New Security Architecture in Europe and its impact on Georgia – one year since European Perspective
Tbilisi, Georgia 15 June, 2023 Radisson Blu Iveria Hotel Tbilisi
The conference aims to support the dialogue and embolden discussion over the upcoming cornerstone events for Georgia – assessment from the European Union in the fall to be followed by Council’s decision on the Candidate Status and the upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius.
In the course of two panels, we will try to assess the situation after exactly a year since the European Council granted Georgia European Perspective and issued conditions based on 12 point recommendation plan for further advance to the candidate status.
Since last June, rather complicated and eventful processes have taken place that we all have witnessed. There were several action plans elaborated for achieving the best results, lots of consultations and negotiations. Accordingly, several reports are produced by various groups of CSOs assessing the process and recommending further policy change. We aim to gather all those stakeholders under one roof to share their findings in an attempt to synchronize all recommendations and support the process of realizing Georgia’s European dream.
With the launch of the series of discussions, we propose to explore, analyze and discuss the essence of European integration beyond formal procedures. We must profoundly agree on the fundamental values and principles the modern, European Georgian state should be built on. Similarly to 104 years ago, when the founders of the first Georgian Republic surprised the world with their courage and faithfulness to the beliefs of liberal democracy, Georgian elites of today need to find strength and devotion to principles of freedom, democracy, justice, solidarity, equality, human rights, and human dignity.
However, before we get to the fall’23, there is a NATO Vilnius summit at the doorsteps. Different from the EU-related debates, there is not much information available or any public dialogue related to the Vilnius summit. What is it to expect? What is it Georgian government tries to achieve? Where do we stand on the road to NATO membership? These are all legitimate questions and we should have a frank dialogue with both government and our international allies.
On the 30th of May, 2022, we gathered all the stakeholders and discussed the new security architecture of Europe and its implications for Georgia. We also discussed how the Russian war against Ukraine brought the nearly entire civilized world together and paved the way for entirely new security narratives, opportunities, and visions for cooperation and integration. This year, we want to assess the state of affairs in Georgia and, more significantly, determine whether the reforms that have been made are enough to qualify Georgia for the candidate status and how will these hectic events happening in the modern world shape Georgia’s future?
Main takeaways from the conference
Advancing Georgia’s Partnership with the EU and NATO on the road to membership;
Where do we stand after one year since gaining a European Perspective;
Exploring Georgia’s Role in Strengthening Regional Security;
Towards greater synergy amongst countries in EU enlargement pull;
The future prospects of Georgia -Ukraine -Moldova (“Association trio”) partnership.
Civic IDEA’s report “China’s “Wolf Warrior” Policy in the Media – the Case of Georgia”
Civic IDEA is happy to share with you a new report on the CCP’s influence activities in the Georgian media. The objective of the research is to analyze the degree of Chinese influence on the Georgian media, both traditional and so-called new media, in the context of the strategy of the Chinese Communist Party through both content and systemic analysis. The media report portrays how China is covered in the Georgian media and how the strategic mission of the Chinese Communist Party is fulfilled – with propaganda and tactical approaches on the “cultural front” to achieve the formation of public opinion in the form desired by the Chinese Communist Party and later, to use it for leverage over various stakeholders or establish control. At the same time, the systematic media analysis aimed to examine the share of the People’s Republic of China and its affiliated business actors in both media ownership and the advertising market.
The report was created in cooperation with the Journalism Resource Center.
For more information, you can download the report here 👇
On April 24, Civic IDEA, in cooperation with the Kazakh partner organization “Zertteu Research Institute” organized a workshop, “Why China Matters? The Case of Georgia”, gathering 16 journalists, experts and researchers, and activists from CSOs in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The event covered the following topics:
Why China matters? – general context
Chinese leverage on Georgia’s economic, political, and academic sectors
Chinese Influence on Media (including fake news, methods to cope with Disinformation)
The main goal of the workshop was to encourage an active discussion and productive exchange of opinions and experiences between Georgian and Kazakhstani colleagues.
On April 13, Civic IDEA contributed to the National Endowment for Democracy’s roundtable on Georgia, current challenges, foreign policy trajectories and the role of civil society in a captured state: CSO as a Remnant of Democracy in a Captured State: The Case of Georgia
Georgia has struggled to create a modern, European sovereign state for 30 years. The journey was rough, full of well-crafted obstructions built by Russia through violent interference or by fueling domestic conflicts. Since Russia’s brutal aggression in Ukraine started, politics in Georgia have become even uglier. The government in Tbilisi proved to be absolutely unable to operate under pressure and gave up the fight. There is a general agreement that there is a Georgia blueprint modeled after the Kremlin used by the government in Tbilisi in dealing with media, NGOs, expert community, and, more generally, all active citizens aimed at discrediting them, thus neutralizing from vibrant public life. It is all happening parallel to unprecedented opportunities for EU integration. It looks as if the Georgian government does all for not allowing progress on the European path. Over the last year and a half, we have forced the government to change or withdraw multiple outrageous decisions due to the resilience of civil society and massive peaceful protests.
It is also essential to notice that Russia is not the only player in Georgia anymore, causing worries for civil society. Year after another, China emerged as a core partner and model friend of the Georgian government. All the warning signs are enshrined in dozens of MoU, decisions, and friendly exchanges. While Georgian civil society tried its best to navigate the rather tricky and frequently dangerous environment, we constantly seek expertise, advice, and discussion with our partners and friends in search of better choices and alternatives. Abandoned by the government for the third time, we search for an answer to whether Georgian civil society can change the course of developments in Georgia once again.
On April 11, “Hoover Institution On War, Revolution And Peace”, together with “Freemen Spogli Institute”, hosted a Roundtable at Stanford University, California, US, where the Civic IDEA team discussed the relevant topics related to the PRC’s influence strategies in Georgia: “PRC as an alternative to Russia in Georgia – Leverage on Investments and Academia”
China’s global influence has been increasing over the past few decades, driven by its rapidly growing economy, expanding diplomatic and cultural outreach, and ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Georgia is among those countries that see the PRC as an alternative to Russia, especially amid the war in Ukraine. It has been actively engaged in BRI, signed FTA with China and considers the further expansion of its role as a transit hub in the Middle Corridor initiative, which supposedly will attract more Chinese money to the country. Although Georgia is not yet the victim of PRC’s “debt trap diplomacy”, almost all the state’s critical infrastructure projects are led by notorious and internationally blacklisted companies, winning the state’s procurement bids. Thus, no ground is left for Western companies to firmly establish themselves in Georgia’s economic sector and attract further Western investments. This occasion limits the diversification of financial partners and puts the PRC state-operated and dubious companies in a priority position, hence making Georgia less attractive to the European market. The domination of Chinese companies within the BRI in Georgia’s infrastructure market has caused indignation among some EU member states’ ambassadors in Georgia. We remember Polish Ambassador in Georgia complaining about Georgia prioritizing Chinese companies over European ones. But in the end, everybody from the government again turns a blind eye to European criticism and stays ignorant about the Chinese firms continuously winning state procurements.
PRC has also been actively promoting cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries, establishing multiple Confucius institutes and classrooms in almost every university and higher education institution in Georgia, strengthening the role of the Georgia-China Friendship Association, providing generous scholarships to Georgian students, actively encouraging exchanges and funding in the fields of research and science and promoting dual partnerships between academic institutions. Within the framework of these academic exchanges, several shady characteristics have been identified, threatening Georgia’s national security in a broader context. Firstly, some of the Chinese universities that are involved in various international and dual partnerships with their Georgian counterparts are suspected of carrying very high, high and medium security risks due to their involvement with the PLA, cyber espionage, military research activities and engagement with other PRC’s defense entities. Secondly, the National Center for Educational Quality Enhancement (legal entity of the Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia) has no control over the study program and legal status of the Confucius Institutes mistrusted and shut by the Western societies. Thirdly, Georgian alumni with Chinese university degrees usually promote the PRC endeavors and vision of the world locally affecting the mindset and perception of Georgian society largely. At last, the National Academy of Sciences is blindly exchanging information and staff with Chinese entities on the basis of contracts that are regulated by the laws of the PRC and may be easily exploited by the Chinese authorities.
From April 5-8, 2023, world’s media focused on Beijing, where French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen met with senior officials from the People’s Republic of China, including President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang. Given the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine and rising tensions in Sino-American relations, this state visit was thought-provoking. What were the main goals, issues, and outcomes of the visit? I will try to answer these and other questions in this blog.
Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to China started on April 5 with a large delegation including some ministers, lawmakers and nearly 60 CEOs of top French companies. Before leaving France, President Macron also asked the President of the European Commission for a joint visit to show China and the world that the European Union holds the same position on various topics. Ursula von der Leyen accepted the invitation and joined Macron’s state visit to China.
According to the Foreign affairs website of People’s Republic of China President Xi first met with Macron, then held trilateral talks with Macron and Ursula von der Leyen, before meeting with her bilaterally to discuss China-EU relations. Finally, the French president and Mr. Xi held an informal meeting in Guangzhou, focusing on Sino-French relations. In addition, the main topics discussed at the meetings were China-EU economic relations, the war between Russia and Ukraine and China’s role in resolving the conflict.
EU-China Relations and Europe’s Strategic autonomy
The visit was marked by very important and interesting messages from three leaders regarding EU-China relations. First of all, the messages of the Chinese president were not very different. He reiterated the need that “China-EU relations should not be aligned with, dependent on, or dictated by a third party.” It is clear, of course, that when Xi speaks of a third party, he means the United States and wants to strengthen the idea of “dividing” the West. He also criticized the “democracy versus authoritarianism” and the new Cold War era narratives, mentioning that “these only bring division and confrontation to the world.” He goes even further and calls on Europe to stand together with China against “Hegemonism and Unilateralism.“, again directed at the United States.
At the trilateral meeting, President Xi made the idea of exclusive cooperation between the EU and China very clear. While the United States is trying to “decouple” from his country, President Xi reaffirmed that “China supports Europe in achieving strategic autonomy.”
The idea of Europe’s strategic autonomy is not strange for President Macron. The term refers to the EU’s ability to act independently in areas of strategic importance. These areas include defense policy, the economy, technologies and much more. According to some EU leaders, especially in the field of defense, the European Union is very dependent on NATO and the United States. That is why Macron and some other leaders support the idea of strategic autonomy – they want to see the European Union as an independent and strong player on the world stage.
Europe’s strategic autonomy is attractive to China: it is in Beijing’s interest that Europe and the United States be less interconnected. The Chinese government sees this as an opportunity to improve its relationship with the EU. Given the rising economic tensions in Sino-US relations, this goal is especially crucial. That is why President Macron was welcomed by his Chinese counterpart with great pomp and respect. The informal meeting between Xi and Macron in Guangzhou over a cup of tea proved once again that the Chinese president is very interested in cooperation with France.
No to decoupling, yes to de-risking
But Europe’s strategic autonomy is also involving less dependence on China in several areas. On March 30, President von der Leyen gave a speech on EU-China relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre ahead of her visit to China. In her view, the EU should focus not on “decoupling” but on “de-risking” from China. This message was also repeated by her and shared by Macron in Beijing during the visit.
Where does the idea of “decoupling” come from ? This issue was first discussed in Washington as a response to the heavy economic dependence on China. In relations with Beijing, the United States has taken a tougher stance – since Trump, Washington has pursued a strategy of “decoupling” economic ties with China, and this process continues under the Biden administration. For Europe, it is not realistic to decouple completely from China, but European leaders also know that dependence on Beijing carries high risks. This is why the EU prefers the “de-risking” strategy, which, according to Ursula Von der Leyen, contains several specific ways to deal with the different risks, such as diversifying trade and investment relations, technology transfers, etc.
Russia-Ukraine War
The war between Russia and Ukraine was another central topic of the visit. In this regard, the European leaders stressed the importance of involving China, a member of the UN Security Council, in the “promotion of a just peace”, which respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Macron and Ursula wanted to convince XI to use its “special” relationship with Putin to stop Russian aggression against Ukraine, but there was no concrete promise from China in this sense. However, in the meeting with Macron, Xi and his French counterpart agreed that they are opposed to a nuclear war and to escalating the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in that direction.
Another key message sent by Europeans was about arming Russia. As we know, the Biden administration recently stated that China was considering providing lethal aid to Russia; Though It has already been proven that the PRC is only sending non-lethal aid to Russia, including helmets and body armor, but if it decides to send lethal aid as well, it would pose a serious threat to international security. That’s why after the meetings with Xi and Chinese Premier Li Qiang, the president of the European Commission told the media that she had warned China not to supply military equipment, directly or indirectly, to Russia. In addition, Ursula Von der Leyen made it clear that if Beijing decided to arm the aggressor, “this would significantly damage” relations between the EU and China. According to the French diplomat, after Mr. Macron asked Mr. Xi not to arm Russia, President Xi replied that “it was not his war.” When Emmanuel Macron and Ursula von der Leyen left China, the EU’s position on this issue was reaffirmed by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany – Annalena Baerbock. On April 14, during her visit to China and meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in Beijing, they discussed this issue and the Chinese minister said, “We do not and will not deliver weapons to the conflicting parties at a later date.”
It is clear that for the EU, any Chinese lethal aid for Russia in the war would be seen as crossing the line. In addition, European leaders are asking China to become actively involved in ending the war between Russia and Ukraine, as Beijing is the only country that still has influence over Russia. However, the only concrete consensus during Macron and Ursula’s visit on the Russia-Ukraine war was President Xi’s promise to call Zelensky when the conditions and timing are right.
Taiwan issue
The high-level EU-China state visit obviously did not take place without the issue of Taiwan. On this subject, the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, was more critical. Both she and Macron reaffirmed their loyalty to the “one-China policy”, but Macron tried to avoid discussing critical issues with Xi, such as Taiwan and China’s human rights violations, while Ursula, on the Taiwan issue, mentioned that “the threat to use force to change the status quo is unacceptable“.
On his departure from China, Emmanuel Macron took questions from the French press on the plane, and his answers on the issue of Taiwan were controversial. In particular, he told the media that Europe ran a “great risk” of being involved in crises “that are not ours,” which would make it more difficult to build the EU’s strategic autonomy. He goes even further and said that “The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this (Taiwan) topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction.” These statements became the main topic of the world’s media after China began large-scale military exercises around the island of Taiwan, just hours after the French president left Guangzhou to return to Paris. Macron’s views on Taiwan have been welcomed in China, but of course were criticized by some European policymakers. Annalena Baerbock’s statements on the issue show that Macron’s views are not shared by all European leaders. Indeed, during her visit to China on April 12, she condemned the recently launched military exercises around Taiwan and said Germany “cannot be indifferent” to the escalating tensions.
Other important results of the visit
While Emmanuel Macron was in China with CEOs of major French companies, it was clear from the beginning of the state visit that he was in Beijing to strengthen economic relations with China. Macron has signed several agreements for French companies in sectors such as pork, wind power, cosmetics and civil nuclear power. During this visit, France and PRC also issued a 51-point joint declaration on cooperation in various fields ranging from security to culture. The President of the European Commission also stressed the importance of continued cooperation between China and the EU on climate change and other common goals, but as she focused on “de-risking” for the EU economy, she did not sign a concrete agreement in Beijing.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we can say that the joint visit of Macron and Leyen to China was an attempt by European leaders to show their unity with regard to the EU’s foreign policy towards Beijing. It is true that on some issues, Macron acted more like a “good cop”, while Ursula chose a “bad cop” stance and at times criticized Chinese policy on several issues, including Taiwan and human rights in the Xinjiang region. However, the two EU leaders did manage to agree on two key messages: On the Russia-Ukraine war, they told President Xi that arming Russia would significantly damage EU-China relations and China should be actively involved in ending the war. Regarding EU-China relations, their message was that the EU does not follow the U.S. strategy of “decoupling” and prefers to “de-risk” from China. Time will tell if this strategy is effective or not.
Giorgi Khachidze – Author of the Blog, Intern, Civic IDEA
The Hoover Project on China’s Global Sharp Power – The China Index: Measuring PRC Influence Around the Globe on Tuesday, April 11, 2023 at 9:00 AM PT | 12:00 PM ET.
The China Index is the first cross-regional project to objectively measure and visualize China’s overseas influence through comparable data. This event brings together report contributors from Bogota, Berlin, Tblisi, and Taipei, who will analyze the PRC’s influence campaigns in their regions, from Latin America to Germany to Central Asia.
ABOUT THE SPEAKERS:
Puma Shen is an associate professor at National Taipei University, the chairperson of Doublethink Lab and vice president of the Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR), focusing heavily on disinformation and local tracking of privacy violations. He was a lawyer, and an expert in white-collar crime, including state crime, disinformation campaigns, and financial crime. His publications analyze Chinese information operations in Taiwan and the U.S., and he is now investigating United Front activities in Taiwan and Southeast Asia.
Didi Kirsten Tatlow is a sinologist and journalist. A graduate of the Beijing Language Institute (语言学院) and SOAS, University of London, she began her journalistic career in 1994 at the Hong Kong Standard, later moving to the Associated Press and the New York Times, among others, and winning multiple awards. After leaving China in 2017 she worked for think tanks in Berlin and Prague before returning to journalism in 2022 as a Senior Reporter for International Affairs at Newsweek magazine. She is an editor and author of Beyond Espionage: China’s Quest for Foreign Technology.
Parsifal D’Sola Alvarado is the founder and executive director of the Andres Bello Foundation—China Latin America Research Center in Bogotá, Colombia. He is a Chinese foreign policy analyst specializing in Sino-Latin American relations, and a non-resident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Between 2019 and 2020, he acted as Chinese foreign policy advisor to the foreign affairs minister of the Interim Government of Venezuela. He holds a BS in Telecommunications Engineering from Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, an MA in East Asian Studies from Columbia University, and an MSc in International Politics from SOAS, University of London.
Tinatin Khidasheli chairs Civic IDEA, a think-thank fighting the Soviet legacy in Georgia, confronting Russian propaganda, and advocating for sound defense and security policy. She served as the first female minister of defense of Georgia, and chaired the Parliamentary Committee for European Integration as well as the Inquiry Commission into Violations of Freedom of Speech and Telecommunication laws at the Parliament of Georgia. She holds a LLM in international law from Tbilisi State University and a MA in political science from Central European University.
Glenn Tiffert is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a historian of modern China. He co-chairs the Hoover project on China’s Global Sharp Power and works closely with government and civil society partners to document and build resilience against authoritarian interference with democratic institutions. Most recently, he co-authored and edited Global Engagement: Rethinking Risk in the Research Enterprise (2020).
Civic IDEA thoroughly researched CSCEC and the outrages related to its name worldwide. In the last few decades, the names of CSCEC and its subsidiary companies have been actively aired in numerous scandals in China, Pakistan, Kenya, the USA, the Philippines, Ethiopia and several other countries. In 2009, the World Bank blacklisted China State Construction Engineering Corporation Ltd. due to its involvement in collusive practices and corruption scandals in the Philippines concerning the Philippines National Roads Improvement and Management Program. In August 2020, the United States Department of Defense released a list of Chinese companies having close ties with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the CSCEC was among them. The Trump Administration accused the Chinese firm of cyber espionage and prohibited the US entities from becoming shareholders of the CSCEC. The latter’s involvement in malicious cyber activities is not a surprising discovery, since already in 2017, it was revealed that Beijing had bugged African Union HQ built by the CSCEC in Ethiopia and for five years, data from CPUs in the PRC-constructed building had been transferred to Chinese servers. In early 2022, a lawsuit was filed in a Kenyan court against the CSCEC due to corruption allegations. The court was requested to debar the company from continuing working in Kenya and violating Kenya’s laws and directives.
The most recent scandal erupted in Ukraine when in late March 2023, the Ukrainian anti-corruption agency NAZK added the name of the Chinese company to the list of international sponsors of the Russian war in Ukraine. The agency representatives claimed that despite Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, CSCEC had continued actively operating in a terrorist state, implementing the most critical infrastructure projects there and planning to expand its presence further by holding constant meetings with the Russian government.
Previously in Georgia, there have been two significant misconducts revealed in CSCEC works – 1) delays and postponement of the contract and 2) environmental damage. On August 21, 2019, the Roads Department signed a contract with China State Construction Engineering Corporation Limited regarding construction works of the Chumateleti-Khevi section of the E-60 highway (km 0.0 – km 11.6). The paradox is that the project partially financed by the World Bank was granted to the Chinese company once blacklisted by the same World Bank. But the Roads Department’s practice shows that this is not the only case when the notorious and blacklisted Chinese company wins the project funded by its blacklister organization. According to the contract, the period of implementation of the works is 3 years; therefore, the construction of the road should have been completed by the end of 2022. Nonetheless, the Chinese contractor was unable to finish the work in due time, and for reasons unknown to us, the completion of the project was delayed by seven months. Currently, August 31, 2023, is set as the deadline for the completion of the E-60 highway Chumateleti-Khevi (F1) construction project.
In 2020, local residents revealed through social media that the Chinese company CSCEC had installed a concrete-making plant on the river bank and it was causing pollution of the river. As the local media later found out,due to the leak of this information, the government was obliged to fine the local branch of CSCEC with 3000 GEL.
We are happy to share with you a discussion paper written by our chairwoman Tinatin Khidasheli about the expectations for the 2024 parliamentary elections. She argues that based on election data for the last 10 years, the “Georgian Dream” party (the ruling party in Georgia) as a single party has no chance of winning the proportional vote. This article contains facts and unmistakable data proving that, even by Georgian “normal” standards, winning an election and independently forming a government by the Georgian dream is impossible. She also provides some scenarios for the developments before the elections.
This is the first article in the series of discussion papers Civic IDEA will publish before the 2024 parliamentary vote.
On March 20, 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping embarked on his first visit to Russia since the beginning of the Ukraine war. The three-day visit conveyed significant signals to the international community and highlighted the burgeoning partnership between the two powers.
As the war in Ukraine persists, China has found itself balancing multiple objectives. On the one hand, it calls for an end to the hostilities, but on the other hand, it maintains a strong strategic partnership with Russia. Despite the ongoing war, trade between Beijing and Moscow continues to grow, and Chinese and Russian diplomats remain in frequent contact. Even military exercises between the two nations continue without interruption. While Chinese state media does not often directly endorse Russia’s territorial claims in Ukraine, it consistently blames NATO and the United States for the conflict. Prior to their recent meeting, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin had already met more than 40 times, cementing their bond as fellow autocrats who speak the language of power.
Here are some key takeaways from the meeting:
The meeting took place amidst some crucial international developments: the Japanese Prime Minister’s surprise visit to Kyiv, the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant issued for Vladimir Putin, and the U.S. warning China not to back Russia in the Ukraine war.
The warm meeting between the two leaders that took place despite these implications is a message in and of itself.
The Ukraine War
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the meeting hadn’t resulted in any progress toward resolving the war in Ukraine. Both sides emphasized the importance of decreasing tensions and not “prolonging the war in Ukraine”. However, the fact that Russia’s invasion was the initial cause of the war was not acknowledged. Both countries have refused to call the Russian invasion “war”, instead calling on NATO to “respect the sovereignty” of other states.
The leaders also referenced the controversial 12-point peace proposal presented by the PRC last month that was supposed to deal with the ongoing war in Ukraine. The Chinese attempt to become the main negotiator in the conflict was criticized by the West, as it did not suggest Russia withdraw its forces. However, during the meeting, Putin stated that “he viewed China’s proposals for a resolution of the Ukraine conflict with respect.” On the other hand, Xi Jinping once again pointed out Beijing’s “neutral position” on the war in Ukraine and called for dialogue.
Economic and Energy Cooperation
Besides the clear political support, the visit also served as a clear reaffirmation of close economic ties between China and Russia. Both leaders mentioned that they “will build a closer energy partnership, supporting companies from both countries in advancing cooperation projects in oil, gas, coal, electricity and nuclear energy.” According to Putin, Russia welcomes Chinese businesses to replace the western companies that have left the country since the start of the war in Ukraine.
In the media statement, Putin mentioned that the possibility of expanding Russian gas exports to China was discussed, along with the potential development of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline through Mongolia. While Putin highlighted the pipeline as a replacement for the defunct Nord Stream 2 line delivering gas to Europe, Xi did not explicitly mention it during the briefing.
– The Power of Siberia, a cross-border pipeline carrying natural gas from Russia, was officially launched on December 2, 2019. It runs for 3,000 km through Siberia and extends through China’s eastern side, including the capital, to Shanghai. The final section is scheduled to commence delivering gas in 2025. Despite Russia’s $55 billion investment in the pipeline, only $3.81 billion worth of natural gas imports have been made through the pipeline since December 2019. Gas supply from the Power of Siberia 1 pipeline reached 10.4 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2021 and 15 bcm in 2022. For 2023, volumes are expected to reach 22 bcm. The second pipeline – The Power of Siberia 2 – could double gas exports from Russia to China, crossing through Mongolia and into the industrial regions near Beijing. Russia will deliver at least 98 bcm of gas to the PRC by 2030. The importance of the pipeline is growing as Moscow is looking for a way to replace European countries as its major gas importer – Moscow wants Power of Siberia 2 to replace the Nord Stream 2 pipeline (For comparison, the Nords Stream 2 pipeline was expected to deliver 5.6 bcm of Russian gas to Europe). However, according to experts, China will not need additional gas supply until 2030.
Cooperation in the energy sector has also been a crucial part of Sino-Russian relations after the war. As Europe has been taking steps to cut down its reliance on Moscow’s energy, China’s share of Russian energy exports has been growing astonishingly – Beijing’s spending on Russian crude oil, coal, and natural gas, shot up to $88 billion in the year through February, compared to $57 billion in the previous 12 months. However, Russia’s gas exports to the PRC are still a tiny fraction of the record 177 bcm it delivered to Europe in 2018-19.
It is worth mentioning that after the Western economic sanctions on Russia, it has been becoming increasingly dependent on growing economic relations with Beijing – trade between the countries has grown by nearly 20 percent this year, up from $190 billion in 2022.
Military
During the meeting, Moscow and Beijing committed to strengthening their military exchanges and cooperation while also conducting joint maritime and aerial patrols. Additionally, they expressed concerns about NATO’s growing military-security ties with Asia-Pacific countries and opposed external military forces undermining regional peace and stability. Ever since the start of the war in Ukraine, both nations have been actively participating in joint drills around the world. According to the joint statement, the partnership between the two countries had reached its highest level ever. However, the statement clarified that this partnership was not a military-political alliance and was not directed against any other country. It emphasized that the relationship between Russia and the PRC was not confrontational and not aimed at any third country, and it did not constitute a bloc.
“New Era of Cooperation”
During their talks at the Kremlin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a series of documents regarding “strategic cooperation” between their countries. Putin termed the talks as “successful and constructive.” According to Xi, one of the agreements he signed with Putin has ushered the relationship between the two countries into a “new era” of cooperation.
At the end of the state dinner on Tuesday evening, the Russian leader walked Xi Jinping out – there, in front of the cameras, Xi reiterated his belief that global power dynamics are changing. “Together, we should push forward these changes that have not happened for 100 years. Take care” – were the farewell words of the Chinese leader.
International Response
According to Washington, Xi’s visit suggested that Beijing was providing “diplomatic cover” to Moscow to commit more crimes, given the timing of the visit. The White House spokesperson John Kirby said that there are concerns that China might once again call for a ceasefire that permits Russian forces to remain in Ukrainian sovereign territory, allowing them to consolidate their positions and reignite the war when it is more advantageous for them. Although the PRC has attempted to remain neutral in the Ukraine conflict, the United States has suggested that China’s actions could be a “stalling tactic” to assist Moscow. Washington has accused Beijing of contemplating arms exports to Moscow, a claim that the PRC has vehemently refuted. China has strongly denied the US’s allegations that it is contemplating exporting weapons to Moscow.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia has clearly shown his support for Vladimir Putin and the strengthening partnership between the two countries. The meeting highlighted close economic ties and cooperation in the energy and military sectors, as well as shared concerns over NATO’s growing military-security relations with the Asia-Pacific region. The invitation extended by Xi to the Russian Prime Minister during the visit is also indicative of the deepening cooperation between the two nations.
The fact that the meeting took place against the backdrop of the ongoing Ukraine war further showcases that the PRC’s support towards Ukraine and its territorial integrity is a bluff. On the other hand, The Kremlin’s charm offensive with China is a testament to Russia’s growing isolation from the West and the need to bolster relations with its strategic partner. Finally, this meeting can also be perceived as a clear challenge to the West – China is “flexing its muscles” as it indicates that it can ignore the decisions of the international community and the only way of dealing with Russia actually goes through Beijing.
Nutsa Dzandzava – Author of the Blog, Intern, Civic IDEA
