Already in the updated version of the list, which dates back to December 2021, we see that Georgia’s leading strategic partner, the United States, has blacklisted not only the Huawei divisions in different cities in China but also its other branches abroad. More precisely, the US has barred exports, reexports, and transfers coming from the Huawei subdivisions in Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, UK, Vietnam. According to the document, the main reason for their debar-ment is linked to the security vulnerabilities that Huawei items convey.
In our 2020 report “Who is in charge of the post-cold war world? Chinese influence operations in Academia, Media & CSOs,” we have thoroughly covered the controversies related to Huawei and its activities in the US, the UK, and different EU member states. We also reviewed the resilience strategies used by multiple countries, such as Japan, the US, or the UK, that effectively impose restrictions and sanctions against the Chinese tech giant to ensure their national security.
A Smart City is a city built on the combination of endowments and activities of self-decisive, independent, and aware citizens. It follows strategies through the innovation and use of its natural resources, the city areas that collect large amounts of data and use it to improve city operations. Developers can produce applications based upon managed data to be converted into insights and insights into tools. These applications can serve as a form of public-private partnerships and create opportunities for the public sector, private sector, and the citizens. Privacy International brings some clearance to the definition of “Smart Cities” based on global multinationals – For IBM – it is about finding “new ways for the city to work”; For Google’s Alphabet, “building innovation to help cities meet their biggest challenges.”; For Siemens, “open-air computers” make them “healthier, more comfortable, and more relaxed.”
The development of “digital cities” or “smart cities” in China started in 2011 with the adoption of the 12th Five-Year Plan, when it was announced the intention “to accelerate the construction of new-generation IT infrastructure, mobile communication networks, internet infrastructures, digital and television broadcasting networks, satellite communication facilities, and an ultra-high-speed, large capacity, and brilliant national trunk transmission network, broadband connection throughout urban and rural areas to strengthen interconnectivity.”
This is the basis of modern China’s smart cities and citizens’ surveillance.49% of the smart cities are located in Asia. Smart Cities projects are expanding in Central Asia; the main countries and tech companies introducing them are tech companies from the People’s Republic of China.
In Central Asia, the countries are accelerating the development of safe cities to focus on security and order with Chinese assistance in developing and financing them: Tajikistan in 2013, Kazakhstan in 2007, Kyrgyzstan in 2019; In China in the World index developed by Taiwan-based Doublethink Lab, Central Asian countries, at least Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan collaborated (such as data collection or exchange agreement, or adoption of related hardware) with the PRC government or PRC-connected entities on facial, voice recognition or other applications involving biometrics achieved by AI.
Xinxiang became a kind of frontline laboratory for “Smart City” and surveillance technology, where start-up and tech companies first test surveillance technologies. Xinjiang – a model of digital repression that China has developed first and foremost for security reasons and for enabling severe human rights violations and developed many novel forms of surveillance, making it a world leader in repressive uses of digital surveillance such as facial recognition and biometric data collection integrated widely in the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region in western China. In 2017, the government officials in Xinxiang started collecting Uighurs, 3D portraits, voiceprints, fingerprints” and iris scans from all residents of ages 12 and 65 in the framework of a free public-healthcare program called Physicals for All and collected.
The military personnel check the residents’ smartphones for banned mobile apps and require each vehicle to have a GPS tracking device. Smart cities in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) already form part of the state authorities’ systematic surveillance and repression of Muslim ethnic groups in the region. Facial and gait recognition, coupled with CCTV outside mosques, and powered by AI and analytics technology, enables authorities in Xinxiang to maintain a “digital police state.”
Famous tech company Huawei worked with facial recognition start-up Megvii in 2018 to test an AI camera system that could scan faces in a crowd and estimate each person’s age, sex, and ethnicity. The plan could trigger an ‘Uyghur alarm’ if it detected an Uyghur, flagging them to China police, where members of the group have been detained en-masse in the re-education camps. One of the authorities in Uighur studies, author of The Xinjiang Papers – Dr.Adrian Zens, an expert on Xinjiang, says that the companies like Huawei can develop such systems in regions like Xinjiang in tandem with the security services, which can enable intrusive surveillance – makes surveillance accessible and possibly palatable in other nations including Central Asia.
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), based on a database leak discovered by Victor Gevers in MongoDB from SenseTime, which provides video-based crowd analysis and facial recognition technology, reported about live-tracking the locations of about 2.6 million Uighur residents of Xinjiang: the records include individuals’ national ID number, ethnicity, nationality, phone number, date of birth, home address, employer, and photos. Within 24 hours, 6.7 million individual GPS coordinates were streamed to and collected by the database, linking individuals to various public camera streams and identification checkpoints associated with location tags such as “hotel,” “mosque,” and “police station.” Police in Xinxiang force the residents (targeting Uyghur Muslim population) to install the mobile app called JingWang (Citizen Safety) developed by police forces from Ürümqi, Xinjiang’s capital. Urumqi Municipal Public Security Bureau launched the “People’s Safety” app on April 25, 2017, as information reporting software used by the municipal public security bureau to take the initiative and technical attack and successfully develop the grass-roots and ordinary people. The app (spyware) sends the government a user’s WeChat and Weibo chat records and the device’s IMSI and IMEI and Wi-Fi login details. Adam Lynn from Open Technology Fund confirmed that the JingWang app significantly lacks the security to protect the private, personally identifying information of its users: The app extracts a phone’s IMEI, MAC Address, manufacturer, model, phone number, subscriber ID, and filenames with hashes for all files stored on the person’s device; Jing Wang scans for specific files stored on the device, including HTML, text, and images, by comparing the phone’s contents to a list of MD5 hashes. A hash is a digital fingerprint of a piece of data. Full Jing Wang Report of OTF is available here.
Umedjon Majidi – Author of the blog series, Expert/Research Consultant, Civic IDEA
On January 20, 2022, Associated Press News featured an article “Security scanners across Europe tied to China govt, military,” raising alarms about the notorious Chinese “Nuctech Company Limited” and its dispersal throughout the European states.
Last year, Civic IDEA published a report about Nuctech Company Limited reviewing:
its cooperation with the Georgian government,
fraudulent activities related to Georgian and foreign tender procedures,
malfunctions of its security equipment,
corruption scandals worldwide.
Back then, our team has already stressed out the high-security risks threatening the national security of those states, where Nuctech has operated.
The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) in partnership with the National Democratic Institute would like to invite you to a hybrid roundtable discussion on: Anti-Corruption in Practice: Exploring Symbiotic Dynamics Between the NACC, Civil Society and Investigative Journalists
Date: Friday, November 25, 2022 Where: Online, Zoom (Zoom link will be sent after the closing of registration) Time: 15:00 – 17:00 Language: English and Arabic with simultaneous interpretation Registration deadline: Thursday, November 24, 2022 at 23:59 Organized by: Lebanese Center for Policy Studies Moderated by: Ali Taha, Researcher at LCPS
In recent years, Lebanon has passed a number of anti-corruption laws such as on the right to access information, asset declaration and illicit enrichment. These reforms are nonetheless mere legal tools to achieve an arduous end that is accountability. Oversight bodies such as the newly appointed National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), can serve as an enabling channel for the utilization of such legal tools in combating corruption, and guaranteeing transparency. The commission however has a long journey ahead of it, one that is fraught with all sorts of political, financial, and administrative challenges.
The discrepancy between the spread of corruption in Lebanon’s public sector, and the institutional resources that could be made available to it in times of fiscal austerity, lower expectations as to its effectiveness. Political pressure and meddling which have in the past curbed and nullified attempts at promoting accountability in government, also elicit similar cynicism. Although very real, these challenges do not justify a premature surrender of anti-corruption ambitions. Instead, civil society, investigative journalists and the public at large should play a proactive role to mitigate such challenges, by supporting and overseeing the work of the NACC.
This roundtable comes as a kickstarter for an essentially technical discussion, on the ideal dynamics that should govern the relation of the NACC with civil society organizations and investigative journalists. Specifically, how can they both support and oversee the commission, and using what tools?
Georgia is often “accused” of being an American project in Russia’s “Near Abroad” neighborhood. Tbilisi’s relation to Washington has been shielded from geopolitical developments, becoming an independent variable, even as Baku, Yerevan, Kyiv, Tehran, and Ankara’s US relations have been tested. Georgia has developed a partnership with the United States that permeates the Georgian state and society. Georgian institutions, strategic infrastructure, military culture, elite education, political and economic aspirations owe much to this strategic partnership. The foundations of this partnership were cemented during the first days of Georgian independence, while the guns were still smoking in the streets of Tbilisi.
Unlike the Soviet imperial world, in which Georgians were “a minority,” the United States emerged as an ally that did not require us to limit our aspirations. It is said that the United States is the only nation in the world whose identity is founded on an idea rather than common ancestry and uniform culture. “We find these truths to be self-evident,” as President Biden likes to underscore. This idea of limitless aspiration and self-realization is inclusive. If you have to pursue a dream, however unrealistic, it might as well be American.
I recall that President Shevardnadze made clear in no uncertain terms that “if Georgia navigated relatively safely the collapse and chaos after the Soviet Union dissolved and preserved its independence and sovereignty, that is because of American assistance!” Indeed, little American assistance went a long way in a small country like Georgia. In the 1990s and early 2000s, as America was building new bonds with “post-Soviet Eurasia”, we often came together to celebrate the American appetite to engage with our part of the world. While assistance packages were timid by American standards, their cumulative value was significant. Each million spent in “our part of the world” was a geopolitical commitment to all of us. In effect, the United States was sponsoring our aspirations rather than buying out our destiny (as I learned from US Ambassador Degnan, the US has provided Georgia with almost over $6 billion in assistance, as well as other support).
In 1998 the State Department invited me to a ceremony celebrating the first US $31 million Government assistance package to Uzbekistan. The host was Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Assistance to the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. The guest of honor was Hilary Clinton, the First Lady at the time but much more than that. The ceremony was opened by short emotional remarks of Ambassador Morningstar, followed by the First Lady’s eloquent tribute to America’s immense power and utmost generosity. Naturally, the Uzbek Ambassador and good friend, Sodiq Safoev, was the keynote speaker. To my horror, I was asked by Ambassador Morningstar to close the event with an impromptu speech. No diplomat likes to “think on his feet,” but it would be undiplomatic and unfriendly to say “no.”
Following Sodiq’s lead, I opened by thanking the US Government for its immeasurable assistance, later straying towards a more personal tone. By the way, personal is political. I talked about my son, Nika, who since 1994 (when we arrived in the US) grew into a typical American suburban teenager and was about to sit his final exams at Bethesda High School (BCC) in Washington DC. So, I added his American experience to the multi-billion-dollar package of US assistance that literally laid the foundations of the newly founded Republic of Georgia. And then I wondered whether Nika’s generation – or any generation thereafter – would ever repay the loan people of Georgia got from Washington. I wished that our country would grow into a state with a rule of law, irreversibly democratic, affluent, on its feet, substantially sovereign, and capable of paying back its debts. I was never afraid that my son would be “Americanized”: I knew that his American experience would enrich him without threatening his Georgian identity.
The point I made in my closing remarks of that afternoon event was that Nika’s debt and our collective “loan” were not merely financial but also moral. The Greenback is an international currency, but the generosity of the American taxpayer is very much national and personal. Washington is the capital of a nation with a mission in which no one is really a foreigner. Framing the issue at hand in these terms was appreciated; the thank you note I received from Ambassador Morningstar reassured me that I could still think effectively on my feet. But more importantly, the point I made then had lasting value: Georgia’s commitment to the United States was not countable; Nika’s American experience is part of his Georgian heritage.
At the end of September, right after Xi Jinping visited Central Asia, false information about a coup against him in China was spread all over social media. The emergence of these rumors was caused by thousands of canceled flights in China, Xi not showing up in public (in reality going through a mandatory quarantine after his international trip), and footage of military equipment moving towards Beijing. In fact, such information was not confirmed but labeled “wishful thinking” coming from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and elsewhere. One could believe that it is plausible for Xi Jinping to encounter the coup one day due to the mounting discontent of the Chinese elite following the economic and policy breakdowns. In fact, the country’s ruler, Xi Jinping, was found to have completely different plans that are far from facing a military coup and include making himself a supreme force in the country and ensuring China’s return to the list of the leading global powers after economic and political stagnation.
On October 16, the Chinese Communist Party is expected to hold the 20th National Congress in Beijing, where they will elect new leadership for the next five years, most probably abandoning the “Seven up, eight down” policy tradition and consolidating Xi Jinping’s power. Party congress will also address the most critical issues in the PRC, such as the declining economy, worsening relations with the US, and restrictions related to the Covid-19 pandemic. The congress will be attended by 2296 delegates representing ethnic minorities, women, and all provinces and regions. According to the Eurasia Group, with Xi securing the third term, he is expected to enhance the share of his political associates both in the 25-person Politburo and its Standing Committee. Wang Yang will likely remain the Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, while Xi’s supporter members, Ding Xuexiang, Huang Kunming, Li Xi, Li Qiang, are expected to be promoted. Many people believe that congress has a symbolic weight, and the names of the leaders with their positions have already been agreed upon in advance. Besides those projected to be put forward, several political individuals keep close ties with Xi Jinping and will replace the retired ones. For instance, He Lifeng is anticipated to take the post of Vice Premier in charge of economic and financial affairs. The latter has worked with Xi in Fujian province and has accompanied him during almost all domestic or international trips. Miao Hua represents another example, becoming the Vice Chairman in charge of political affairs. Miao Hua, likewise He Lifeng, met Xi in Fujian and since then has served in PLA.
Accordingly, Xi Jinping has begun celebrating his stay in office. After completing the mandatory 10-day quarantine following his Central Asia tour, the Chinese leader took six colleagues and Politburo Standing Committee members to an exhibition dedicated to the achievements of his first two terms.
As stated by Financial Times, while two of Xi Jinping’s colleagues from the Politburo’s Standing Committee, Li Zhanshu and Han Zheng, are expected to step down due to their age, Xi may reduce the age limit even further, prompting the resignation of three other committee members. Premier Li Keqiang is among those three members. Li was considered Xi’s main rival before the latter was appointed a head of the party and the state and, accordingly, enjoyed great popularity among Xi’s critics. Nevertheless, Xi Jinping managed to sideline Li effectively due to the latter’s liberal attitude and loyalty to the CCP.
Xi Jinping will likely change the constitution during the party congress, fully adapting it to his political ideas and thoughts. The new amendment will ensure the “implementation of the eight-point decision on improving Party and government conduct by the Political Bureau of the 19th CCP Central Committee”, correcting the flaws related to the useless formal procedures and advancing the President’s power. The eight-point decision covers the following aspects:
• doing better research and analysis and truly understanding actual conditions when doing grassroots-level studies;
• streamlining meetings and improving the way meetings are conducted;
• making documents and briefing papers more concise and improving writing styles;
• standardizing procedures for working visits abroad;
• improving security guard work and continuing to observe the principle of doing what improves relations with the people;
• improving news report;
• having strict rules on the publication of articles; and
• promoting frugality and the strict observance of rules on incorruptibility in government.
This way, Xi Jinping is trying to resume the “Great Helmsman” status, most commonly referred to as Mao Zedong. One can assume that his ambitions go beyond those five years of his third term, as Xi has reverted to “Two Centenaries” goals, aiming to return the country among the leading global powers by 2049 when the PRC celebrates its 100th anniversary. The first part of his policy aims to achieve tremendous progress in the economy, carbon neutrality, military, and technology, while the second phase will be devoted to transforming China into a “strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious and modern socialist country”.
All in all, Xi Jinping’s ambitions for the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party go beyond the limit as he tries to extend his term in office, ignoring political traditions and adapting Chinese politics to his desires and interests projected until 2049. This is facilitated by the constitutional and economic changes he initiated, as well as the rigid policy of removing opponents and appointing supporters to higher state bodies.
Ani Kintsurashvili – Author of the Article, Senior Researcher, Civic IDEA
Civic IDEA’s 11th China Watch report discusses the controversies around China’s state-owned nuclear company China Nuclear Industry 23 Construction Co., Ltd., alternatively referred to as “CNNC No.23” or CNI23 operating since 1958. There is no record provided by internet sources about the misconduct related to particularly CNI23 and its representation in different states. Nevertheless, some problems and scandals are still associated with its founding investor firms: China National Nuclear Corporation and China General Nuclear Power Engineering Co., Ltd. China General Nuclear Power Engineering Co., Ltd. first appeared on the Georgian market in 2012 and since then has won several state procurements and made private investments.
For more information about the CNI23, see the attachment below: ?
We are particularly grateful to our Taiwanese partner organization Doublethink Lab, for advancing global research and collaborations on PRC influence in Georgia and worldwide.
Secretary General of the China Communist Party, China’s President Xi Jinping one of the leaders who did not make any foreign visits since the outbreak of virus Covid-19 from January 2020. The situation has changed last week.
…he couldn’t miss a trip to Central Asia:
On 14 September Xi Jinping visits Kazakhstan to participate at the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions in Nur-Sultan (currently Astana). China has still complicated relations with some of Central Asian countries, namely Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan due to anti-Chinese sentiments, failed China investment (Bishkek heating project), ethnic Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uyghur maltreatment and imprisonment of ethnic Kazakhs relatives in Xinjiang. The importance of Kazakhstan
Why this trip of Xi Jinping to Central Asia is such a big deal?
For Kazakhstan, Temur Umarov, Carnegie’s Fellow suggests to be more timely, especially voices coming from Kremlin over neutral (or pro-Ukraine) position of Kazakhstan over Russia-Ukraine war. Kazakhstan is an important partner for China – Belt and Road Initiative launched in Kazakhstan’s Astana in 2013.
Kazakhstan importance to China is played by the transit potential and connectivity of Chinese cargo to Europe. Since Russia launched “military operation” in Ukraine, the whole West, especially European Union stand against Russia and the countries using Russia as a transit. Russia is totally isolated from global markets and Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan consider China as a great alternative to Russia as a trade partner and ally. Kazakhstan has a bug number of ethnic Russians in the north. There is a concern that Russia may want to “liberate” them from Kazakhstan.
Chinese cargo trains going through Kazakhstan (then to Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea) increased up-to 6 times. In 2020, the two main cargo transit hubs on the border of Kazakhstan and China, Alashankou and Khorgos, was increased significantly in volumes compared to pre-pandemic. It was also emphasized the importance of the “Middle Corridor,” linking Kazakh rail to Turkmenistan, Iran, Turkey, and onwards to Europe. In 2022, about 2013 container trains passed the Kazakh territory, which is 25% more than the previous year. From Kazakhstan to Europe 1,147 trains were operated, which is a year-to-year increase of 14%. In the opposite direction 866 trains were sent, a notable increase of 43%.
The ensuring security of the global supply chain is one of the development priorities, putting importance on the role of the trains as “emergency measures” stabilizing unexpected events affecting sea-based trade was mentioned in the recent report on the China-Europe train by China Railway.
On 16 September 2022, President Xi Jinping attended the 22nd Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) at the Samarkand Congress Center. President Xi delivered an important statement entitled “Ride on the Trend of the Times and Enhance Solidarity and Cooperation to Embrace a Better Future”. Leaders of SCO member states signed and released the Samarkand Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SCO was founded in 2001 in Shanghai in post-border delimitation process of China with Central Asia and Russia, today is dubbed as a security organization of the East (as an alliance against the NATO) benefits both China and Russia. SCO serves the unique platform where China is played a leading role to bring together Russia, China, Central Asian countries also India, Pakistan and potentially Iran and Turkey in the future.
Some statements and documents were issued on protecting international food and energy security, tackling climate change, and keeping supply chains secure, stable and diversified; a memorandum of obligations on Iran’s SCO membership was signed; the procedure for Belarus’ accession was started; MOUs granting Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar the status of SCO dialogue partners were signed; agreement was reached on admitting Bahrain, the Maldives, the UAE, Kuwait and Myanmar as new dialogue partners; and a series of resolutions were adopted, including a Comprehensive Plan for the Implementation of the SCO Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation for 2023-2027. It was decided at the meeting that India will assume the SCO rotating presidency for 2022-2023.
Taiwan, Xinjiang and One China policy
Considering after 3 years of “lockdown”, the analysts link his trip to Central Asia as a reaction to Nancy Pelosi, US House of Representative Speaker to Taiwan in August; Russia has already expressed that that trip was provocative and dangerous of peace and stability in Asia; Others believe that it is a time for showing off the strength before the next Party Session scheduled next month where he to be reelected for the next term.
China is pursuing “reunification” of Taiwan as a Republic of China to People’s Republic of China even a military scenario to be involved. If a war breaks out over Taiwan, China will be unable to secure energy supplies by sea. China has turned its focus to Central Asia as part of Chinese strategic thinking, so the neighboring countries recognize Republic of China as an integral part of PRC. In China senior leadership circles, discussion about fighting against external interference meaning western aid to Russia-Ukraine war and supporting Taiwan.
This year the EU Parliament adopted a resolution where it describes China policies in Xinjiang as a genocide against Uyghur people. Based on this background Xi’s visit to Central Asia is the important diplomatic trips. Central Asian states history and culture is inseparable from Xinjiang and share a 3,000-km border with Xinjiang, and it requires a constant maintenance from Beijing to ensure there are no cross-border sympathizers to those opposing its extreme policies in Xinjiang.
Umedjon Majidi – Author of the blog series, Expert/Research Consultant, Civic IDEA
A few days ago, the Central Asian region became the epicenter of the world’s attention due to Xi Jinping’s historic visit, which is his first post-pandemic trip outside the People’s Republic of China. Xi’s Central Asian voyage started in Kazakhstan, where he landed on September 14 and met with the Kazakhstani President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, together with the delegation including the Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan and the Mayor of Nur-Sultan. The two sides discussed energy, health and trade relations and agreed on signing numerous new bilateral agreements. Two countries issued a joint statement according to which Kazakhstan supports the PRC’s claim over Taiwan and stay loyal to the “One China Principle”. “During this short period (30 years), we have established strong interstate ties. I sincerely thank you for your support for Kazakhstan’s economic development and our international initiatives,” – Tokayev told the Chinese leader. The same day, after ensuring mutual understanding and support with Kazakhstan, Xi Jinping flew to Uzbekistan to attend a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and held bilateral meetings with several leaders, of which Russian President Vladimir Putin is particularly noteworthy. Prior to the meeting with the Russian president, the CCP leader met with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan to likewise Kazakhstan, safeguard their long-term partnership and shared future at the bilateral level. The president of Uzbekistan expressed his firm and unequivocal support for the one-China principle concerning its core interests in Taiwan. On September 16, the CCP leader met with the Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan and pledged “political mutual trust”. On the same day, Xi Jinping also held bilateral talks with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, where the latter showed his willingness to obstruct the US sanctions with the help of the PRC and SCO. Xi himself mentioned that he expects the growth of their comprehensive partnership and showed support to “Iran in safeguarding its sovereignty and national dignity”.
However, it is interesting to know why the Chinese leader specifically chose Central Asia as his first destination after two years of lockdown. Unsurprisingly, his behavior carries more broad and more strategic meaning for the country and his party. His message was concise and clear, addressing that in these challenging times when Russia’s role is declining in Central Asia, PRC shows readiness to play the role of the leading global power in the region and seeks to reconfirm this objective with the visit of the Chinese leader. CCP’s foreign ambitions have always aimed to link countries to China through economic and infrastructure projects. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has served this goal since 2013 and connected countries from the South Pacific through Asia to the Middle East, Europe and Africa through various trade routes. With his visit, Xi guaranteed the PRC’s devotion and considerable financial investment in the global initiative. Central Asia, and particularly Kazakhstan, has played an essential role during the nine-year bilateral cooperation under the BRI. The region itself is conceived being a gateway connecting the PRC with Europe. It is not surprising that in a world full of tense circumstances, China does not lose interest in Central Asia and is always ready to expand its influence in the region. Central Asia itself proved to be reasonably stable without any significant power competition compared to the rest of the world. Accordingly, China is positioning this region as a favorable hub for its companies and long-term investments.
On the other hand, the expectations of the Central Asian countries about Xi’s visit being a vow to deepen mutual understanding and trust, and bring bilateral economic bonds closer, were also justified by Xi’s first and historical visit since the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic. While the region is closely dependent on Moscow in various sectors and Russia itself is embroiled in a war with Ukraine, sanctioned by the entire West (and not only by the Western countries but also by the leading Asian democracies), and waned on the regional level, Central Asia may consider the PRC as an effective alternative to Russia in the future, especially in terms of the economic cooperation. Accordingly, the statements made by the Central Asian leaders during Xi’s visit and their shared future expectations for survival reflect this strategic intention.
Meanwhile, the Chinese leader used the SCO summit in Uzbekistan to meet face-to-face with the Russian president. Given China’s strong opposition to sanctions against Russia and the urgency to acquire more supporters on the Taiwan issue, Xi Jinping vowed his readiness to work with President Putin and pursue their shared interests in defiance of the West, as Beijing and Moscow both perceive the SCO as a counterbalance to the US alliances in the region. “China is willing to make efforts with Russia to assume the role of great powers, and play a guiding role to inject stability and positive energy into a world rocked by social turmoil,” Xi told Putin during the sideline meeting. It is important to note that despite China’s publicly announced policy of restraint on Russian aggression against Ukraine, it covertly continued economic and political cooperation with Kremlin even before this meeting. To be clear about PRC’s positioning in the Russian-Ukraine war, it is not accusing Russia solely but the US-let North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which, according to Chinese perception, has provoked and manipulated the already tense situation between the conflicting parties. At this meeting, Xi Jinping reiterated PRC’s position and sought an assertion from Putin that war will not further undermine regional security. Nonetheless, on September 21, several days after this in-person meeting, President Putin declared the partial mobilization of the Russian military, and the mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin, announced the preparation of the first recruitment center in Moscow for foreigners willing to fight along with the Russian soldiers against Ukraine. It is unknown whether the meeting with Xi Jinping and the “strong mutual support” voiced by the Chinese leader involved the narrative of military assistance to Russia amid the Western military aid to Ukraine. However, Putin’s subsequent actions certainly give a reason to suppose so. Surprisingly enough, the same day, the Chinese leader gave instructions to the People’s Liberation Army of China for military readiness due to the escalation of the situation over Taiwan.
Noticeably, foreign interests are accompanied by Xi’s personal intentions and ambitions. On October 16, 2022, the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will gather in Beijing, where the party’s top leadership for the following five years will be elected. The congress is particularly noteworthy as the current leader, Xi Jinping, is likely to take a third term, breaking the “seven up, eight down” rule, according to which those leaders who are 68 and above are expected to step down and Xi Jinping has already exceeded the age limit. Experts anticipate that Xi is already preparing for the third term despite this political tradition, as his rule has dramatically transformed the PRC’s political landscape. His visit to Central Asia came ahead of the congress to prove his confidence in being the PRC’s most influential leader since Mao, heading the anti-Western alliance of nations.
Ani Kintsurashvili – Author of the Article, Senior Researcher, Civic IDEA
