addition, the role of Xi Jinping as a core and guiding role in the communist party and opposing narrative to Taiwanese independence leads to the more authoritarian system and humiliating removal of the previous secretary general Xu Jintao. Foreign Policy magazine commented on this incident as “deliberately and publicly humiliate his predecessor”.

It is a possibility that Hu Jintao’s public removal from the hall was planned that Xi Jinping deliberately and publicly humiliated his predecessor—a way of wielding the tools of party discipline, followed by judicial punishment, against him. It was suggested that during Hu’s Jintao rule, corruption rose, and public coverage of corruption also rose, as free speech online and, to some extent, civil society groups and NGOs. Most party members were more occupied with making money than with enforcing the party line of authoritarianism and power. Humiliating Hu in this fashion would also send a clear signal to the “retired elders,” the former high-level leaders who long remained a force within the party, that Xi’s power was unbound.

Western frontier – Central Asian countries

In Xi’s meetings with several Central Asian leaders, they were quoted as using phrases and political slogans coined by the Chinese Communist Party, praising him for “building a moderately prosperous society” and advancing toward China’s “great rejuvenation.” His counterparts described Xi as “the core” of his country, for instance, and the single person responsible for China’s successes — a narrative Beijing has intensified in recent months. “The words from the president of Uzbekistan are exactly like the local governors in China use when they have the chance to praise the current leader; they use that script,” said Peidong Sun, a Cornell University, Associate professor of contemporary Chinese social and cultural history.

Uzbekistan’s leader, in presenting Xi with an award, had expressed respect for him “as a statesman,” according to the president’s website, and not “the greatest statesman.” Many Central Asian nations welcome Chinese investment but are wary of becoming dependent on Beijing. In addition, in the region, the countries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, people share linguistic, cultural, and in some cases, family ties (especially in Kazakhstan) with groups in Xinjiang, a region in China’s far west. Many have been concerned about the vast crackdown there that has ensnared Central Asian people. Putin’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine, followed by a series of humiliating defeats of the Russian army, may give Beijing room to gain an edge.

Starting in 2013, the so-called Belt and Road Initiative, a program of railways, port, and highways along the land and maritime Silk Roads that linked China to Europe and the Middle East for centuries. China’s “March West” strategy (coined in 2013 by political scientist Wang Jisi, paving the way for Beijing’s roll-out of the Belt and Road Initiative in the subsequent years), and, indeed, a crux of contestation between the two ends of the Sino-Russian dynamic. But more than that, the region has also become a powerful embodiment of the agency of medium states concerning great power politics – and the limits of that agency. As Iskandar Akylbayev and Brian Wong have argued , the medium-state diplomacy exhibited by Kazakhstan should not be underestimated. Thus, China’s ability to prosecute deepened and more dynamic penetration of Central Asian markets and natural resources constitutes a vital pillar of its geo-economic strategy in 2022.

Kazakhstan serves as a critical bridge between China and Europe and the Caspian Sea, as well as a growing prime supplier of natural gas to China, alongside Turkmenistan (though the latter has struggled with meeting its pledged volumes). Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are engaged in an ongoing railway project with China – a prime corridor of infrastructural mega-projects that could, in fact, yield significant returns. Tajikistan remains the least heavily involved partner to China in the region, but with Wang’s recent visit in August, this may well be changing. The protests in Kazakhstan in Shymkent are based on the environmental impacts of Chinese investors/companies. Kazakh president Mr. Tokayev is an essential ally of Xi Jinping, being formerly the Kazakh Ambassador to China. He wrote a thesis on Kazakh-China relations and speaks fluent Chinese language; There are speculations on his Chinese connections and links. When he greeted Xi Jinping at the airport, he easily held a conversation in Chinese with China president.

The importance of this engagement is the broadening of China’s historically economy-led (Chinese public and private investment and commerce) presence in the region to include hard power – strategy-security-military dimensions too. Friendly and neighboring states that are more aligned with their foreign policy prerogatives and long-term economic calculus. Underestimates the extent to which China is prepared to recouple and deepen trade ties – selectively – in the aftermath of the pandemic.

The actual phenomenon that could be observed is a selective decoupling-recoupling strategy. While there is indeed evidence that China is seeking self-sufficiency across areas ranging from semiconductors and chips to energy, this must be viewed in conjunction with the evidence that it is engaging in wider and quasi-asymmetrical relation-deepening about “friendlier” states.

Umedjon Majidi – Author of the blog series, Expert/Research Consultant, Civic IDEA

Central Asian countries, specifically Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan bordering with China share 2050-mile border with Xinjiang. There is a mixed feelings about China among Central Asian countries – China is seen as a great investor for the future of the countries and many young students in Central Asia are starting to learn Chinese language. Chinese companies and projects are often seen as more credible than locals. Confucius Institutes are full of talented young students chasing the opportunities that China offers. Locals at an individual level do not care about these broader issues and are instead trying to navigate their way to prosperity among the economic boom they see in China.

Rune Steenberg believes that Many Central Asians’ strong distrust of foreign, and particularly Chinese, firms and their misgivings about their own governments have made this task more difficult. The more that Chinese companies involve themselves in Central Asian communities, the more enmeshed they have become to local problems like corruption or local political fights.

Central Asia Barometer is a Bishkek-based nonprofit that engages in applied social science research. It conducts large-scale public opinions surveys in the Central Asia twice annually. One key question is how respondents perceive about China.

In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan the most common response to this question is “somewhat favorable.” Yet in all three countries, when asked about China, the share of people giving a favorable answer has dropped noticeably in recent years.

Kazakhstan has faced more pressure in the last five years from China as Kazakh authorities deal with local anger at the Chinese government’s forced detentions of ethnic minorities (especially Uyghurs) in the Xinjiang region.

In 2011, fighting broke out between oil workers and the Kazakh state in Zhanaozen leading to several deaths—Chinese company CITIC was among the investors and received some blame for the bad pay which appeared to underpin the protests. Smaller scale brawls between Kazakh and Chinese workers are frequent. As seen currently in Kazakhstan, protests are usually linked to bad working conditions, clashes between workers, or environmental damage. There is also usually a strong undertone of local politics. However, in the communication between Chinese and Central Asian people there are still an immense problem around cultural understanding and language issues.

The “great wall of iron”, Beijing’s clampdown on ethnic Muslims of the Xinjiang including ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz has spiraled into religious repression and internment camps detaining up to 2 million Muslims in Xinjiang;

A pressure on Central Asian governments to clamp down upon any type of Uyghur exile political expressions; As an effect hereof and the involvement of high government officials in such deals  can be seen an influence on how the Uyghur case is covered in the media and public discourse where it is avoided or connected to the fight against Islamic fundamentalism.

Bradley Jardin: Kyrgyzstan’s leaders awarded a $386 million contract to a Chinese company in 2013, prompting a corruption scandal that led to the arrest of two former prime ministers. Protesters in Kyrgyzstan have demanded more scrutiny over Chinese-funded enterprises and the appropriateness of loans. However, it remains to be seen whether local authorities will suppress these protests or seek new ways to reduce the dependence on China. There are questions surrounding corrupt and pollutive practices of Chinese companies working in the region. Chinese firms tend to lower their standards in the region, ignoring requirements they usually adhere to back home.

Combined Heat and Power plant (CHP) in August 2017.

The 4-year modernization of the city’s only source of heat for over half a century was initiated by the ex-president, and cost $386 million, which was borrowed from China on credit. The contractor chosen for the project, Tebian Electric Apparatus Stock Co LTD (ТBЕА), which built two new boiler units, each with an emission capacity of 150 megawatts (MW) of power and 150 gigacalories of heat.

On 26 January 2018, during a period of unusually hard frosts, an accident at the CHP plant led to a four-day breakdown of its heating system.

Kyrgyzstan’s member of parliament demanded that the culprits be put behind bars and took themselves en masse to the CHP plant to discover why the boilers had packed up.

After the power plant’s director Nurlan Omurkul uulu was fired from his job, he made it public that the cause of the accident wasn’t incompetency of the specialists, but the money laundering and fraud of the money allocated to the rebuilding project. And the real cost of the modernization wasn’t $386 million, but $100 million less. “About 90% of the necessary materials and equipment were bought at an elevated price,”

In Kyrgyzstan, conflict between Kyrgyz and Chinese workers is frequent.

In August, 500 Kyrgyz villagers entered the site of a mine operated by a Chinese company and fought with its Han workers — hospitalizing 20 of them. Chinese companies are now working to counter negative perceptions. claims that Chinese workers are marrying Kyrgyz women in large numbers, even though only 60 such marriages were recorded from 2010 to 2018. Many critics of China in the region also fear an influx of Chinese immigrants, although the actual numbers seem low. From 1995 to 2014, around 93,000 people emigrated from China as part of an official Kazakhstan repatriation program. Only 80 of them were Han Chinese, China’s majority ethnic group, representing 92 percent of the overall population in China.

Umedjon Majidi – Author of the blog series, Expert/Research Consultant, Civic IDEA

Turkish-speaking minorities under oppression

The oppression of Turkic-speaking indigenous peoples professing mainly Islam, forced sending of Uyghur, Kazakhs and others to “political re-education camps”, seizure of their passports, placement under so-called house arrests. Many minorities of Xinjiang have fled China for fear of detention. The Kazakhs are the second largest Turkic-speaking ethnic group in Xinjiang after the Uyghurs and estimated around 1.2 million people.

Kazakh Oralmen and kandas

In 2017-2018 Uyghur Association in Kazakhstan Otandas El sent invitation 100 ethnic Kazakh families in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to move and settle in Kazakhstan. Chinese Government allows to emigrate ethnic minorities to their historical lands if they emigrate as a family. Mukan Mamytkhan, the Head of Uyghur Association believes that by the end of 2022 all 100 families will be relocated in Kazakhstan. Kazakh ethnic minorities are the second biggest minorities after Uyghurs living in the western China, in Xinjiang. Ethic Kazakh from abroad in case of migrating to the historical land, Kazakhstan, called ‘kandas’. In 2020 Kazakh government adopted a Law on kandas – ethnic Kazakhs living outside of Kazakhstan and making them eligible for fast-tracking them for citizenship once they enter Kazakhstan.

The protests

A group of Kazakhs whose relatives are detained in China or unable to leave China has been holding an indefinite protest in front of the Chinese consulate in Almaty  and Nursultan since February 2021, demanding the release of their loved ones from custody in Xinjiang and family reunification. The Chinese ambassador to Kazakhstan says that the detainees in Xinjiang are “citizens of China” and “they violated the Chinese laws”. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan called the situation in Xinjiang “China’s internal affair.” Beijing is one of the major investors and creditors of Kazakhstan.
The agreement called “Shanghai Five” signed in April 1996 in Shanghai between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and China, countries bordering with China, the sides promised not to help the separatist movements in another country and therefore the Kazakhstan government hands are tied. The authorities of were bound by the provisions of the border treaties on non-assistance to Uighur separatists in Xinjiang.
On May 12, 2022, the representatives of the organization “Nagyz Atajurt” (also called “Nagyz Atajurt Erktileri“), which defends the rights of ethnic Kazakhs who were persecuted in China, announced their intention to create a political party at a press conference in Almaty: “Our goal is to actively participate in the creation of a new, democratic political system based on the traditions of our people, the history of the past and present, language identity, national identity,” said the head of Nagyz Atazhurt Bekzat Maksutkhanuly. He also notes that the issues of citizens who demand reunification with their relatives in Xinjiang still remain unresolved.

Kazakhs in Uyghur Tribunal

In London, “Uyghur Tribunal“, studies evidence of persecution of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and other minority Turkic-speaking peoples of Xinjiang, who profess mainly Islam and assesses Beijing’s actions under the Genocide Convention. The commission, chaired by British lawyer Geoffrey Nice, is hearing the testimony of witnesses, scientists and experts these days.Several ethnic Kazakhs testified at the hearings of Uyghur Tribunal on September 12 2021 in London. These are natives of China, who after leaving the “camps” managed to move to Kazakhstan and soon disclosed information about staying within the walls of closed institutions and the use of torture there.

New York Times reports about about 21 minutes Virtual Reality documentary cartoon movie “Retrained: secret camps in Xingxiang directed by Ben Monk based on the stories told approach; The stars of the documentary – Amanzhan Seituly, Orynbek Koksebekuly, and Yerbakyt Otarbayare prisoners of the Xinjiang retraining camp (prison) who managed to get out. Now they live in Kazakhstan – the documentary shows how it looks like to be inside of the camp-prison. In other coverage by Ben Mauk is about a couple who were in the camp after traveling from Kazakhstan – three men – Argali Ermek, Orynbek Koksybek, Erbakyt Otarbay – imprisoned, later camp of political re-education and then home-arrest – were medicated (without packages) and injected – now they are infertile – before imprisonment they could conceive but now, they are not able to conceive (sterilization).

Sterilization + Birth Control = Genocide

Head of Organization Naghyz Atajurt confirms that the men under their care are diagnosed with infertility; CNN also confirms that Xinjiang region population rate was decreased to 30% – birth rate dropped in 2018 by 30% as Chinese government officials of Xinjiang officially confirmed. Adrian Zens, a Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, Washington, D.C. (non-resident), one of the Uyghur advocate based in Berlin, Germany also confirms that sterilization and birth control in the region underwent in massive scale – Suppression of birth (Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;) is one of the 5 criteria by United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide – Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: Killing members of the group; Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Xinjiang Region creates concerns UN High Commission on Human Rights due to the violation of human rights Muslim minorities in the SUAR region, the minorities include ethnic Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajiks. Document leaks states about the inhuman treatment of the Xinjiang residents targeted at Uygurs and ethnic minorities – Adrian Zens on Xinjiang Police Files The “Xinjiang Police Files” consists of tens of thousands of files containing extensive incriminating details from inside China’s internment camp system. The files were obtained by a third party from directly inside confidential internal Xinjiang police computer networks, and have been authenticated and analyzed by Dr. Adrian Zenz, a foremost scholar on the Xinjiang internment campaign, in a peer-reviewed academic paper published in the respected Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies and a second paper published in the online magazine ChinaFile.

According to Nina Yau, senior researcher at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, the key point is the problem of Xinjiang: “The attention of the international community is focused on the Uyghur problem, so support from Central Asia is extremely important for Beijing.” The presence of the leaders of the Central Asian countries in Beijing indicates a willingness to participate in the prestigious program of Beijing. The current Olympics are the most politicized since the Cold War, so we need to consider the visit of the presidents of Central Asia from the point of view of the global consequences of the sporting event.”

“The presence of Central Asian leaders at the opening of the Olympics means that China has regional support for its policies in Xinjiang. Solving the Uyghur problem within the region is the best way to avoid outside interference, Nina Yau is sure. – It makes no sense for Central Asia to protest the policy towards the Uighurs, especially given that China’s support is beneficial from an economic point of view: the sale of oil and gas, industrialization and the like. This, in turn, gives regional countries the opportunity and resources to stay the course. The situation is a win-win for all parties.”

Since 2017, there have been reports from China of harassment of Turkic-speaking indigenous peoples, who profess mainly Islam, the forced sending of Uighurs, Kazakhs and others to “political re-education camps”, the confiscation of their passports, and the placement under so-called house arrests. In recent years, many members of Xinjiang’s indigenous ethnic groups have fled China for fear of detention. China’s policies are sharply criticized by Western countries, including the United States, which call what is happening in Xinjiang genocide. Beijing rejects the accusations, calling the camps “vocational training centers” set up to fight extremism and terrorism.

Central Asia support in solving the problem of Xinjiang. This means deporting any requested Chinese citizens of several ethnic groups– Uighurs, Kazakhs or Kyrgyz – back to China. Illegal border defectors are in most cases immediately sent back without ascertaining whether the person is seeking refugee status. This worked quite successfully for a while, but internal pressure from the Kazakh population on their government also led to the authorities slightly softening their position for ethnic Kazakhs. Kazakhstan’s political elites are now in a very difficult situation.

China also appreciates regional support for the Xinjiang issue in the international arena. Central Asian countries, which have consistently voiced their support for Beijing, have proven to be an important counterweight to Western voices, and it has become clear that Central Asian countries are more likely to side with China than the West. In addition, from time to time we see politicians from Central Asia talking in Chinese newspapers about supporting China’s policy towards Taiwan or supporting China’s national security law in Hong Kong. This is purely political influence of Beijing in order to form its own support group, although the region may not know or be interested in the situation in Taiwan or Hong Kong, but Central Asian leaders simply agree with Beijing’s position.

Beijing’s political influence is that Beijing should get what it wants. For a long time, China only wanted support on its domestic issues, but that is changing. Now China is dissatisfied with anti-Chinese sentiment among the local population in Central Asia and is asking political leaders to solve this in some way. This is a more direct intervention that can polarize the relationship between the political class of Central Asia and the local population. Repeatedly, representatives of the Chinese embassy came to complain about how poorly China is portrayed in the Kyrgyz media, they told Kyrgyz politicians that this is a bad practice of good neighborliness. The situation is similar in Tajikistan, there is a hidden message that the anti-Chinese position is a crime, so there are no protests there, citizens can be arrested for this. In Kyrgyzstan, police are also arresting and threatening leaders of anti-China protests, and at the moment, people can still complain about China, but China is already demanding that Central Asian governments prevent this.

China pressured Kazakhstan not to accept them as refugees because that would confirm suspicions about what was happening in Xinjiang. This began in the mid-2010s, ethnic minorities were already leaving Xinjiang illegally because their passports were being confiscated, and repressive policies began to spread. In Kyrgyzstan, there have been several cases in which Kyrgyz border guards who caught these “fugitives” were immediately brought back to China’s side, without going through the migration ministry’s legal procedure, as required in such situations. I am sure that there were similar cases in Kazakhstan.

Umedjon Majidi – Author of the blog series, Expert/Research Consultant, Civic IDEA

The complicated geopolitical situation that has arisen as a result of the war in Ukraine, as well as large-scale Western sanctions imposed on Russia and Belarus has raised a new question about how the Belt & Road Initiative will develop in the future. This is especially of concern to Kazakhstan, which has managed to take an important role in transcontinental routes. The blocking of the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian directions puts an end to the most important routes going to Europe. Bypass routes through the Caspian or the Middle East are working, but the cost of transportation and the labor costs of the trans-Caspian route are significantly inferior to the sea routes.

Under these conditions, BRI partners, including Kazakhstan, are setting the task of cultivating new points of growth in such areas as artificial intellect, big data, digital finance, e-commerce, and green energy. The implementation of this approach largely explains the sharp increase in trade turnover between Kazakhstan and China in 2022. The trade turnover between Kazakhstan and China in January-July 2022 reached $13.5 billion, which is 38.3% more than in the same period in 2021, which was then $9.7 billion. Moreover, the volume of Kazakhstani imports for seven months of 2022 from China is a record result for such a period: in 2022 Kazakhstani imports from China amounted to $5.5 billion, with an increase of 22.6% compared to the same period in 2021. Over the seven months of last year, imports amounted to $4.5 billion. The main growth in imports is observed in the commodity group “machinery, equipment, vehicles, devices and apparatuses” – by 19.4% (for the seven months of 2022 – $3.1 billion, for the seven months of 2021 – $2.6 billion).

In general, the program for development of IT industry within the framework of BRI has been called the Digital Silk Road (DSR). The DSR is a government initiative where Chinese companies are key players. Chinese telecommunications giants such as Huawei and ZTE, as the largest telecommunications service providers and major 5G technology providers, are successfully achieving their goal of dominating the 5G market worldwide. Leading Chinese video surveillance companies such as Hikvision, Dahua and Huawei are among the main providers of surveillance services and technologies in developing countries, including Kazakhstan. According to a Fudan University report, it is noted that over the past two years, 201 Chinese companies in the digital field have completed 1,334 overseas investment and cooperation projects, 57% of which are related to DSR. In general, by developing next-generation telecommunications infrastructure, smart city technology and surveillance systems, data centers and storage infrastructure, and other high-tech tools, Beijing is seeking to increase its role in Internet telecommunications governance and cyberspace regulation.

The rapid development of the IT sector in Kazakhstan, on the one hand, has a positive impact on the economy and makes the country more attractive for investment. On the other hand, the transfer of Chinese surveillance and censorship technologies is worrisome, and could further shrink civic space in Kazakhstan. The greatest concern is not only the import of Chinese technologies, but also the possible import of Chinese approaches to organizing the work of smart cities, which can now be called cities of surveillance and censorship. Smart cities built on Chinese surveillance technology promise increased security and convenience for residents, but at what cost?

The examples of China itself are widely known. The most well-known measure of the Chinese government “to combat cybercrime” (in fact, for content restriction and total surveillance) is the so-called Golden Shield, or Dragon Firewall. It is a nationwide electronic barrier that filters and controls information flows in such a way that all Internet user data in China passes through a limited number of checkpoints (gateways), operated by a limited number of Internet providers. Since 2006, the entire Chinese segment of the Internet has come under the control of this state system.

In Kazakhstan in the past few years, has been actively implemented the Smart City projects, within the framework of which CCTV cameras are installed on the streets of cities to ensure law and order and comply with traffic rules. For video surveillance systems implemented in Kazakhstan, Chinese products are mainly used.

Since 2017, Sergek hardware-software complexes (which means “vigilant” in Kazakh) have been operating in the biggest cities of Kazakhstan, which are supplied by Korkem Telecom (a subsidiary of Open Technologies Group). These companies are Kazakh, but Korkem Telecom’s technical partner is Chinese Dahua Technology.

Sergek is an intelligent video monitoring, analysis and forecasting system that includes:

– A network of video recording modules that control key areas of the urban space – highways, squares, road junctions, house adjoining areas;

– Image recording and recognition system;

– Intellectual system of information processing and analysis.

Sergek has computing power and special software that allows real-time processing of significant amounts of information. Hikvision, another Chinese manufacturer of CCTV cameras and security equipment, has been operating in Kazakhstan since 2015. Hikvision cameras in Kazakhstan monitor road safety as part of the Smart City projects, and are also used in the Unified Video Monitoring System of Almaty. This system should implement situational video analytics: recognize faces and license plates on cars.

In September 2019, Reuters, citing unnamed intelligence sources and security experts, reported that hackers working for the Chinese government had hacked telecommunications networks in several countries, including Kazakhstan, to track down Uyghur tourists in Central and Southeast Asia. China seeks to monitor Kazakhstan because it is the historical homeland of many residents of China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region; over the past few years, Chinese authorities have arrested more than one million people in Xinjiang.

China has a lot more technical capabilities than it seems at first glance, and it’s not just about cameras, but also about Chinese-made mobile devices that are in high demand in Kazakhstan due to their low price, Kazakh cybersecurity experts say. Kazakhstani researchers consider the risks from the penetration of Chinese surveillance and censorship technologies to be very high, and point out that this aspect of the implementation of DSR initiatives occupies an undeservedly small place in public discussions on the topic of BRI in Kazakhstan.

NB

In January 2022, in Kazakhstan broke out protests, related to rising gas prices, which very quickly turned into political protests. A large number of citizens were detained – about 7,000 people, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs – who were detained based on data from street surveillance cameras. In response to an official request to the Ministry of Internal Affairs whether Face ID cameras and artificial intellect systems were used during the detention of protesters, the Ministry of Internal Affairs replied that such systems were not used. However, given the scale of the protests, and the large number of detained participants, this is hard to believe.

Danil Bekturganov – Director, NGO “Civil Expertise”

China’s acceptability in Tajikistan comes after Russia – the Tajik people and the Tajik government; why Russia is popularly accepted as a significant or dominant power – is clear; China comes after Russia. According to the Kenan Institute (based on a Central Asian Barometer survey), 54% of people strongly favor/support (in contrast, 73% strongly favor Russia and 40% strongly prefer the United States); 30% are somewhat favorable, and only 13% don’t know or refused to answer; 20% of people think that China is a reliable and friendly great power – it’s significant considering the number of percentages for Russia is 78% and for the US is 2%. Elizabeth Wood and Thomas Baker summarized the Central Asian Barometer Survey on Public Perception of China in Central Asia conducted from 2017-to 2021:  China’s public diplomacy wins the Tajiks’ admiration through culture, language, and civilization; the degree to which citizens and leaders view the PRC favorably could also be instrumental in advancing other economic, geopolitical, and security interests.

Tajikistan presents high approval rates for the leadership of the PRC (63 percent on average). In contrast with the USA, it is less favorable (35 percent on average). Tajikistan is the case of China’s “extract” strategy, in which there are significant economic interests for the PRC, and the PRC has maintained high approval rates there.

Favorability ratings may indicate appreciation for a foreign power’s norms, rules, and values and China’s engagement to contest the US hegemony in the region. According to the Gallup World Poll, 2006-2020, based on AidData Analysis: How do citizens and leaders in SCA countries view the PRC versus other great powers? Consistently favorable (Pakistan and Tajikistan), China is perceived in Tajikistan as a great friend as it offers help without strings attached (this narrative was established by president and elite circles). The State imposed this narrative which welcomes blind emerging dependency on Chinese investment. Tajikistan. This will see Chinese investment in all spheres of economy. The leading government parliament-based newspaper Narodnaya gazeta described China in 2014 as “Good neighbor, true friend and reliable partner”. The leading scholars, experts on China in Tajikistan, Abdugani Mamadazimov and Rashid Gani Abdullo express their optimism that the Chinese vector of Tajik foreign policy as the “path toward future well-being of independent of Tajikistan”.

“China Threat theory” is non-existent in public spheres in Tajikistan. Some negative publications usually go around environment problems of renovation and construction of heating plants in Dushanbe, and about invasion of Chinese workers, leasing of agricultural land to Chinese farmers. Rustam Haidarov warns that the entry of Chinese farmers is only the first step towards something bigger: “It is China’s strategy to resettle its people in different countries. It’s China’s policy,” he said. “They occupy slowly, cautiously. They realize their own goals in Tajikistan and affect our economic policy. In time this will lead to an influence in politics”. Asia Plus, and Ozodi, covered the issue of disappearance of flora and fauna – snakes, turtles etc.

In Tajikistan construction sites, where Chinese labor are present. Unfortunately, with the lack of reporting about BRI, or even the lack of any systematic discussion of challenges and risks characterize Tajikistan in BRI, there is no public discussion and awareness about China’s BRI rapidly increasing control of resource extraction in Tajikistan. The general public has limited access to information related to Chinese involvement.

Umedjon Majidi – Author of the blog series, Expert/Research Consultant, Civic IDEA