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This week’s Global Gateway Forum offers the EU a chance to show global leaders how a focus on democratic values and transparency distinguishes it from China’s Belt and Road. To succeed, this focus should be established from the start, write Sam van der Staak and Paul Maassen.

On 25 October, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will host global leaders for the EU’s first Global Gateway Forum. The 300-billion-euro investment fund aims to be not only more effective but also more democratic than China’s competing Belt and Road initiative.
However, to outperform China and win the hearts and minds of citizens globally, Global Gateway needs to better underscore its commitment to democratic principles.
The EU’s Global Gateway initiative promises to invest 300 billion euros in digital, energy, and transport sectors and strengthen health, education, and research systems across the world.
This week’s Global Gateway Forum offers the EU an opportunity to show global leaders how a focus on values distinguishes it from China’s Belt and Road. Since its launch in 2013, China’s flagship investment vehicle has left a trail of corruption scandals and human rights violations.

One study found that 35% of Belt and Road projects suffered from corruption scandals, labour violations, environmental hazards, and public protests.
By contrast, Global Gateway aims to be more democratic and ‘work for people and planet’. The Global Gateway website presents democratic values as the first of its underlying principles. EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrell has even called Global Gateway’s twin aims “to promote trusted connectivity and democratic values worldwide”.
EU external action is typically most effective when it combines investing in trade or security with investing in foundational values it stands for like democracy and good governance. It has excelled in value-heavy policies such as the war in Ukraine, the Green Deal, digital rules, and COVID-vaccine solidarity.
Conversely, it encounters challenges when promoting interests that clash with its principles, as evident in its historical energy dependence on Russia, the 2020 investment agreement with China, and the recent migration deal with Tunisia.
Yet, despite its ambitions, Global Gateway’s democratic impact is not self-evident. In fact, Global Gateway partner countries constitute a poor reflection of democracy.

According to the Global State of Democracy Indices, only 2 out of 46 partner countries, Costa Rica and Chile, are high-performing in the fields of representation, rule of law, rights and participation. Only eight countries are high-performing in one, two or three of these categories. 25 partner countries 54% score in the low range on the absence of corruption.
The combination of autocratic leadership and poor transparency is a dangerous mix when billions of euros are at stake. If done well, investing in infrastructure can deliver much more than roads and cables.
It can create opportunities for citizens to shape or oversee decisions that will impact their lives. It can be a lever for combating corruption. It can help create a more vibrant level-playing field for the private sector. And it can contribute to building trust in society that democracies deliver for all, not just the powerful elites.
Therefore, if it is to make its economic goals succeed, Global Gateway’s declared focus on democratic values and transparency should be established from the start. The EU can do so in at least four ways.
First, the EU can build a level of conditionality into its investments, by awarding more democratic countries such as Zambia and Nepal higher shares of funds than autocratic and hybrid ones. Partner countries would be rewarded with additional investments when their democracy expands, and reverse conditionality when their democracy backslides.
Second, the EU should avoid the Chinese opaque model, whereby infrastructure projects result from deals with powerful individuals instead of all-of-society investment agreements.
In weak democracies, to guarantee that money is well spent and citizen rights ensured, the EU should tie its initiatives to support parliamentary oversight, auditing capacity (including proven citizen audits like the ones in the Philippines and Nigeria), and media and civic scrutiny.
Evidence shows that collaboration between government and civil society is positively correlated with reforms that are more ambitious and have stronger outcomes. The EU can use the opportunity of the current review of its NDICI global funding instrument to increase the share going to democracy support.

Third, Global Gateway can link investments to democracy at regional and global levels. It can offer partner countries and civil society a seat at the table when designing EU digital rules or climate plans that have a global ripple effect.
Large-scale spending is notoriously prone to waste and corruption, so it is crucial that the EU fosters legitimacy in its investments. It can establish an EU-Global South Technology and Democracy Alliance to support the human-centric use of tech in partner countries.
Lastly, the EU should build the operational capacity to deliver Global Gateway’s democratic ambitions. It should include a democracy lens from the start of each project, instead of as an afterthought. It should develop democratic guidelines on transparency, accountability, and participation for EU Delegation staff dealing with infrastructure and energy projects.
The EU should appoint a democracy coordinator within each Global Gateway project. It should set up an independent screening initiative to audit Global Gateway projects for open and responsive procedures from concept to realization.
If the EU is serious about linking investments to democracy under Global Gateway, as it has regularly mentioned, it has options to implement this successfully.
Doing so will not only ensure this massive investment pays off long term for people and the planet but also make it stand out from China’s opaque practices that have enraged citizens from Kenya to Cambodia.
Most importantly, the values-driven approach will win the hearts and minds of its global partners, which the EU so sorely needs in an increasingly multipolar world.

Sam van der Staak is the director for Europe at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). Paul Maassen is the chief country support and secretary-general for Europe at the Open Government Partnership (OGP).

Link ?

https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/opinion/to-outperform-china-eus-global-gateway-should-underscore-its-democratic-ambitions/

On October 15-17, 2023 chairperson of Civic IDEA, Tinatin Khidasheli attended the “Forum 2000” held in Prague, where she participated as a speaker in two discussions.

On October 16 she participated in a panel called, “Claiming the Center in Georgia “. This panel highlights women politicians in Georgia addressing political polarization by promoting centrist parties and parliamentary collaboration. Empowering women is vital for overcoming personal rivalries and restoring democratic reform and European integration. While the Georgian population favors European integration, the government builds ties with Russia and China. Recent polarization between the UNM and GD overshadowed smaller center parties, limiting political representation. The October 2024 elections offer a chance for change with new collaboration-friendly rules. Young women leaders such as those on this panel can renew Georgian politics through cooperation and representing new voices.

On October 17 Tinatin Khidasheli participated in a panel called, ,, Is the Chinese World Replacing Russkiy Mir in Central Asia and the Caucasus?’’ While the Kremlin may pretend Russia is still a global power capable of imposing its will on its neighbours, in reality, Russia’s capacity to project real power is weakening and will continue to wane. Meanwhile, China is systematically penetrating Central Asia and the Caucasus, regions previously thought to be ”Russian turff” and filling the vacuum. Even Russia is increasingly dependent on China. Europe, as usual, is behind the curve. With so much of Europe’s attention to Ukraine, this encroachment by China into the Caucasus and Central Asia has been overlooked. What is the current state of affairs? What can be done to draw attention to the risks of growing Chinese influence in the region? Alongside participation in the panel, Tinatin Khidasheli leads the Forum 2000 China working group.

In July this year, Georgian experts and the political community were surprised when, during the visit of Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili to China, the two sides issued a joint statement on the establishment of a Strategic Partnership. The document has been criticised by experts for its perceived imbalance between Chinese and Georgian interests and concerns.

This month, Prime Minister Garibashvili announced visa-free travel for Chinese citizens and the government’s intention to increase the number of direct flights to China to “further facilitate tourism.” This was followed by statements from Georgian officials that they would welcome Chinese investment in the strategically important infrastructure project for Georgia, the Anaklia deep-sea port. Indeed, today the Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development, Levan Davitashvili, revealed that the Sino-Singaporean consortium has been selected as one of the two finalists in the selection process for the Anaklia port private partnership.

Against the backdrop of ambivalent relations with Georgia’s strategic partners – the EU and the US – these developments raise concerns and question marks. What does it all mean, and what are the implications for Georgia’s established foreign policy priorities?

Armed with these questions, we turned to Tinatin (Tina) Khidasheli, chair of the Georgian think-tank Civic Idea, which studies Sino-Georgian relations. Tina Khidasheli is a former Georgian Defense Minister and former Member of Parliament.

Civil.ge:Georgia recently announced a visa-free regime for Chinese citizens “to boost trade, investment, and tourism” alongside the establishment of a “Strategic Partnership” with China. While this move has been met with both praise and criticism, what is your assessment? What potential benefits and risks do you see for Georgia in this decision, especially considering the country’s aspirations for NATO and EU integration?

For a country like Georgia, which has a very flexible visa policy, the “boosting trade, investment and tourism” argument is pure speculation. The visa regime has never prevented Chinese investors from coming to Georgia, as the process is very easy, cheap and hassle-free. It is more of a political statement than a practical step.

After issuing a statement on strategic cooperation, the Georgian government felt the need to act and, without looking at the actual consequences of the action, came up with this idea as a first step with a political flavor, almost similar to the announcement of the first Chinese-run World Trade Expo on 23-25 September. We will see many initiatives in the coming weeks leading up to the Silk Road Forum at the end of October.

The bigger problem with all these decisions, including the establishment of a visa-free regime, is that even in dealing with a country like China, the Georgian government has no concrete medium- or long-term plan, development strategy or risk assessment documents. We do not see any planning for medium- or long-term goals and outcomes that the government wants to achieve, but a very concrete domestic agenda goal to sell increased Sino-Georgian cooperation as a counterbalance to the government’s total failure on the Western front, be it with the EU or the US.

Civil.ge:Given the commitment made by the government of Georgia in its agreement with China, particularly regarding adherence to the ‘one-China principle,’ support for initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) and considering other European countries’ decisions to withdraw from initiatives like the BRI what is your perspective on the potential implications of such a commitment?

Again, these are all political decisions so far, without any particular substance or understanding of what the actual results will be for Georgia. I do not expect these principles to have any immediate practical effect on the Sino-Georgian affair, nor do I expect any immediate reactions from the West. The fact that the Georgian government, without any consultation with the Parliament or the Commander-in-Chief (President of Georgia), took the liberty of joining the GSI, which was created and delivered as an anti-US and anti-NATO strategic statement, says a lot.

The GSI recognizes, approves and promotes the idea of the UN as the one and only institution guaranteeing world peace and prosperity. It denies the importance of other institutions and recognizes the legitimate interests of countries in self-defense in cases and decisions that are absolutely outside the jurisdiction, territory or legitimacy of any particular country. To make the case easier, we need to remember simple facts. The GSI was launched and presented after Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. Accordingly, it is seen as the PRC’s response to the invasion. It accepts the legitimacy of Russia’s claim that NATO’s enlargement threatens Russia and declares it a strategic concern in Russia’s case. It does not explicitly legitimize Russia’s aggression, but it declares these legitimate concerns to be grounds for serious consideration. Georgia has unilaterally recognized the GSI and pledged to abide by its principles, notwithstanding its clear confrontation with our most important long-term strategic partner in defense and security.

It is difficult now to predict exactly what the consequences for Georgia will be, but it is fair to say that the language of the strategic declaration, as well as its release so close to a historic decision on EU candidate status, is a pure provocation by the government. It fits in perfectly with the rhetoric we have recently heard from the mayor of Tbilisi, Kaladze, about NATO.

Civil.ge: The term “strategic partnership” often implies the possibility of military cooperation and intelligence-sharing. How do you view the potential for such cooperation between Georgia and China, and what implications might this have for the region and Georgia’s Western alliances?

So far, there is no visible sign of any planned military/defence cooperation. We have only had two attempts to bring the Chinese into the defense sector: the Motor Sich case and a promise of a military training exchange that never materialized, mainly due to the intervention of Covid.

To some extent, as long as Georgia sticks to the NATO agenda (also for PR purposes), I do not really see the possibility of official Sino-Georgian military cooperation. China does not usually start by moving its military officers or personnel around. Another obstacle is Sino-Russian defense cooperation and joint military training, where again it would be absolutely suicidal for the Georgian government to participate.

As for intelligence sharing, in a sense, we are already doing it by keeping Chinese Nuchtech on our borders. So, making it official in treaties will depend totally on the turn Georgia will make after the 2024 elections.

Civil.ge:It has been suggested that China uses strategic partnerships with small states to exert influence and secure support for its global initiatives. What role do you see Georgia playing in the broader context of China’s Initiatives and its ambitions in the South Caucasus and Central Asia?

It is absolutely clear that the main interests of the PRC lie in Central Asia and the resources of the Caspian Sea. Georgia, by virtue of its geographical and political position, is an integral part of the whole scheme. As I see it, the July 2023 statement on strategic partnership was not so much about the materialization of the huge amount of concrete plans as it was about locking in Georgia as a sphere of interest. I call it the PRC’s master plan to replace “Russki Mir” with Confucius World for the time when all the above principles and plans will be activated.

It should also be mentioned that the statement on strategic partnership goes even deeper and provides that Georgia will coordinate its activities with the PRC at the level of an international organization. Therefore, we should not be surprised if one day Georgia will start voting with the Chinese voice instead of the EU or the US in the UN or other organizations.

Civil.ge:As Civic IDEA closely monitors the ongoing developments in Georgia’s cooperation with China and continues to investigate potential risks and misconduct in various sectors, including infrastructure, economics, and education, could you elaborate on the specific concerns and irregularities that your organization has uncovered during its five years of research? Additionally, what recommendations or measures do you propose for Georgia to address these concerns, enhance transparency, and promote accountability in its relationship with China?

This is a very big question, and you can find all the answers in our reports. Each report has a summary of problems demonstrating the magnitude of misconduct or risks to the country, including corruption risks.

Civil.ge:Given the evolving dynamic in which Russia and China appear to be united in challenging the Western liberal democratic world order, especially as evidenced by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and their joint efforts to forge multilateral institutions, and given China’s role in financing Russia’s actions and blocking sanctions against Russia, what strategies or safeguards can Georgia implement to protect its interests and maintain its relations with both China and the West?

We believe in cooperation, so there is nothing in our policy paper recommendations against Sino-Georgian cooperation. There’s always room to do more, and the Georgian government could have successfully worked on mutually beneficial treaties and agreements. The problem with the 31 July statement is that it is absolutely one-sided, and represents the whole spectrum of issues that the PRC is concerned about, but none of them reflect the interests of Georgia. So our recommendation is simple: at least work with the principles of reciprocity in mind when drafting these documents.

But if we look at the bigger picture, it is absolutely clear that Georgia has a chance to become stronger and have more influence with the major regional players only if and when it is supported by the Western alliances and allies. Close cooperation with the EU and the Americans has always helped Georgia to get maximum results from all cooperation agreements with third countries, and this is no different in the case of the PRC. Obviously, we are slowly but surely losing the power and influence that we have steadily gained through our firm commitment to EU and NATO membership and the transformation of the country into a European-style liberal democracy.

Georgia’s only competitive advantage in this volatile region is its firm European aspirations, its democratisation and its setting an example of democratic success for the region, and I do not mean just the post-Soviet space. This is what makes transit through Georgia attractive and an obvious choice from Russia or Iran. We seem to be losing this competitive advantage.

Civil.ge: And finally, how would you comment to the today’s announcement by the Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development Levan Davitashvili who revealed that one of the two finalists in the Anaklia Deep Sea Port private partnership selection competition is a Chinese-Singaporean consortium, without naming it though?

The Sino-Singaporean consortium, or even the Swiss-Luxembourg consortium, does not tell us much because where the company is registered does not tell us much about it. The biggest problem at the moment is that the information is completely classified. There is no reason why the government should not publish a list of companies interested in the bid, or why it should talk to citizens in riddles, but unfortunately this has become a very common practice. In the meantime, it prevents us from doing due diligence, and until that happens, there should be public scrutiny.

LInk: ?

https://civil.ge/archives/560558?fbclid=IwAR06SR-JQdN9dxJIgk-4ibiLWmqW2ZvLPrOkjqhsvf9LKYak9_8FTG-u_aY

Tinatin Khidasheli’s comment following the meeting with Josep Borrell is as follows: “Not illusionary, but rather based on the information I have at this moment, we anticipate getting the candidate status. The sole factor that could hinder this achievement is if, within the next three months, the “Georgian Dream” proposes something akin to a new “Russian law” or engage in actions of such an extreme nature that it makes it impossible for us to obtain the candidate status”.
https://www.amerikiskhma.com/embed/player/0/7260606.html?type=video
The full article is available at
https://www.amerikishkhma.com/a/josep-borrehttps://www.amerikiskhma.com/a/josep-borrell-irakli-gharibashvili-eu-membership-georgia/7260660.htmlll-irakli-gharibashvili-eu-membership-georgia/7260660.html?fbclid=IwAR0IOiLscOeb5WdeTDCipxrcnQ0IJMuPZL5vaCCB_9wgajVwEniEqCLB1nI

www.amerikishkhma.com

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has reported on Sino-Georgia partnership in its article “The Controversial Company That Opened The Door For China’s Growing Influence in Georgia”. The article overviews Sino-Georgia’s business deals, with a particular focus on the notorious Chinese company CEFC, where Georgia’s current PM, Irakli Gharibashvili, served as an advisor and which owns 75% of Poti FIZ.
“Civic IDEA was the first to call attention to CEFC’s work in Georgia and Chinese investments in the country. According to the NGO’s research, every infrastructure project in Georgia worth more than $100 million since Garibashvili returned as prime minister in 2021 has involved Chinese firms.“

For more see the article: ?

https://www.rferl.org/a/china-growing-influence-georgia-garibashvili-cefc-energy/32582441.html

As it is known from the strategic partnership document, Sino-Georgian cooperation will be strengthened and intensified in four dimensions. Those are

• Political
• Economic
• People to people and cultural cooperation, and
• International.

Thus the discussion aimed at addressing the essence of strategic partnership, the potential for the materialization of the promises made, and the risks associated with it. The first logical question is: why does a small state like Georgia represent such a priority for China, and how does the strategic partnership with the PRC work in the future?

Here is the summary and are some of the takeaways from the discussion:

The basic idea of such strategic partnerships is to make the world a safe place for the Chinese Communist Party and the PRC to operate in general with less criticism on the international level by facilitating free export-import relations, establishing trade routes that benefit the PRC and ensuring the state’s security. Small countries in the UN system have the right to vote and have a prominent place. The strategic partnership with China makes the small states obliged to vote in favor of its needs, while in response to this, they become dependent on China’s goodwill in terms of certain economic benefits. China has been building the alternative, post-western international world order by offering

• Belt and Road Initiative in 2013,
• The Global Development Initiative in 2021,
• The Global Security Initiative in 2022,
• The Global Civilization Initiative in 2023.

Ensuring PRC’s leverage on small states is precisely the main objective behind the GSI, the GDI, and the GCI that are signed within the strategic partnership. The PRC uses such partnerships to demonstrate to the world that various states are signing its “anti-hegemonic”, “multipolar”, “tolerant” initiative.

At the initial stage of the strategic partnership, there is no concrete content behind it. Nonetheless, content is filled gradually once the small states adhere to their support for the PRC and its global policy direction. The current document does not commit Georgia to pursue any specific course of action. There exists certain freedom in principle for Georgians to decide their own fate. Nonetheless, the PRC will exert significant political pressure on Georgia, making it committed to certain principles that go against NATO membership or any other Western institution. With signing the agreement, Georgia concedes a lot, accepting all of the PRC’s main initiatives without any reciprocity from China.

As for the country-specific interests, in Georgia’s case, deep sea ports (Anaklia and Poti Fiz), Georgia’s role in securing trade routes to Europe alternative to the ones crossing the Russian territory, contracts for Chinese companies operating in the infrastructure sector remain crucial to deepen the relations further and attract the Chinese investments which have not been materialized yet in a full-scale. Together with that, strategic partnerships usually cause economic entanglement, in the end resulting in economic coercion. In other words, increasing economic dependence on China is dangerous due to the non-existence of legal mechanisms to stop the pressure from Beijing and its preferences.

The PRC and Russia both claim to crave peace and stress the multipolarity, while they crave the lack of accountability and enforcement against the Authoritative powers for them to secure themselves from being accused of human rights violations, achieve corruption deals easily etc. Usually, any action that weakens Russia and its interests does not benefit the PRC either, as, despite all differences in interests, both authoritarian powers are united against the West and especially the liberal democratic world order. It is also visible when it comes to the war in Ukraine, where the PRC maintains “neutrality” portrayed in disinformation campaigns, military and economic support, and benefiting Russian interests.

Moreover, the Sino-Georgian strategic partnership is directed towards neutralizing Georgia’s potential to join NATO and the EU and become the sole South Caucasian member of these alliances. Georgia sits in the middle both geographically (playing a significant role in the middle corridor initiative) and geopolitically (aspiring to join the Western alliances, the EU and NATO). While the balance of power between Russia and China is shifting nowadays due to weakened Russia amid the Western sanctions and the war in Ukraine, the PRC might pursue more assertive policies in South Caucasus and Central Asia. Therefore, the PRC will try to break Georgia away from the Western trajectory and bring it closer to its own orbit.

In addition to that, the Global Security Initiative (GSI) requires special attention due to its unspoken content, including dubious and controversial principles such as “Indivisible Security”.  This notion originated from the Soviet Union and integrates the idea that violation of the state’s national sovereignty by another state can be justified once the other’s (violator’s) strategic interests are put in jeopardy. Consequently, the “indivisible Security” legitimated Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The efforts made by Georgia and China very much resemble the occurrences in Central and Eastern Europe, such as the 16+1 initiative 10 years ago. Back then, many European states were craving for boosted political and economic partnership with the PRC, signing agreements and accepting offerings from Beijing while unaware of what they were signing for. Besides, the agreements were usually signed unexpectedly, without any pre-conditions, lacking democratic debate and transparency. Unsurprisingly, such agreements have either never been realized or caused negative results.
The geopolitical situation is changing very quickly, especially with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and playing both East and West scenarios is becoming impossible. Central and Eastern European leaderships have acknowledged this; however, this occasion did not serve as a lessons-learned approach for Georgia.

Another worthy example is Italy, which has been the liaison with the BRI since 2019. The agreement with both states was signed without any democratic debate due to the success of Chinese people-to-people diplomacy. All of this has not benefited Italy, but it undermined it’s standing as a trusted partner in G7, the EU, and NATO. Therefore, it is no surprise that due to these disadvantages, Italy is planning to leave the BRI. Even though there exists a will to leave, the signed document does not provide any clearance regarding how to do it. What is evident by now is that Italy will have to pay the price for exiting the BRI.

Is the Georgian government unaware of those risks? Or do they have their own motives despite the risks?

Weak institutionalized electoral democracies have to deliver public goods to their people. The PRC arrives with loans to subsidize infrastructure, bringing their state-owned enterprises, building ports, highways, bridges, and developing mines without any immediate costs to the nation. Governments look at Chinese investments positively as they do not have to pay the debt because it is transferred to their successor authorities. The government can win votes in elections with this strategy. Secondly, PRC investments provide tremendous opportunities for kickbacks and local corruption, resulting in elite capture. It can be very attractive for local officials who crave to enrich themselves and prioritize their personal interests over the state’s interests.

The European country of Georgia has announced an upgrade in bilateral ties with China, to what both are calling a “strategic partnership.” It is part of a foreign policy shift, that has seen Tbilisi friendlier to authoritarian states, including Russia.

In the deal with China, Georgia commits to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing promises Tbilisi preferential lending from Chinese banks, for possible projects including a new international airport, a deep sea port, and several hydroelectric power stations.