National Academy of Sciences – Another Cause of Concern in Sino-Georgian Relations

During the past five years of intensive work revealing the PRC’s soft and hard power strategies jeopardizing Georgia’s national security, Civic IDEA has already published two reports covering China’s influence on Georgia’s academic, media and CSO sectors before, during, and after the emergence of the covid-19 pandemic. Today, we suggest another monitoring report from the Chinese cooperation and activities in Georgian Academia, though not related directly to the universities, but to the National Academy of Sciences of Georgia.

Through personal correspondence and public information available on their official website, Civic IDEA has discovered several memorandums and cooperation agreements the National Academy of Sciences has signed with both state and private Chinese entities, as well as numerous events and activities following the advanced relations with China. We came across several interesting connections that have already been established between local chapters of the Academy of Science, as well as individual scientists under the auspices of the Academy and Chinese universities, which gives us the idea that the increased research and academic cooperation will only boost and the partnership will gain even more attachment in the future.

See the full report 👇

EU Commission’s fourth recommendation (anti-corruption policy) performance report

Within the scope of the project, “Civil Monitoring of Accountability, Transparency and Anti-Corruption Activities within the Framework of the 12 Recommendations of the European Union,” hereby we share a performance monitoring report on the EU Commission’s fourth recommendation – (anti-corruption policy). The report has been prepared by the Virtual Democracy Academy in cooperation with Civic IDEA.

The document reviews and scrutinizes Georgia’s present anti-corruption policy, as well as the Georgian government’s efforts to implement the Commission’s anti-corruption recommendations. The document will also further analyze the initiatives and actions of civil society and political opposition in relation to the fulfillment of the Commission’s 4th recommendation.

The main findings of the report:

  • Fulfilling the 12 recommendations of the European Commission is one of the main challenges and obligations of the country. Despite the fact that the Government declared its full readiness to fulfill the mentioned obligations, as of today, Georgia has fully implemented only one recommendation.
  • The legislative changes carried out within the framework of the implementation of the fourth recommendation do not fully meet the request of the European Commission, which is caused by the fact that the law on the anti-corruption bureau cannot ensure that the anti-corruption bureau is equipped with all the main levers necessary to effectively fight corruption.
  • The shortcoming of the new anti-corruption bureau is also manifested in the fact that the institution does not have an investigative function, and the procedure for appointing the head of the anti-corruption bureau calls into question the institutional independence of the bureau.
  • The international practice of the anti-corruption bureau indicates that the assignment of the investigative mandate is critical for the agency’s effective functioning. Lithuania stands out as one of the best examples of this. The country, which has the same past as Georgia, was able to create an effective anti-corruption agency, which, thanks to its investigative mandate, successfully fights corruption at both the petty and elite levels.
  • The international experience of the countries shows that any effort taken to combat corruption would yield no benefits unless the bureau’s independence is also guaranteed. Furthermore, the achievements in the battle against corruption are more obvious in countries where the anti-corruption agency has a high degree of independence.
  • As a result, all legislative changes implemented by the authorities to fulfill the fourth recommendation leave the perception of formal fulfillment of the obligation. The anti-corruption bureau does not entirely share the work model of successful countries’ anti-corruption organizations, which includes equipping it with investigative functions.

The project is implemented with financial support from the European Union and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and in coordination with the Center for Strategic Research and Development of Georgia.

For the full report, please visit  👇

China Watch Report 12 Hunan Road and Bridge Construction Group Co Ltd in Georgia

For four years, Civic IDEA yearly has been publishing several reports about the Chinese companies that, within the framework of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, actively continue to operate in the Georgian market, and more specifically in the infrastructure sector of Georgia, and are responsible for the construction of the main highway, roads, bridges and on the construction of tunnels. If you move from the Eastern part of Georgia to the Western part of Georgia, you will find many abbreviations of different Chinese companies on your way while going through the Ricoti Mountain pass. This is exactly the pass where the construction of a 51.6 km long road is planned, which includes 96 bridges and 53 tunnels. 

In our reports, we have already reviewed the activities of China State Construction Engineering Corporation Limited and China Road and Bridge Corporation in Georgia and the related misconduct based on a comparative analysis of foreign examples. This time we offer an analysis of the projects won by Hunan Road and Bridge Construction Group in Georgia and its shady practices in Uganda and mainland China. 

For the full report, please visit  👇

The security risks carried by the Chinese tech frontrunner Huawei

For more information, please visit the link 👇


  • its cooperation with the Georgian government,
  • fraudulent activities related to Georgian and foreign tender procedures,
  • malfunctions of its security equipment,
  • corruption scandals worldwide.

Back then, our team has already stressed out the high-security risks threatening the national security of those states, where Nuctech has operated.

For more information, please visit the link 👇


Civic IDEA’s 11th China Watch report discusses the controversies around China’s state-owned nuclear company China Nuclear Industry 23 Construction Co., Ltd., alternatively referred to as “CNNC No.23” or CNI23 operating since 1958. There is no record provided by internet sources about the misconduct related to particularly CNI23 and its representation in different states. Nevertheless, some problems and scandals are still associated with its founding investor firms: China National Nuclear Corporation and China General Nuclear Power Engineering Co., Ltd. China General Nuclear Power Engineering Co., Ltd. first appeared on the Georgian market in 2012 and since then has won several state procurements and made private investments.

For more information about the CNI23, see the attachment below: 👇

Big Power Game, Xi’s Voyage to Central Asia

Ani Kintsurashvili – Author of the Article, Senior Researcher, Civic IDEA

Collection of Articles Vol. 2 “From Caspian to Black Sea Economic, Academic and Digital Threats posed by the PRC”

Civic IDEA has the honor to share with the audience the second part of the series of Collection of Articles under the name “From Caspian to Black Sea: Economic, Academic and Digital Threats posed by the PRC”. Publication in front of you is the second edition of a collective effort by Civic IDEA and its partners and distinguished experts from the region to analyze and debate the Chinese activities in their respective countries in various fields, be it academia, business, politics, or other state matters. This time, the publication was inspired by the outstanding work of our Taiwanese partner Doublethink Lab about the Chinese influence operations assembled in China Index-2021, to be followed at This regularly updated web tracker allows all interested in monitoring and measuring PRC influence around the Globe.

The contributor authors to the second issue of the collection of articles are the following:

Tinatin Khidasheli – Chairperson, Civic IDEA

Ani Kintsurashvili – Senior Researcher, Civic IDEA

Vusal Guliyev – Fellow, the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University

Gubad Ibadoghlu – Senior Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Umedjon Majidi – Anti Corruption Expert, Sarajevo, BIH

Gia Jandieri – Director, New Economic School of Georgia

Danila Bekturganov – Director, NGO “Civil Expertise”

Denis Cenusa – Associated Expert, Think Tank EESC (Lithuania) / Think Tank Expert-Grup (Moldova)

Civic IDEA is also grateful to National Endowment for Democracy and the US Embassy for their immense support and contribution.

Georgia’s Foreign Debt Policies: PRC’s bank among Georgia’s top creditors

Civic IDEA started observing Georgia’s foreign debt policy after the Georgian Dream officially refused financial assistance from the European Union. It turns out that Georgia is still actively borrowing from various financial institutions or directly from other countries, and the two main creditors of the country are the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). On September 21, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which is highly affected by China, officially announced that it would provide the Georgian government with a USD 100 million loan, aiming to strengthen Georgia’s electricity sector. On September 24, ADB already approved a USD 15 million loan to assist Georgia in effectively implementing the vaccination programs. Three weeks before the debt approval from the ADB, the Georgian government publicly refrained from taking 75 million Euros worth of aid from the European Union. According to Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili’s official statement, Georgia has begun the reduction of its foreign debt, and therefore, no additional assistance from the EU was needed. 

Based on the information we have, the question naturally arises: Why does the Georgian government take debt from the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank when their services are twice as expensive as the EU’s? We will provide our readers with a consistent history of when, why and under what conditions the Government of Georgia decided to cooperate with the bank, which was established only recently, in 2016.