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As the flames of conflict continue to burn in Ukraine, an alarming alliance is taking shape, one that could upend the balance of power on the global stage.
PRC’s deepening strategic and military partnership with Russia, which intensified following Russia’s offensive against Ukraine in February 2022, is becoming a significant concern for the United States and NATO. In response to this growing partnership, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has recently emphasized the importance of continuing sanctions on Russia to maintain pressure and curb its aggression. China plays a crucial role in supporting Russia’s defense industrial base.
“Chinese contributions allow Russia to sustain its military efforts. They enabled Russia to keep that defense industrial base going, to keep the war machine going, to keep the war going. So that has to stop.” – Anthony Blinken
Initially, there were doubts about China’s direct support for Russia’s war efforts, particularly regarding the provision of lethal aid. However, recent evidence has unmasked this myth, revealing China’s direct involvement in supplying crucial military components to Russia despite official claims of neutrality. Readers can explore the details and implications of this involvement further in the article. Notably, joint military exercises involving Chinese and Belarusian troops, conducted near the Belarusian city of Brest, just five kilometers from the Polish border, underscore their growing military cooperation. The timing of this drill suggests that the Chinese Communist Party is signaling to the United States its potential willingness to support Russia in a conflict involving NATO and Europe.
Unveiling the Truth: China’s Full-Scale Support for Russia in the Ukraine War
China’s involvement in supporting Russia’s war efforts has been multifaceted despite Beijing’s official neutrality. Recent revelations and documents suggest a more complex reality.
Chinese companies have supplied Russia with essential components to sustain its military operations in Ukraine. For instance, records obtained by BelPol reveal that Shenzhen-based Green Cycle Energy provided Belarusian defense contractor BelOMO Holding with precision parts crucial for laser-guided bombs and missiles. This transaction, which continued even after the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned BelOMO, indicates that Chinese companies contribute to Russia’s arms supply chain despite international sanctions. In fact, China’s support for Russia’s military extends beyond mere supply chains. Chinese firms have been involved in transactions with Belarusian contractors directly linked to Russia’s military efforts. For example, Morotack (Tianjin) Technology supplied critical components to BelOMO, and St. Petersburg-based Precision Laser Systems exported laser-related parts with Chinese-produced laser diodes to Belarusian contractors. This interconnection underscores the deepening ties between the Chinese and Russian defense sectors.
According to a CNN report following Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s discussions with US allies, “China continues to steer clear of providing Russia with lethal weaponry, which the US has warned against since the beginning of the Ukraine war, but in many cases, the inputs can be just as impactful as lethal weaponry.”
Beyond supplying components, there is growing evidence of tactical collaboration between Chinese and Russian defense industries. Reports suggest that Russia is sharing battlefield intelligence with China, potentially revealing vulnerabilities in Western weapons systems. This exchange of information is a concern for the U.S. and allied forces, as it may undermine the effectiveness of their military technology in future conflicts. The U.S. and European countries increasingly focus on tightening sanctions and monitoring Chinese companies involved in this indirect support.
Joint Military Exercises in Belarus: Why Is This Important?
On July 15, 2024, as China and Russia launched joint military exercises in the South China Sea, NATO leaders adopted a joint declaration labeling China a ‘decisive enabler’ of Russia’s war against Ukraine. This declaration came just as Chinese and Belarusian troops commenced their joint exercises near Brest on July 8, sending a clear message to NATO. The drills included anti-terror training, interpreted as a warning signal rather than just a routine exercise. This and the fact that such missions were rare and notable for their timing made the situation more alarming. It implied that China was prepared to directly support Russia and potentially challenge NATO.
The deputy head of the Belarusian Armed Forces claimed the maneuvers were a response to Western aggressive foreign policy and Ukrainian provocations, further escalating tensions. These coordinated military maneuvers underscore the PRC’s strategic objective to not only support Russia but also to challenge and threaten NATO’s presence and influence on its eastern flank.
As Beijing and Moscow strengthen their ties, the West faces an increasingly complex and dangerous geopolitical landscape where the traditional dominance of the United States and its allies is seriously threatened. NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg’s recent remarks reflect this heightened urgency, warning that the world has entered a new era of ‘enduring competition with China.’ Stoltenberg emphasized the interconnectedness of European and Asian security, underscoring NATO’s broader strategic focus. The alliance has also highlighted China’s growing role in supporting Russia’s war efforts, signaling a shift in NATO’s strategic posture towards greater vigilance in the Indo-Pacific region. Especially considering the fact that in the last week of July, extensive naval activities have unfolded in the Indo-Pacific, with over 18 Chinese and Russian Navy ships participating in joint exercises and patrols and the Shandong carrier group concluding a 10-day drill east of Taiwan, highlighting China’s increasing military assertiveness in the region. At the recent NATO Summit, leaders reaffirmed their commitment to countering these threats, strengthening cyber defenses, and enhancing collaboration with Indo-Pacific partners to address the challenges posed by China’s global ambitions. Following this summit, a new NATO plan has been revealed, with Germany preparing to mobilize 800,000 troops and massive logistical support through critical infrastructure in the event of a conflict with Russia. Readers can find a more detailed assessment of this plan and its implications further down in this article.
These events have significant implications. As China and Russia strengthen military ties, NATO’s actions—like bolstering its Eastern Flank and forming strategic Asian partnerships—reflect an escalating global power struggle beyond traditional boundaries.
Additionally, another concern is the potential transfer of battlefield innovations and lessons learned from Ukraine to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). U.S. officials worry that the PLA could adopt Russian military tactics and countermeasures, thereby enhancing its capabilities in a potential conflict with the U.S. or its allies in the Indo-Pacific region. This concern is heightened by the PLA’s involvement in joint exercises with Russia and Belarus, notably the Eagle Assault-2024 drill near Brest. Despite its “anti-terrorism label,” the exercise is perceived as a show of military strength and resolve against NATO, with tasks like hostage rescue masking its true purpose of demonstrating Chinese and Russian military capabilities.
Strategic Implications for NATO and the U.S.
The strategic partnership between China and Russia, often described as a “no limits” partnership, presents a multifaceted challenge to NATO and the U.S. The alliance’s growing military cooperation, particularly in the fields of nuclear and conventional forces, signals a concerted effort to undermine Western influence and security. The recent NATO declaration, which labeled China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, reflects the seriousness with which the alliance views this emerging axis of power.
China’s support for Russia is not limited to military cooperation. The economic ties between the two nations have strengthened significantly since the onset of the Russo-Ukraine war, with trade volumes surging despite international sanctions on Russia. China’s provision of satellite imagery, microelectronics, and other dual-use technologies has been crucial in keeping Russia’s military-industrial complex operational, further entrenching the two countries’ interdependence.
Amid these developments, the world is also focused on the significant military maneuvers occurring in Europe. While attention has been paid to the China-Belarus military exercises, NATO’s new plan to deploy up to 800,000 troops and significant military assets has surfaced. This plan, detailed by Der Spiegel, outlines Germany’s strategy to rapidly mobilize many troops and equipment across Europe, focusing on key routes that could be vulnerable to Russian attacks. In light of this development, China’s strategic posture is increasingly precarious. It can also be said that the challenges posed by China’s support for Belarus (which undermines the strength of international sanctions) might have partly been motivated by NATO’s decision to deploy up to 800,000 troops, reflecting a heightened response to the evolving geopolitical threat. Additionally, the scale and immediacy of NATO’s deployment plan heighten the stakes for China, which has been strengthening its military alliance with Russia and participating in joint exercises with Belarus. The timing of NATO’s readiness measures intensifies China’s sense of vulnerability and urgency, reflecting a growing geopolitical tension as Beijing recalibrates its strategy in response to the expanded Western mobilization.
The special irony lies in China urging Ukraine to de-escalate in Kursk while actively deepening its military and economic ties with Russia, facilitating the killing of not only Ukrainians but also Russians in this war.
One must also take into account that Polish President Andrzej Duda’s visit to China and the threat of closing the Polish-Belarusian border pushed Belarus to make significant governmental changes. Lukashenko appointed pro-China officials, like Dmytry Krutoy, to strengthen ties with Beijing and Moscow. Krutoy, tasked with overseeing relations with Russia and China and advising the new Belarusian ambassador to China, is a technocrat favorable to China. This maneuver ensured Belarus remained a key transit route for Chinese trade, reinforcing its strategic partnership with China while maintaining support from Russia.
China’s influence increasingly overshadows Belarus’s sovereignty. The joint military exercises and Belarus’s entry into the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization exemplify Beijing’s deepening involvement. China’s strategic engagement with Belarus not only bolsters Russia’s position in the Russo-Ukrainian war but also supports autocratic regimes, complicating efforts for a peaceful resolution in Ukraine.
A Broader Geopolitical Shift
The Sino-Russian partnership is also part of a broader geopolitical realignment that includes other authoritarian regimes, such as Iran, North Korea, and Belarus. This emerging axis is challenging the Western-dominated international order and seeking to carve out a new multipolar world. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which recently admitted Belarus as its 10th member, is one platform where these countries coordinate their efforts to counter Western influence.
For NATO and the U.S., the implications of this strategic realignment are becoming increasingly urgent. Recently, Belarus has been positioning itself for a signficant role within BRICS, anticipating a boost in status from the forthcoming summit in Kazan. This move highlights the growing integration of Belarus into a broader coalition of authoritarian states that includes China, Russia, and Iran. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Belarus recently joined, and BRICS, where Belarus is seeking membership, both reflect a concerted effort by these nations to challenge the Western-dominated international order.
This evolving axis is not just symbolic; it poses real challenges. The alliance must prepare for potential coordinated actions across various fronts, including joint military operations and economic tactics, which could destabilize Western democracies. The recent discussions in Minsk, attended by representatives from BRICS and other key states, also underscore the seriousness and complexity of this emerging geopolitical landscape.
Author: Mariam Kasradze
The structure and foundations of international law have been commented on and criticized by people across the globe. Some scholars are skeptical about the justice of the international system and criticize it for being power-influenced or West-centric. People from all around the world claim that the system of international law has been created by Westerners, and it does not apply to the cultural position of other nations. For instance, Gathii (2012) explains that the concept of sovereignty was initially created without consideration of African states.
Therefore, the African states did not qualify to be sovereign as their state structure differed from those requirements created at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which became an excuse for colonization. On the other hand, the current form of international order creates norms that depreciate self-centered governments or unregulated international aid, promoting world development and peace.
The world superpowers play a crucial role in the promotion of an international rules-based system and world order. One of the global superpowers is the People’s Republic of China. The international community has often expressed dissatisfaction with the adherence to international laws by China. To understand the attitudes of the PRC towards the international rules-based system and further theorize Chinese actions, it is important to understand Chinese cultural, historical, and diplomatic perspectives on the international order
Firstly, it is crucial to analyze the historical factors influencing the formation of the Chinese perspective and what those perspectives are. Some of the historical events that impacted the formation of Chinese views on international law include the transformative period from the late Qing dynasty to the Republic of China era, the effect of British historiography on the Chinese attitude, the Cold War period, and intricate relational dynamics with the U.S (Yuan, 2024). (Flag of Qing Dynasty)
The transition period from the Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China significantly influenced the formation of the Chinese perspective of international law and how the state positions itself on the global political stage. The adoption of Marxist ideas shaped the tone of the further development of Chinese ideas. Also, British perspectives and colonial influences played a role in forming China as a significant political actor in international law. Moreover, cooperation with the Soviet Union and the intricate relational dynamics with the United States supported the establishment of an international system where China positions itself as one of the leading powers. Two key features of the Chinese traditional approach to international relations and law are based on the normative-ideological dimension, supported by Confucian views, and a power-based or interest-maximizing dimension, supported by legalist views (deLisle, 2000). While the normative dimension focuses on the force of a moral standpoint and informal norms of behavior, the power-based dimension stresses the importance of external force and state power for compliance. These approaches are reflections of Western notions of idealism and realism. During imperialism, China developed a Sinocentric approach to international order, highlighting the normative-ideological dimension of the moral importance of the Chinese emperor. Later, during the nineteenth century, with the development of Western ideas of international order, China had to interact with and tolerate imposed norms on the international stage. However, Chinese scholars did not hesitate to criticize the Western international order, stressing Chinese moral superiority and accusing Western powers of pursuing personal interests with these laws. During the Soviet period, as befits a Soviet state, the Chinese condemned the Western, bourgeois international order while embracing socialist international law. Lastly, rapid economic growth and increased political influence in the post-Mao era raised Chinese engagement with international law (Zuo, 2018). However, strong normativism and state-interest approach effectively described the Chinese approach to “rules-based international order”.
In addition, understanding the modern Chinese views on International order is essential for analyzing of the Country’s approach towards international developmental aid and infrastructure projects. Fundamental principles and concepts of the Chinese approach to international law are based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Gorian & Gorian, 2015).
These principles were adopted at the Bandung Summit on Afro-Asian Solidarity in 1955. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence include Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, Mutual non-aggression, Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and Peaceful co-existence. These principles are considered to be fundamental in the formation of the Chinese approach to international law. China has used these principles to resolve various border disputes and promote equality, peace, and development. However, in the traditional Chinese views, the law is seen as a tool to promote self-interest (Ruhlig, 2018). As seen in the disputes over the South China Sea, China carefully studies international laws and interprets them to suit its interests. In this case, the state challenged the jurisdiction of international tribunals and reinterpreted historical treaties to maximize its control over the region. While adhering to specific obligations under international law for economic and reputational benefits, the country also strategically interprets and utilizes legal norms to advance its interests, demonstrating a nuanced and pragmatic approach to reconciling traditional values with modern legal norms (Sheikh, 1973).
1. Gathii, J. T. (2012). Africa. In Fassbender, B., and Peters, A. (eds), Regions – Africa and Arabia. The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law. https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780199599752.003.0018.
2. Gorian, E., & Gorian, K. (2015). Chinese conception of international law as the response to the challenges of today. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences. https://doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n3p236
3. deLisle, J. (2000). China’s Approach to International Law: A Historical Perspective. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), 94, 267–275. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25659409
4. Ruhlig, T. (2018). How China approaches international law: Implications for Europe. European Institute for Asian Studies. https://www.eias.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/EU_Asia_at_a_Glance_Ruhlig_2018_China_International_Law.pdf
5. Sheikh, A. (1973). The Peoples’ Republic of China and International Law. The International Lawyer, 7(4), 770–787. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40704832
6. Yuan, D. (2024). Histories of international law in China all under heaven? Centre for Chinese and Comparative Law. https://www.cityu.edu.hk/slw/lib/doc/CCCL/2023110910_HISTORIES_OF_INTERNATIONAL_LAW_IN_CHINA_ALL_UNDER_HEAVEN.pdf
7. Zuo, A. (2018). China’s Approaches to the Western-dominated International Law: A Historical Perspective from the Opium War to the South China Sea Arbitration Case. University of Baltimore Journal of International Law, 6(1). https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjil/vol6/iss1/3
Chinese Perspectives on International Rules-Based System Read More »
The Georgian Government has increasingly moved to strengthen relations with China, hailing the economic potential of the partnership including high-profile infrastructure projects. But despite the optimism, the relationship has so far remained almost entirely one-sided, and in fact, opens the country up to substantial new risks.
Georgia’s foreign strategic alignment has been profoundly influenced by its geopolitical location, historical context, and aspirations for closer integration with Western institutions such as NATO and the European Union. However, in recent years, China has emerged as a significant player in Georgia’s foreign policy landscape. The two nations have actively sought to strengthen their political relations through a series of high-level visits and agreements, with Chinese initiatives in Georgia progressing at a remarkable pace, marked by significant expansions occurring almost monthly.
A pivotal moment in Sino-Georgian relations was the issuance of the Strategic Cooperation Statement on 31 July 2023, which heralded a new era of bilateral collaboration. The visit of then–Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili to China in 2023 culminated in this strategic partnership statement aimed at bolstering policy coordination and collaboration on regional and international affairs.
This partnership has been perceived as a strategic manoeuvre by China to expand its influence in the South Caucasus, a region traditionally regarded by Moscow as within its sphere of influence. The China-Georgia partnership can thus be viewed as part of a larger geopolitical shift in the region.
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the resulting geopolitical realignments have heightened the strategic importance of the South Caucasus. China’s involvement in Georgia could potentially reshape regional dynamics, particularly as it seeks to develop alternative trade routes that bypass Russia, exemplified by projects such as the Middle Corridor, which links China to Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus.
But despite the deepening Sino-Georgian relationship since 2016, there is no significant economic activity that might be relied upon to reshape the existing dynamics. The progress and developments thus far have been largely one-sided, and the prospects for Georgia’s flagship project for the Middle Corridor, the Anaklia Deep-Sea Port, are not very promising.
And despite few gains, there are several concerns: from foreign policy to economic collaboration, with the cooperation appearing to be overwhelmingly China-centred in various ways.
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Opinion | Georgia’s one-sided relationship with China comes with significant risks Read More »
On May 29, 2024, the Georgian Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development, Levan Davitashvili, announced that the public-private partnership selection process winner for Anaklia port development will be a Chinese-Singaporean consortium. This decision marks a significant shift in Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and raises security concerns due to the geopolitical implications of increased Chinese involvement.
CHOICE (China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe) reached out to Civic IDEA to provide expert analysis on the implications of the Anaklia Sea Port project for Georgia and Europe. Lawyer/Researcher Ketevan Gelashvili and researcher Aksana Akhmedova from Civic IDEA have prepared an in-depth article examining every crucial detail on this subject.
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Impact of Chinese Investment in Anaklia: Strategic Implications for Georgia and Europe Read More »
On July 31, 2023, during the official visit of Georgian PM Irakli Gharibashvili to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a Sino-Georgian strategic partnership agreement was formally established. Under the terms of this agreement, Georgia pledges its full support to all initiatives put forth by Xi Jinping and expresses its readiness to engage actively. This surprising turn of events undermines the nation’s ambitions to align with Euro-Atlantic partnerships and could pose long-term security risks. There is no doubt among the Western academia and the security community that in the era of Great Power Competition, the initiatives launched by China are aimed at revising the existing global international order and establishing alternative, Sinocentric foreign policy relations, where China’s domestic authoritarianism or aggressive foreign policy will remain immune to the resulting international reactions.
Against this backdrop, it is crucial to understand the role and function of each individual initiative in achieving China’s above-mentioned ultimate goals. For this purpose, the “Civic Idea” has prepared a series of analytical blogs where China’s initiatives are analyzed.
Assessing Georgia’s strategic partnership within the context of Chinese global politics requires a comprehensive understanding of the nuanced terminology employed by the Chinese government in delineating its priorities concerning partnerships with other nations. The categorization of a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” signifies a substantial level of connection and alignment of interests between China and partner nations, albeit not always guaranteeing preferential treatment. Notably, China designates varying partnership tiers, with its closest allies like Russia and Pakistan characterized by terms such as ‘coordination for a new era’ and ‘all-weather partnership,’ respectively. Beyond these highest-level partnerships, China upholds a spectrum of relationships, including Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships and Strategic and Cooperative Partnerships tailored to enhance bilateral ties. For instance, among its 41 Comprehensive Strategic Partners, Kazakhstan (Permanent Comprehensive Strategic Partnership) is a significant partner, emphasizing notably close bilateral relations. Additionally, China maintains strategic partnerships with 23 countries, including Canada, Djibouti, Nigeria, Sudan, and Ukraine, with the recent addition of Georgia. While these partnerships signify strategic interests, distinctions emerge when examining bilateral agreements between the listed strategic partners and Georgia, revealing notable differences in their respective dynamics and scope.
The blog series provided by Civic IDEA scrutinizes Georgia’s position in the global political landscape through its strategic partnership with the PRC. Our goal is to evaluate and compare Georgia’s situation with that of other states aligned with China, seeking to identify prevailing trends. Our research is divided into several parts, starting with an exploration of the political domain. This involves examining the “One China Principle” and assertions regarding territorial integrity made by both China and its partnering nations, contrasting them with Georgia’s stance. Following this, the study will delve into global initiatives endorsed by China, assessing Georgia’s involvement compared to other nation-states. One separate study will be devoted to the economic domain, with a primary focus on the Belt and Road Initiative. This will provide a closer look at Georgia’s participation, contrasting it with other collaborating countries. Overall, our blogs aim to offer a comprehensive understanding of Georgia’s strategic alignment within its partnership with China and shed light on its broader implications in global politics.
For more information, please see the full report below 👇
ASSESSMENT OF GEORGIA’S STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP STATEMENT WITH THE PRC Read More »
Following the publication of the Sino Georgian strategic cooperation statement, discussions on the ups and downs of this document have become a focal point in the Georgian media. This is not surprising since the issue concerns one of the largest and most ambitious states in the world, and its foreign policy moves are constantly at the center of attention.
Yet, a quick look at the China-related stories in the Georgian media highlights a distinct line of internal political resistance and the particular media outlet’s political inclination inclination. Yet due to the limited availability of information in Georgian, people form their perceptions of China based solely on what their chosen media source conveys.
In order to spread propaganda messages and narratives crafted by the Chinese Communist Party, dedicated programs air on various channels from time to time, exclusively featuring news about the People’s Republic of China. Recently, these programs incorporated exclusive interviews with the Chinese ambassador, directly conveying the agenda and objectives of the propaganda. Georgian Dream MPs and propagandists echo the narratives of the Chinese Communist Party with remarkable precision. “The fascination by economic cooperation with China” is one of their favorite talking points, and they repeat with absolute conviction that only “fools refuse” investments from China, for which the Georgian government works tirelessly.
Hereby, we need to emphasize that genuine success in economic relations can be gauged by a surge in direct investments and heightened interest from numerous companies entering the country, resulting in the creation of additional jobs and increased incomes fueled by external capital. It’s important to note that when observing the infrastructure developments such as roads, bridges, and tunnels in Georgia, a substantial portion of the funding originates from the Georgian taxpayers, specifically allocated in the state budget. These Chinese companies execute projects at the Georgian nations’ behest, being funded and directed by the Georgian government. As a result, their involvement has no correlation with the “growing” economic cooperation and the “enhanced economic appeal” of the country, which is primarily attributed to the successful work of the government.
The truth is best reflected by official statistics, and nothing is more accurate and reliable than that. Without any additional explanations and interpretations, we present the data published by the Department of Statistics of Georgia over the years regarding foreign direct investments. This data unmistakably illustrates the government’s complete failure to attract Chinese investments, particularly in contrast to the lofty claims of significant interest and “immeasurably deepened” relations.
FDI from PRC
2010 – 2022 in thousands USD
As can be clearly seen in the present table, China’s investments in the country are so insignificant and meaningless that it is impossible even to consider them seriously. Meanwhile, in the wake of the government’s “effective steps”, even those minor investments are falling year by year. For example, in recent years, investments have decreased almost twice compared to 2018. The benchmark for 2020 and 2021 is simply negative. Naturally, the main argument of the opponents regarding the years 2020 and 2021 starts with the “COVID-19” pandemic, although the pandemic did not prevent Georgia’s real strategic partners from investing in the country. See the corresponding table.
FDI by countries
compared to the PRC.
2020 – 2021 in thousands USD
The share of a country with a huge and “most successful” economy in Georgia’s investment basket is extremely small, and the government’s policy, which promises huge results, has led nowhere since 2016. Investments made by the People’s Republic of China were definitely characterized by growth; in 2013, it exceeded 100 Million USD, and in the following year, 2014, it doubled and reached 221 million USD. However, after that, a sharp decrease began, and its average figure is a completely symbolic and meaningless reality. The table below clearly shows the dynamics of 2011-2022:
The share of PRC
FDI to Georgia.
2011 – 2022
The truth is that, China does not appear among the top 10 major investors in Georgia during the tenure of the “Georgian Dream” party in government:
Top 10 countries by FDI to Georgia
2015 – 2022
The PRC is not among them.
in thousands USD
Mathematics is the best friend for unveiling the truth. The numbers do not lie and do not perfectly describe the partnership, interests interests, and foreign policy objectives of states.
A drop in the ocean Chinese investments in Georgia Read More »
The dynamics of international relations have been fundamentally altered by the global pandemic’s far-reaching impact and Russia’s full-scale conventional warfare in Ukraine. The common understanding stood that the post-coronavirus era would usher in a new world order, with the invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions against Russia further bolstering this contention. While the entire democratic world is concentrated on fighting one crisis after another, we also see the shifts in the behavior and positions of individual states, security alliances and international organizations.
International society is in the middle of significant transitions, revising goals and values and adjusting new policies toward the changing world order. It is the time to redefine the terms, mandates, search for new partners and new allies, and mark red lines. It is exactly the objective of this essay, to identify specific problems and policy shortcomings revealed amid recent global developments and the absolute necessity for the security alliances to consider, building resilience and boosting effective and timely cooperation with relevant parties aimed at rapid response and effective prevention of crises in the future.
The COVID-19 pandemic has become the most unprecedented global challenge the world has faced since World War II. The early alarms regarding the outbreak were elusive and unbelievable for all, resulting in the absence of prompt reactions and a number of political, economic, and health policy setbacks. In line with these obstacles, the virus has also shown the states their own insecurities. Countries acted spontaneously, and prioritized individual needs as opposed to collective strategies within the alliances to combat the virus jointly. The lack of solidarity at the initial stage negatively affected the mobilization, coordination, and allocation of necessary resources to combat the pandemic in the early phase. Together with uncoordinated action, unfamiliarity with the virus, the absence of sufficient medical equipment and treatments, and the shortages of vaccines caused total chaos in the world. In the early stage of fighting the pandemic EU and NATO missed the most important asset, unparalleled knowledge and strength available to them when joining forces and getting into collective action. Hence, the crisis instigated a severe blow to the world population and struck the global market as well, leaving long-term damaging consequences.
Timely assessment and recognition of failures and shortcomings brought by individual action strengthened democratic alliances and brought us to the strongest ever united democratic front against the unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine.
Why did this happen only now? It certainly is not the first demonstration of Russian aggression. The events of 2008 and 2014 have already exposed Russia to stirring up conflicts, occupying territories of independent states, and then using them as leverage to manipulate its neighbors, prevent progress, and their integration into the Western economic and security alliances. The democratic world united against Russia only after Kremlin turned the conflict that started in 2014 into a full-scale war in Ukraine, bringing back fear of war in Europe and reminding the largest and strongest alliances, the EU and NATO of their original mission to keep Europe united and in peace. The war in Europe facilitated rapid change in policies and caused an increase in defense spending and arms production.
Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, it is important to highlight two additional issues: the PRC and its role in the new world order and the threat of global nuclear conflict.
The Chinese factor is a common feature of the pandemic and the war since it is equally relevant in both cases. The PRC’s concealment of the covid outbreak, information manipulation, and subsequent wide-scale “covid diplomacy” led to the massive transmission of the virus, nurturing disastrous global economic and health crises. The Chinese factor is also noteworthy precisely because of the global game it has played so far, according to which, on the one hand, it calls itself the “peacemaker”, and on the other hand, as an authoritarian state, provides indirect economic and military support to another authoritarian state, Russia, against the Western security alliances.
The war in Ukraine also revived the concept of nuclear security as the risks of inadvertent nuclear escalation increased. It likewise highlighted the ineffectiveness of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, thereby raising doubts about the credibility of security alliances and the promises they have made, placing the onus on them to offer complete support to Ukraine. Therefore, as long as nuclear weapons are in the hands of authoritarian states, this issue should not lose its relevancy for security alliances, as mismanagement will have enormously irreversible results for the whole world.
The crisis of the last years brought the existing international world order under huge pressure. The experience of the pandemic proved that we could take nothing for granted and even the strongest alliances, united by the strongest bonds of common values, markets, and security dilemmas, might crumble against the invisible and unknown enemy. However, success is determined not only by how we react initially but, more importantly, by recognizing shortcomings, accurate assessment, and immediate action for improvement and eradication of causes of failures. Regardless of all the problems, democracies came out more robust from the covid crisis, even more, enchanted by the magic of unity and solidarity.
Rigorous and reliable cooperation under the umbrella of security alliances serves as vital mechanisms for collective action, fostering the consolidation of resources, expertise, and collaborative endeavors to effectively confront shared challenges while promoting global security and stability. Different from and learning from the mistakes of covid pandemic, Russia’s brutal aggression in Ukraine unified the democratic world and facilitated an even stronger commitment to peace and liberty based on respect for the sovereignty of the democratic states and freedom of choice over partnership and alliances. Faced by the brutality of conventional war in Europe, brought the alliances to look ahead and pay special attention to authoritarian states beyond Russia, creating leverage by initially reducing cooperation, and lowering economic/diplomatic dependence on them. With these means and united action, we aim at rapidly preventing future crises, the security alliances must never stop working to develop even more efficient universal policy directives for themselves and to share with the partner parties.
Ani Kintsurashvili – Author of the Article, Senior Researcher, Civic IDEA
Security Alliances and Cooperation in Pandemic and Conflict Read More »
From April 5-8, 2023, world’s media focused on Beijing, where French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen met with senior officials from the People’s Republic of China, including President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang. Given the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine and rising tensions in Sino-American relations, this state visit was thought-provoking. What were the main goals, issues, and outcomes of the visit? I will try to answer these and other questions in this blog.
Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to China started on April 5 with a large delegation including some ministers, lawmakers and nearly 60 CEOs of top French companies. Before leaving France, President Macron also asked the President of the European Commission for a joint visit to show China and the world that the European Union holds the same position on various topics. Ursula von der Leyen accepted the invitation and joined Macron’s state visit to China.
According to the Foreign affairs website of People’s Republic of China President Xi first met with Macron, then held trilateral talks with Macron and Ursula von der Leyen, before meeting with her bilaterally to discuss China-EU relations. Finally, the French president and Mr. Xi held an informal meeting in Guangzhou, focusing on Sino-French relations. In addition, the main topics discussed at the meetings were China-EU economic relations, the war between Russia and Ukraine and China’s role in resolving the conflict.
EU-China Relations and Europe’s Strategic autonomy
The visit was marked by very important and interesting messages from three leaders regarding EU-China relations. First of all, the messages of the Chinese president were not very different. He reiterated the need that “China-EU relations should not be aligned with, dependent on, or dictated by a third party.” It is clear, of course, that when Xi speaks of a third party, he means the United States and wants to strengthen the idea of “dividing” the West. He also criticized the “democracy versus authoritarianism” and the new Cold War era narratives, mentioning that “these only bring division and confrontation to the world.” He goes even further and calls on Europe to stand together with China against “Hegemonism and Unilateralism.“, again directed at the United States.
At the trilateral meeting, President Xi made the idea of exclusive cooperation between the EU and China very clear. While the United States is trying to “decouple” from his country, President Xi reaffirmed that “China supports Europe in achieving strategic autonomy.”
The idea of Europe’s strategic autonomy is not strange for President Macron. The term refers to the EU’s ability to act independently in areas of strategic importance. These areas include defense policy, the economy, technologies and much more. According to some EU leaders, especially in the field of defense, the European Union is very dependent on NATO and the United States. That is why Macron and some other leaders support the idea of strategic autonomy – they want to see the European Union as an independent and strong player on the world stage.
Europe’s strategic autonomy is attractive to China: it is in Beijing’s interest that Europe and the United States be less interconnected. The Chinese government sees this as an opportunity to improve its relationship with the EU. Given the rising economic tensions in Sino-US relations, this goal is especially crucial. That is why President Macron was welcomed by his Chinese counterpart with great pomp and respect. The informal meeting between Xi and Macron in Guangzhou over a cup of tea proved once again that the Chinese president is very interested in cooperation with France.
No to decoupling, yes to de-risking
But Europe’s strategic autonomy is also involving less dependence on China in several areas. On March 30, President von der Leyen gave a speech on EU-China relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre ahead of her visit to China. In her view, the EU should focus not on “decoupling” but on “de-risking” from China. This message was also repeated by her and shared by Macron in Beijing during the visit.
Where does the idea of “decoupling” come from ? This issue was first discussed in Washington as a response to the heavy economic dependence on China. In relations with Beijing, the United States has taken a tougher stance – since Trump, Washington has pursued a strategy of “decoupling” economic ties with China, and this process continues under the Biden administration. For Europe, it is not realistic to decouple completely from China, but European leaders also know that dependence on Beijing carries high risks. This is why the EU prefers the “de-risking” strategy, which, according to Ursula Von der Leyen, contains several specific ways to deal with the different risks, such as diversifying trade and investment relations, technology transfers, etc.
Russia-Ukraine War
The war between Russia and Ukraine was another central topic of the visit. In this regard, the European leaders stressed the importance of involving China, a member of the UN Security Council, in the “promotion of a just peace”, which respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Macron and Ursula wanted to convince XI to use its “special” relationship with Putin to stop Russian aggression against Ukraine, but there was no concrete promise from China in this sense. However, in the meeting with Macron, Xi and his French counterpart agreed that they are opposed to a nuclear war and to escalating the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in that direction.
Another key message sent by Europeans was about arming Russia. As we know, the Biden administration recently stated that China was considering providing lethal aid to Russia; Though It has already been proven that the PRC is only sending non-lethal aid to Russia, including helmets and body armor, but if it decides to send lethal aid as well, it would pose a serious threat to international security. That’s why after the meetings with Xi and Chinese Premier Li Qiang, the president of the European Commission told the media that she had warned China not to supply military equipment, directly or indirectly, to Russia. In addition, Ursula Von der Leyen made it clear that if Beijing decided to arm the aggressor, “this would significantly damage” relations between the EU and China. According to the French diplomat, after Mr. Macron asked Mr. Xi not to arm Russia, President Xi replied that “it was not his war.” When Emmanuel Macron and Ursula von der Leyen left China, the EU’s position on this issue was reaffirmed by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany – Annalena Baerbock. On April 14, during her visit to China and meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in Beijing, they discussed this issue and the Chinese minister said, “We do not and will not deliver weapons to the conflicting parties at a later date.”
It is clear that for the EU, any Chinese lethal aid for Russia in the war would be seen as crossing the line. In addition, European leaders are asking China to become actively involved in ending the war between Russia and Ukraine, as Beijing is the only country that still has influence over Russia. However, the only concrete consensus during Macron and Ursula’s visit on the Russia-Ukraine war was President Xi’s promise to call Zelensky when the conditions and timing are right.
Taiwan issue
The high-level EU-China state visit obviously did not take place without the issue of Taiwan. On this subject, the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, was more critical. Both she and Macron reaffirmed their loyalty to the “one-China policy”, but Macron tried to avoid discussing critical issues with Xi, such as Taiwan and China’s human rights violations, while Ursula, on the Taiwan issue, mentioned that “the threat to use force to change the status quo is unacceptable“.
On his departure from China, Emmanuel Macron took questions from the French press on the plane, and his answers on the issue of Taiwan were controversial. In particular, he told the media that Europe ran a “great risk” of being involved in crises “that are not ours,” which would make it more difficult to build the EU’s strategic autonomy. He goes even further and said that “The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this (Taiwan) topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction.” These statements became the main topic of the world’s media after China began large-scale military exercises around the island of Taiwan, just hours after the French president left Guangzhou to return to Paris. Macron’s views on Taiwan have been welcomed in China, but of course were criticized by some European policymakers. Annalena Baerbock’s statements on the issue show that Macron’s views are not shared by all European leaders. Indeed, during her visit to China on April 12, she condemned the recently launched military exercises around Taiwan and said Germany “cannot be indifferent” to the escalating tensions.
Other important results of the visit
While Emmanuel Macron was in China with CEOs of major French companies, it was clear from the beginning of the state visit that he was in Beijing to strengthen economic relations with China. Macron has signed several agreements for French companies in sectors such as pork, wind power, cosmetics and civil nuclear power. During this visit, France and PRC also issued a 51-point joint declaration on cooperation in various fields ranging from security to culture. The President of the European Commission also stressed the importance of continued cooperation between China and the EU on climate change and other common goals, but as she focused on “de-risking” for the EU economy, she did not sign a concrete agreement in Beijing.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we can say that the joint visit of Macron and Leyen to China was an attempt by European leaders to show their unity with regard to the EU’s foreign policy towards Beijing. It is true that on some issues, Macron acted more like a “good cop”, while Ursula chose a “bad cop” stance and at times criticized Chinese policy on several issues, including Taiwan and human rights in the Xinjiang region. However, the two EU leaders did manage to agree on two key messages: On the Russia-Ukraine war, they told President Xi that arming Russia would significantly damage EU-China relations and China should be actively involved in ending the war. Regarding EU-China relations, their message was that the EU does not follow the U.S. strategy of “decoupling” and prefers to “de-risk” from China. Time will tell if this strategy is effective or not.
Giorgi Khachidze – Author of the Blog, Intern, Civic IDEA
On March 20, 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping embarked on his first visit to Russia since the beginning of the Ukraine war. The three-day visit conveyed significant signals to the international community and highlighted the burgeoning partnership between the two powers.
As the war in Ukraine persists, China has found itself balancing multiple objectives. On the one hand, it calls for an end to the hostilities, but on the other hand, it maintains a strong strategic partnership with Russia. Despite the ongoing war, trade between Beijing and Moscow continues to grow, and Chinese and Russian diplomats remain in frequent contact. Even military exercises between the two nations continue without interruption. While Chinese state media does not often directly endorse Russia’s territorial claims in Ukraine, it consistently blames NATO and the United States for the conflict. Prior to their recent meeting, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin had already met more than 40 times, cementing their bond as fellow autocrats who speak the language of power.
Here are some key takeaways from the meeting:
The meeting took place amidst some crucial international developments: the Japanese Prime Minister’s surprise visit to Kyiv, the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant issued for Vladimir Putin, and the U.S. warning China not to back Russia in the Ukraine war.
The warm meeting between the two leaders that took place despite these implications is a message in and of itself.
The Ukraine War
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the meeting hadn’t resulted in any progress toward resolving the war in Ukraine. Both sides emphasized the importance of decreasing tensions and not “prolonging the war in Ukraine”. However, the fact that Russia’s invasion was the initial cause of the war was not acknowledged. Both countries have refused to call the Russian invasion “war”, instead calling on NATO to “respect the sovereignty” of other states.
The leaders also referenced the controversial 12-point peace proposal presented by the PRC last month that was supposed to deal with the ongoing war in Ukraine. The Chinese attempt to become the main negotiator in the conflict was criticized by the West, as it did not suggest Russia withdraw its forces. However, during the meeting, Putin stated that “he viewed China’s proposals for a resolution of the Ukraine conflict with respect.” On the other hand, Xi Jinping once again pointed out Beijing’s “neutral position” on the war in Ukraine and called for dialogue.
Economic and Energy Cooperation
Besides the clear political support, the visit also served as a clear reaffirmation of close economic ties between China and Russia. Both leaders mentioned that they “will build a closer energy partnership, supporting companies from both countries in advancing cooperation projects in oil, gas, coal, electricity and nuclear energy.” According to Putin, Russia welcomes Chinese businesses to replace the western companies that have left the country since the start of the war in Ukraine.
In the media statement, Putin mentioned that the possibility of expanding Russian gas exports to China was discussed, along with the potential development of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline through Mongolia. While Putin highlighted the pipeline as a replacement for the defunct Nord Stream 2 line delivering gas to Europe, Xi did not explicitly mention it during the briefing.
– The Power of Siberia, a cross-border pipeline carrying natural gas from Russia, was officially launched on December 2, 2019. It runs for 3,000 km through Siberia and extends through China’s eastern side, including the capital, to Shanghai. The final section is scheduled to commence delivering gas in 2025. Despite Russia’s $55 billion investment in the pipeline, only $3.81 billion worth of natural gas imports have been made through the pipeline since December 2019. Gas supply from the Power of Siberia 1 pipeline reached 10.4 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2021 and 15 bcm in 2022. For 2023, volumes are expected to reach 22 bcm. The second pipeline – The Power of Siberia 2 – could double gas exports from Russia to China, crossing through Mongolia and into the industrial regions near Beijing. Russia will deliver at least 98 bcm of gas to the PRC by 2030. The importance of the pipeline is growing as Moscow is looking for a way to replace European countries as its major gas importer – Moscow wants Power of Siberia 2 to replace the Nord Stream 2 pipeline (For comparison, the Nords Stream 2 pipeline was expected to deliver 5.6 bcm of Russian gas to Europe). However, according to experts, China will not need additional gas supply until 2030.
Cooperation in the energy sector has also been a crucial part of Sino-Russian relations after the war. As Europe has been taking steps to cut down its reliance on Moscow’s energy, China’s share of Russian energy exports has been growing astonishingly – Beijing’s spending on Russian crude oil, coal, and natural gas, shot up to $88 billion in the year through February, compared to $57 billion in the previous 12 months. However, Russia’s gas exports to the PRC are still a tiny fraction of the record 177 bcm it delivered to Europe in 2018-19.
It is worth mentioning that after the Western economic sanctions on Russia, it has been becoming increasingly dependent on growing economic relations with Beijing – trade between the countries has grown by nearly 20 percent this year, up from $190 billion in 2022.
Military
During the meeting, Moscow and Beijing committed to strengthening their military exchanges and cooperation while also conducting joint maritime and aerial patrols. Additionally, they expressed concerns about NATO’s growing military-security ties with Asia-Pacific countries and opposed external military forces undermining regional peace and stability. Ever since the start of the war in Ukraine, both nations have been actively participating in joint drills around the world. According to the joint statement, the partnership between the two countries had reached its highest level ever. However, the statement clarified that this partnership was not a military-political alliance and was not directed against any other country. It emphasized that the relationship between Russia and the PRC was not confrontational and not aimed at any third country, and it did not constitute a bloc.
“New Era of Cooperation”
During their talks at the Kremlin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a series of documents regarding “strategic cooperation” between their countries. Putin termed the talks as “successful and constructive.” According to Xi, one of the agreements he signed with Putin has ushered the relationship between the two countries into a “new era” of cooperation.
At the end of the state dinner on Tuesday evening, the Russian leader walked Xi Jinping out – there, in front of the cameras, Xi reiterated his belief that global power dynamics are changing. “Together, we should push forward these changes that have not happened for 100 years. Take care” – were the farewell words of the Chinese leader.
International Response
According to Washington, Xi’s visit suggested that Beijing was providing “diplomatic cover” to Moscow to commit more crimes, given the timing of the visit. The White House spokesperson John Kirby said that there are concerns that China might once again call for a ceasefire that permits Russian forces to remain in Ukrainian sovereign territory, allowing them to consolidate their positions and reignite the war when it is more advantageous for them. Although the PRC has attempted to remain neutral in the Ukraine conflict, the United States has suggested that China’s actions could be a “stalling tactic” to assist Moscow. Washington has accused Beijing of contemplating arms exports to Moscow, a claim that the PRC has vehemently refuted. China has strongly denied the US’s allegations that it is contemplating exporting weapons to Moscow.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia has clearly shown his support for Vladimir Putin and the strengthening partnership between the two countries. The meeting highlighted close economic ties and cooperation in the energy and military sectors, as well as shared concerns over NATO’s growing military-security relations with the Asia-Pacific region. The invitation extended by Xi to the Russian Prime Minister during the visit is also indicative of the deepening cooperation between the two nations.
The fact that the meeting took place against the backdrop of the ongoing Ukraine war further showcases that the PRC’s support towards Ukraine and its territorial integrity is a bluff. On the other hand, The Kremlin’s charm offensive with China is a testament to Russia’s growing isolation from the West and the need to bolster relations with its strategic partner. Finally, this meeting can also be perceived as a clear challenge to the West – China is “flexing its muscles” as it indicates that it can ignore the decisions of the international community and the only way of dealing with Russia actually goes through Beijing.
Nutsa Dzandzava – Author of the Blog, Intern, Civic IDEA
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