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On May 29, 2024, the Georgian Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development, Levan Davitashvili, announced that the public-private partnership selection process winner for Anaklia port development will be a Chinese-Singaporean consortium. This decision marks a significant shift in Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and raises security concerns due to the geopolitical implications of increased Chinese involvement.

CHOICE (China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe) reached out to Civic IDEA to provide expert analysis on the implications of the Anaklia Sea Port project for Georgia and Europe. Lawyer/Researcher Ketevan Gelashvili and researcher Aksana Akhmedova from Civic IDEA have prepared an in-depth article examining every crucial detail on this subject.

Full Link 👇

The dynamics of international relations have been fundamentally altered by the global pandemic’s far-reaching impact and Russia’s full-scale conventional warfare in Ukraine. The common understanding stood that the post-coronavirus era would usher in a new world order, with the invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions against Russia further bolstering this contention. While the entire democratic world is concentrated on fighting one crisis after another, we also see the shifts in the behavior and positions of individual states, security alliances and international organizations.

International society is in the middle of significant transitions, revising goals and values and adjusting new policies toward the changing world order. It is the time to redefine the terms, mandates, search for new partners and new allies, and mark red lines. It is exactly the objective of this essay, to identify specific problems and policy shortcomings revealed amid recent global developments and the absolute necessity for the security alliances to consider, building resilience and boosting effective and timely cooperation with relevant parties aimed at rapid response and effective prevention of crises in the future.

The COVID-19 pandemic has become the most unprecedented global challenge the world has faced since World War II. The early alarms regarding the outbreak were elusive and unbelievable for all, resulting in the absence of prompt reactions and a number of political, economic, and health policy setbacks. In line with these obstacles, the virus has also shown the states their own insecurities. Countries acted spontaneously, and prioritized individual needs as opposed to collective strategies within the alliances to combat the virus jointly. The lack of solidarity at the initial stage negatively affected the mobilization, coordination, and allocation of necessary resources to combat the pandemic in the early phase. Together with uncoordinated action, unfamiliarity with the virus, the absence of sufficient medical equipment and treatments, and the shortages of vaccines caused total chaos in the world. In the early stage of fighting the pandemic EU and NATO missed the most important asset, unparalleled knowledge and strength available to them when joining forces and getting into collective action. Hence, the crisis instigated a severe blow to the world population and struck the global market as well, leaving long-term damaging consequences.

Timely assessment and recognition of failures and shortcomings brought by individual action strengthened democratic alliances and brought us to the strongest ever united democratic front against the unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine.

Why did this happen only now? It certainly is not the first demonstration of Russian aggression. The events of 2008 and 2014 have already exposed Russia to stirring up conflicts, occupying territories of independent states, and then using them as leverage to manipulate its neighbors, prevent progress, and their integration into the Western economic and security alliances. The democratic world united against Russia only after Kremlin turned the conflict that started in 2014 into a full-scale war in Ukraine, bringing back fear of war in Europe and reminding the largest and strongest alliances, the EU and NATO of their original mission to keep Europe united and in peace. The war in Europe facilitated rapid change in policies and caused an increase in defense spending and arms production.

Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, it is important to highlight two additional issues: the PRC and its role in the new world order and the threat of global nuclear conflict.

The Chinese factor is a common feature of the pandemic and the war since it is equally relevant in both cases. The PRC’s concealment of the covid outbreak, information manipulation, and subsequent wide-scale “covid diplomacy” led to the massive transmission of the virus, nurturing disastrous global economic and health crises. The Chinese factor is also noteworthy precisely because of the global game it has played so far, according to which, on the one hand, it calls itself the “peacemaker”, and on the other hand, as an authoritarian state, provides indirect economic and military support to another authoritarian state, Russia, against the Western security alliances.

The war in Ukraine also revived the concept of nuclear security as the risks of inadvertent nuclear escalation increased. It likewise highlighted the ineffectiveness of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, thereby raising doubts about the credibility of security alliances and the promises they have made, placing the onus on them to offer complete support to Ukraine. Therefore, as long as nuclear weapons are in the hands of authoritarian states, this issue should not lose its relevancy for security alliances, as mismanagement will have enormously irreversible results for the whole world.

The crisis of the last years brought the existing international world order under huge pressure. The experience of the pandemic proved that we could take nothing for granted and even the strongest alliances, united by the strongest bonds of common values, markets, and security dilemmas, might crumble against the invisible and unknown enemy. However, success is determined not only by how we react initially but, more importantly, by recognizing shortcomings, accurate assessment, and immediate action for improvement and eradication of causes of failures. Regardless of all the problems, democracies came out more robust from the covid crisis, even more, enchanted by the magic of unity and solidarity.

Rigorous and reliable cooperation under the umbrella of security alliances serves as vital mechanisms for collective action, fostering the consolidation of resources, expertise, and collaborative endeavors to effectively confront shared challenges while promoting global security and stability. Different from and learning from the mistakes of covid pandemic, Russia’s brutal aggression in Ukraine unified the democratic world and facilitated an even stronger commitment to peace and liberty based on respect for the sovereignty of the democratic states and freedom of choice over partnership and alliances. Faced by the brutality of conventional war in Europe, brought the alliances to look ahead and pay special attention to authoritarian states beyond Russia, creating leverage by initially reducing cooperation, and lowering economic/diplomatic dependence on them. With these means and united action, we aim at rapidly preventing future crises, the security alliances must never stop working to develop even more efficient universal policy directives for themselves and to share with the partner parties.

From April 5-8, 2023, world’s media focused on Beijing, where French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen met with senior officials from the People’s Republic of China, including President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang. Given the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine and rising tensions in Sino-American relations, this state visit was thought-provoking. What were the main goals, issues, and outcomes of the visit? I will try to answer these and other questions in this blog.

Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to China started on April 5 with a large delegation including some ministers, lawmakers and nearly 60 CEOs of top French companies. Before leaving France, President Macron also asked the President of the European Commission for a joint visit to show China and the world that the European Union holds the same position on various topics. Ursula von der Leyen accepted the invitation and joined Macron’s state visit to China.

According to the Foreign affairs website of People’s Republic of China President Xi first met with Macron, then held trilateral talks with Macron and Ursula von der Leyen, before meeting with her bilaterally to discuss China-EU relations. Finally, the French president and Mr. Xi held an informal meeting in Guangzhou, focusing on Sino-French relations. In addition, the main topics discussed at the meetings were China-EU economic relations, the war between Russia and Ukraine and China’s role in resolving the conflict.

EU-China Relations and Europe’s Strategic autonomy

The visit was marked by very important and interesting messages from three leaders regarding EU-China relations. First of all, the messages of the Chinese president were not very different. He reiterated the need that “China-EU relations should not be aligned with, dependent on, or dictated by a third party.” It is clear, of course, that when Xi speaks of a third party, he means the United States and wants to strengthen the idea of “dividing” the West. He also criticized the “democracy versus authoritarianism” and the new Cold War era narratives, mentioning that “these only bring division and confrontation to the world.” He goes even further and calls on Europe to stand together with China against “Hegemonism and Unilateralism.“, again directed at the United States.

At the trilateral meeting, President Xi made the idea of exclusive cooperation between the EU and China very clear. While the United States is trying to “decouple” from his country, President Xi reaffirmed that “China supports Europe in achieving strategic autonomy.”

The idea of Europe’s strategic autonomy is not strange for President Macron. The term refers to the EU’s ability to act independently in areas of strategic importance. These areas include defense policy, the economy, technologies and much more. According to some EU leaders, especially in the field of defense, the European Union is very dependent on NATO and the United States. That is why Macron and some other leaders support the idea of strategic autonomy – they want to see the European Union as an independent and strong player on the world stage.

Europe’s strategic autonomy is attractive to China: it is in Beijing’s interest that Europe and the United States be less interconnected. The Chinese government sees this as an opportunity to improve its relationship with the EU. Given the rising economic tensions in Sino-US relations, this goal is especially crucial. That is why President Macron was welcomed by his Chinese counterpart with great pomp and respect. The informal meeting between Xi and Macron in Guangzhou over a cup of tea proved once again that the Chinese president is very interested in cooperation with France.

No to decoupling, yes to de-risking

But Europe’s strategic autonomy is also involving less dependence on China in several areas. On March 30, President von der Leyen gave a speech on EU-China relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre ahead of her visit to China. In her view, the EU should focus not on “decoupling” but on “de-risking” from China. This message was also repeated by her and shared by Macron in Beijing during the visit.

Where does the idea of “decoupling” come from ? This issue was first discussed in Washington as a response to the heavy economic dependence on China. In relations with Beijing, the United States has taken a tougher stance – since Trump, Washington has pursued a strategy of “decoupling” economic ties with China, and this process continues under the Biden administration. For Europe, it is not realistic to decouple completely from China, but European leaders also know that dependence on Beijing carries high risks. This is why the EU prefers the “de-risking” strategy, which, according to Ursula Von der Leyen, contains several specific ways to deal with the different risks, such as diversifying trade and investment relations, technology transfers, etc.

Russia-Ukraine War

The war between Russia and Ukraine was another central topic of the visit. In this regard, the European leaders stressed the importance of involving China, a member of the UN Security Council, in the “promotion of a just peace”, which respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Macron and Ursula wanted to convince XI to use its “special” relationship with Putin to stop Russian aggression against Ukraine, but there was no concrete promise from China in this sense. However, in the meeting with Macron, Xi and his French counterpart agreed that they are opposed to a nuclear war and to escalating the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in that direction.

Another key message sent by Europeans was about arming Russia. As we know, the Biden administration recently stated that China was considering providing lethal aid to Russia; Though It has already been proven that the PRC is only sending non-lethal aid to Russia, including helmets and body armor, but if it decides to send lethal aid as well, it would pose a serious threat to international security. That’s why after the meetings with Xi and Chinese Premier Li Qiang, the president of the European Commission told the media that she had warned China not to supply military equipment, directly or indirectly, to Russia. In addition, Ursula Von der Leyen made it clear that if Beijing decided to arm the aggressor, “this would significantly damage” relations between the EU and China. According to the French diplomat, after Mr. Macron asked Mr. Xi not to arm Russia, President Xi replied that “it was not his war.” When Emmanuel Macron and Ursula von der Leyen left China, the EU’s position on this issue was reaffirmed by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany – Annalena Baerbock. On April 14, during her visit to China and meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in Beijing, they discussed this issue and the Chinese minister said, “We do not and will not deliver weapons to the conflicting parties at a later date.”

It is clear that for the EU, any Chinese lethal aid for Russia in the war would be seen as crossing the line. In addition, European leaders are asking China to become actively involved in ending the war between Russia and Ukraine, as Beijing is the only country that still has influence over Russia. However, the only concrete consensus during Macron and Ursula’s visit on the Russia-Ukraine war was President Xi’s promise to call Zelensky when the conditions and timing are right.

Taiwan issue

The high-level EU-China state visit obviously did not take place without the issue of Taiwan. On this subject, the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, was more critical. Both she and Macron reaffirmed their loyalty to the “one-China policy”, but Macron tried to avoid discussing critical issues with Xi, such as Taiwan and China’s human rights violations, while Ursula, on the Taiwan issue, mentioned that “the threat to use force to change the status quo is unacceptable“.

On his departure from China, Emmanuel Macron took questions from the French press on the plane, and his answers on the issue of Taiwan were controversial. In particular, he told the media that Europe ran a “great risk” of being involved in crises “that are not ours,” which would make it more difficult to build the EU’s strategic autonomy. He goes even further and said that “The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this (Taiwan) topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction.” These statements became the main topic of the world’s media after China began large-scale military exercises around the island of Taiwan, just hours after the French president left Guangzhou to return to Paris. Macron’s views on Taiwan have been welcomed in China, but of course were criticized by some European policymakers. Annalena Baerbock’s statements on the issue show that Macron’s views are not shared by all European leaders. Indeed, during her visit to China on April 12, she condemned the recently launched military exercises around Taiwan and said Germany “cannot be indifferent” to the escalating tensions.

Other important results of the visit

While Emmanuel Macron was in China with CEOs of major French companies, it was clear from the beginning of the state visit that he was in Beijing to strengthen economic relations with China. Macron has signed several agreements for French companies in sectors such as pork, wind power, cosmetics and civil nuclear power. During this visit, France and PRC also issued a 51-point joint declaration on cooperation in various fields ranging from security to culture. The President of the European Commission also stressed the importance of continued cooperation between China and the EU on climate change and other common goals, but as she focused on “de-risking” for the EU economy, she did not sign a concrete agreement in Beijing.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can say that the joint visit of Macron and Leyen to China was an attempt by European leaders to show their unity with regard to the EU’s foreign policy towards Beijing. It is true that on some issues, Macron acted more like a “good cop”, while Ursula chose a “bad cop” stance and at times criticized Chinese policy on several issues, including Taiwan and human rights in the Xinjiang region. However, the two EU leaders did manage to agree on two key messages: On the Russia-Ukraine war, they told President Xi that arming Russia would significantly damage EU-China relations and China should be actively involved in ending the war. Regarding EU-China relations, their message was that the EU does not follow the U.S. strategy of “decoupling” and prefers to “de-risk” from China. Time will tell if this strategy is effective or not.

On March 20, 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping embarked on his first visit to Russia since the beginning of the Ukraine war. The three-day visit conveyed significant signals to the international community and highlighted the burgeoning partnership between the two powers.

As the war in Ukraine persists, China has found itself balancing multiple objectives. On the one hand, it calls for an end to the hostilities, but on the other hand, it maintains a strong strategic partnership with Russia. Despite the ongoing war, trade between Beijing and Moscow continues to grow, and Chinese and Russian diplomats remain in frequent contact. Even military exercises between the two nations continue without interruption. While Chinese state media does not often directly endorse Russia’s territorial claims in Ukraine, it consistently blames NATO and the United States for the conflict. Prior to their recent meeting, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin had already met more than 40 times, cementing their bond as fellow autocrats who speak the language of power.

Here are some key takeaways from the meeting:

The meeting took place amidst some crucial international developments: the Japanese Prime Minister’s surprise visit to Kyiv, the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant issued for Vladimir Putin, and the U.S. warning China not to back Russia in the Ukraine war.

The warm meeting between the two leaders that took place despite these implications is a message in and of itself.

The Ukraine War

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the meeting hadn’t resulted in any progress toward resolving the war in Ukraine. Both sides emphasized the importance of decreasing tensions and not “prolonging the war in Ukraine”. However, the fact that Russia’s invasion was the initial cause of the war was not acknowledged.  Both countries have refused to call the Russian invasion “war”, instead calling on NATO to “respect the sovereignty” of other states.

The leaders also referenced the controversial 12-point peace proposal presented by the PRC last month that was supposed to deal with the ongoing war in Ukraine. The Chinese attempt to become the main negotiator in the conflict was criticized by the West, as it did not suggest Russia withdraw its forces. However, during the meeting, Putin stated that “he viewed China’s proposals for a resolution of the Ukraine conflict with respect.” On the other hand, Xi Jinping once again pointed out Beijing’s “neutral position” on the war in Ukraine and called for dialogue.

Economic and Energy Cooperation

Besides the clear political support, the visit also served as a clear reaffirmation of close economic ties between China and Russia. Both leaders mentioned that they “will build a closer energy partnership, supporting companies from both countries in advancing cooperation projects in oil, gas, coal, electricity and nuclear energy.” According to Putin, Russia welcomes Chinese businesses to replace the western companies that have left the country since the start of the war in Ukraine.

In the media statement, Putin mentioned that the possibility of expanding Russian gas exports to China was discussed, along with the potential development of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline through Mongolia. While Putin highlighted the pipeline as a replacement for the defunct Nord Stream 2 line delivering gas to Europe, Xi did not explicitly mention it during the briefing.

– The Power of Siberia, a cross-border pipeline carrying natural gas from Russia, was officially launched on December 2, 2019. It runs for 3,000 km through Siberia and extends through China’s eastern side, including the capital, to Shanghai. The final section is scheduled to commence delivering gas in 2025. Despite Russia’s $55 billion investment in the pipeline, only $3.81 billion worth of natural gas imports have been made through the pipeline since December 2019. Gas supply from the Power of Siberia 1 pipeline reached 10.4 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2021 and 15 bcm in 2022. For 2023, volumes are expected to reach 22 bcm. The second pipeline – The Power of Siberia 2 – could double gas exports from Russia to China, crossing through Mongolia and into the industrial regions near Beijing. Russia will deliver at least 98 bcm of gas to the PRC by 2030. The importance of the pipeline is growing as Moscow is looking for a way to replace European countries as its major gas importer – Moscow wants Power of Siberia 2 to replace the Nord Stream 2 pipeline (For comparison, the Nords Stream 2 pipeline was expected to deliver 5.6 bcm of Russian gas to Europe). However, according to experts, China will not need additional gas supply until 2030.

Cooperation in the energy sector has also been a crucial part of Sino-Russian relations after the war. As Europe has been taking steps to cut down its reliance on Moscow’s energy, China’s share of Russian energy exports has been growing astonishingly – Beijing’s spending on Russian crude oil, coal, and natural gas, shot up to $88 billion in the year through February, compared to $57 billion in the previous 12 months. However, Russia’s gas exports to the PRC are still a tiny fraction of the record 177 bcm it delivered to Europe in 2018-19.

It is worth mentioning that after the Western economic sanctions on Russia, it has been becoming increasingly dependent on growing economic relations with Beijing – trade between the countries has grown by nearly 20 percent this year, up from $190 billion in 2022.

Military

During the meeting, Moscow and Beijing committed to strengthening their military exchanges and cooperation while also conducting joint maritime and aerial patrols. Additionally, they expressed concerns about NATO’s growing military-security ties with Asia-Pacific countries and opposed external military forces undermining regional peace and stability. Ever since the start of the war in Ukraine, both nations have been actively participating in joint drills around the world. According to the joint statement, the partnership between the two countries had reached its highest level ever. However, the statement clarified that this partnership was not a military-political alliance and was not directed against any other country. It emphasized that the relationship between Russia and the PRC was not confrontational and not aimed at any third country, and it did not constitute a bloc.

“New Era of Cooperation”

During their talks at the Kremlin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a series of documents regarding “strategic cooperation” between their countries. Putin termed the talks as “successful and constructive.” According to Xi, one of the agreements he signed with Putin has ushered the relationship between the two countries into a “new era” of cooperation.

At the end of the state dinner on Tuesday evening, the Russian leader walked Xi Jinping out – there, in front of the cameras, Xi reiterated his belief that global power dynamics are changing. “Together, we should push forward these changes that have not happened for 100 years. Take care” – were the farewell words of the Chinese leader.

International Response

According to Washington, Xi’s visit suggested that Beijing was providing “diplomatic cover” to Moscow to commit more crimes, given the timing of the visit. The White House spokesperson John Kirby said that there are concerns that China might once again call for a ceasefire that permits Russian forces to remain in Ukrainian sovereign territory, allowing them to consolidate their positions and reignite the war when it is more advantageous for them. Although the PRC has attempted to remain neutral in the Ukraine conflict, the United States has suggested that China’s actions could be a “stalling tactic” to assist Moscow. Washington has accused Beijing of contemplating arms exports to Moscow, a claim that the PRC has vehemently refuted. China has strongly denied the US’s allegations that it is contemplating exporting weapons to Moscow.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia has clearly shown his support for Vladimir Putin and the strengthening partnership between the two countries. The meeting highlighted close economic ties and cooperation in the energy and military sectors, as well as shared concerns over NATO’s growing military-security relations with the Asia-Pacific region. The invitation extended by Xi to the Russian Prime Minister during the visit is also indicative of the deepening cooperation between the two nations.

The fact that the meeting took place against the backdrop of the ongoing Ukraine war further showcases that the PRC’s support towards Ukraine and its territorial integrity is a bluff. On the other hand, The Kremlin’s charm offensive with China is a testament to Russia’s growing isolation from the West and the need to bolster relations with its strategic partner. Finally, this meeting can also be perceived as a clear challenge to the West – China is “flexing its muscles” as it indicates that it can ignore the decisions of the international community and the only way of dealing with Russia actually goes through Beijing.

Establishing political background

In the 90s, since Central Asian nations declared their independence from the Soviet Union, China border negotiations were a priority and on the way. The China-Tajik agreement that was ratified in January 2011 and based on a prior accord between the two governments in 2002 that was reiterated in 2010—cedes about 1,000 square kilometers, or about one percent of Tajikistan, in the sparsely populated Pamir Mountains to China. Tajikistan is concerned that Chinese historians will raise ‘Chinese territories’ in Tajikistan Badakhshan Autonomous Region again as earlier. Tajikistan’s government defined this as a win-win because China previously claimed some 28,000 square kilometers and settled for only about three and a half percent of its claims. Then Presidential Center for Strategic Studies Director, late Suhrob Sharipov, said “if we hadn’t decided to transfer the land, we would not have been able to resist China’s pressure”. It is believed that this solves its border problems with China and ensures its political and economic stability “for decades to come”. Due to its considerable investment in the area, Tajikistan is becoming increasingly dependent on China economically. Tajikistan represents only the latest example of border rectifications in China’s relationships with Central Asia. Central Asian resentments about the border negotiations and uncertainty about Chinese intentions remain close to the surface. Meanwhile, its policy of non-support for Uyghur activities in China continued.

Warm Welcome of China ‘help’ in Central Asia

Central Asian states were initially excited about expanding relations with China. Central Asia welcomed China’s tech-driven approach to security by, for example, adopting Safe City’ development models and projects with hundreds of cameras in their large cities. They deployed facial and numberplate recognition technology, relying on Chinese software and hardware. Some projects, such as Dushanbe’s safe city traffic system, are implemented using official Chinese loans disbursed through the SCO mechanism to purchase Chinese products. While tools such as these are increasingly significant in major cities worldwide, the key question is where the collected data is stored and how it may be used for China’s national security.

Uzbekistan is no more in isolation

During the Karimov era, Uzbekistan stood directly against China’s regional economic initiatives and created direct blocks on some of the projects. Uzbekistan’s perspective was gradually changing. It sought to take advantage of the Chinese economic boom while retaining tight reins of control. This resulted in some illicit or grey trade, while the government slowly allowed China into some market sectors. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have always maintained a certain level of ambivalence, although they have tended more towards seeking to attract Chinese money. As poorer countries, they were grateful for any investment and economic attention, while on the other, they were wary of the unfettered flow of Chinese products.

Digitalization

All member states of the SCO recognize digitalization as an essential step to development. SCO member states have thus welcomed China’s eagerness to share and sell its tech-driven practices and insights. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has made digitalization one of his most urgent tasks and focused on emulating the Chinese model. Kazakhstan praised China’s success. Pointing to a specific Chinese company, Hikvision, he said the company’s techniques “have gone far ahead, they deeply digitalized all major cities. You click on the screen, the data on the person comes out, including literally everything. When he graduated from university, where he goes in his free time, and so on … We need to go in this direction. This is a global trend. I set this task just before our capital’s leadership”. Countries are set on a long-term path of reliance on Chinese technologies, with limited development of local capacity. In a worst-case scenario, this reliance – combined with a lack of local capacity – exposes Central Asian countries to deep potential national security problems, with the little domestic capability to manage these things themselves.

Green Finances

It is trendy in the age of digitization to move the economy to green color, investing more in green and self-sustaining development projects. For example, European countries are interested in investing in green energy, and Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic are rich in water resources and could self-sustain in the coming decades if investing in their development now. Overburdening developing countries with large loans as the Sri Lanka experiment showed, does not bring any good.