Research

We are happy to share with you a discussion paper written by our chairwoman Tinatin Khidasheli about the expectations for the 2024 parliamentary elections. She argues that based on election data for the last 10 years, the “Georgian Dream” party (the ruling party in Georgia) as a single party has no chance of winning the proportional vote. This article contains facts and unmistakable data proving that, even by Georgian “normal” standards, winning an election and independently forming a government by the Georgian dream is impossible. She also provides some scenarios for the developments before the elections.

This is the first article in the series of discussion papers Civic IDEA will publish before the 2024 parliamentary vote.

For the full paper, please visit ?

During the past five years of intensive work revealing the PRC’s soft and hard power strategies jeopardizing Georgia’s national security, Civic IDEA has already published two reports covering China’s influence on Georgia’s academic, media and CSO sectors before, during, and after the emergence of the covid-19 pandemic. Today, we suggest another monitoring report from the Chinese cooperation and activities in Georgian Academia, though not related directly to the universities, but to the National Academy of Sciences of Georgia.

Through personal correspondence and public information available on their official website, Civic IDEA has discovered several memorandums and cooperation agreements the National Academy of Sciences has signed with both state and private Chinese entities, as well as numerous events and activities following the advanced relations with China. We came across several interesting connections that have already been established between local chapters of the Academy of Science, as well as individual scientists under the auspices of the Academy and Chinese universities, which gives us the idea that the increased research and academic cooperation will only boost and the partnership will gain even more attachment in the future.

See the full report ?

Within the scope of the project, “Civil Monitoring of Accountability, Transparency and Anti-Corruption Activities within the Framework of the 12 Recommendations of the European Union,” hereby we share a performance monitoring report on the EU Commission’s fourth recommendation – (anti-corruption policy). The report has been prepared by the Virtual Democracy Academy in cooperation with Civic IDEA.

The document reviews and scrutinizes Georgia’s present anti-corruption policy, as well as the Georgian government’s efforts to implement the Commission’s anti-corruption recommendations. The document will also further analyze the initiatives and actions of civil society and political opposition in relation to the fulfillment of the Commission’s 4th recommendation.

The main findings of the report:

• Fulfilling the 12 recommendations of the European Commission is one of the main challenges and obligations of the country. Despite the fact that the Government declared its full readiness to fulfill the mentioned obligations, as of today, Georgia has fully implemented only one recommendation.
• The legislative changes carried out within the framework of the implementation of the fourth recommendation do not fully meet the request of the European Commission, which is caused by the fact that the law on the anti-corruption bureau cannot ensure that the anti-corruption bureau is equipped with all the main levers necessary to effectively fight corruption.
• The shortcoming of the new anti-corruption bureau is also manifested in the fact that the institution does not have an investigative function, and the procedure for appointing the head of the anti-corruption bureau calls into question the institutional independence of the bureau.
• The international practice of the anti-corruption bureau indicates that the assignment of the investigative mandate is critical for the agency’s effective functioning. Lithuania stands out as one of the best examples of this. The country, which has the same past as Georgia, was able to create an effective anti-corruption agency, which, thanks to its investigative mandate, successfully fights corruption at both the petty and elite levels.
• The international experience of the countries shows that any effort taken to combat corruption would yield no benefits unless the bureau’s independence is also guaranteed. Furthermore, the achievements in the battle against corruption are more obvious in countries where the anti-corruption agency has a high degree of independence.
• As a result, all legislative changes implemented by the authorities to fulfill the fourth recommendation leave the perception of formal fulfillment of the obligation. The anti-corruption bureau does not entirely share the work model of successful countries’ anti-corruption organizations, which includes equipping it with investigative functions.

The project is implemented with financial support from the European Union and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and in coordination with the Center for Strategic Research and Development of Georgia.

For the full report, please visit  ?

For four years, Civic IDEA yearly has been publishing several reports about the Chinese companies that, within the framework of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, actively continue to operate in the Georgian market, and more specifically in the infrastructure sector of Georgia, and are responsible for the construction of the main highway, roads, bridges and on the construction of tunnels. If you move from the Eastern part of Georgia to the Western part of Georgia, you will find many abbreviations of different Chinese companies on your way while going through the Ricoti Mountain pass. This is exactly the pass where the construction of a 51.6 km long road is planned, which includes 96 bridges and 53 tunnels. 

In our reports, we have already reviewed the activities of China State Construction Engineering Corporation Limited and China Road and Bridge Corporation in Georgia and the related misconduct based on a comparative analysis of foreign examples. This time we offer an analysis of the projects won by Hunan Road and Bridge Construction Group in Georgia and its shady practices in Uganda and mainland China. 

For the full report, please visit  ?

Already in the updated version of the list, which dates back to December 2021, we see that Georgia’s leading strategic partner, the United States, has blacklisted not only the Huawei divisions in different cities in China but also its other branches abroad. More precisely, the US has barred exports, reexports, and transfers coming from the Huawei subdivisions in Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, UK, Vietnam. According to the document, the main reason for their debar-ment is linked to the security vulnerabilities that Huawei items convey.

In our 2020 report “Who is in charge of the post-cold war world? Chinese influence operations in Academia, Media & CSOs,” we have thoroughly covered the controversies related to Huawei and its activities in the US, the UK, and different EU member states. We also reviewed the resilience strategies used by multiple countries, such as Japan, the US, or the UK, that effectively impose restrictions and sanctions against the Chinese tech giant to ensure their national security.

For more information, please visit the link ?

On January 20, 2022, Associated Press News featured an article “Security scanners across Europe tied to China govt, military,” raising alarms about the notorious Chinese “Nuctech Company Limited” and its dispersal throughout the European states.

Last year, Civic IDEA published a report about Nuctech Company Limited reviewing:

• its cooperation with the Georgian government,

• fraudulent activities related to Georgian and foreign tender procedures,

• malfunctions of its security equipment,

• corruption scandals worldwide.

Back then, our team has already stressed out the high-security risks threatening the national security of those states, where Nuctech has operated.

For more information, please visit the link ?

Civic IDEA’s 11th China Watch report discusses the controversies around China’s state-owned nuclear company China Nuclear Industry 23 Construction Co., Ltd., alternatively referred to as “CNNC No.23” or CNI23 operating since 1958. There is no record provided by internet sources about the misconduct related to particularly CNI23 and its representation in different states. Nevertheless, some problems and scandals are still associated with its founding investor firms: China National Nuclear Corporation and China General Nuclear Power Engineering Co., Ltd. China General Nuclear Power Engineering Co., Ltd. first appeared on the Georgian market in 2012 and since then has won several state procurements and made private investments.

For more information about the CNI23, see the attachment below: ?

Civic IDEA is pleased to share with you the 10th China Watch report related to another Chinese company operating in Georgia, China State Construction Engineering Corporation Ltd. (so-called CSCEC), and reviews its scandals and misconduct that occurred in Georgia and worldwide.

CSCEC is one of the largest Chinese state construction companies, founded in 1982. Since then, it has operated in more than 100 countries worldwide. The company’s main activities comprise real estate, construction financing, operation and engineering (housing and infrastructure), as well as design and survey. This company has been embroiled in numerous scandals in the past two decades. More precisely, the CSCEC and its subsidies have been exposed to corruption and fraud schemes in the US, Philippines, Pakistan, Hungary, and several other countries and have been blacklisted by different state and international institutions.

Read more about the company’s reputation and activities in our report: ?

Civic IDEA has the honor to share with the audience the second part of the series of Collection of Articles under the name “From Caspian to Black Sea: Economic, Academic and Digital Threats posed by the PRC”. Publication in front of you is the second edition of a collective effort by Civic IDEA and its partners and distinguished experts from the region to analyze and debate the Chinese activities in their respective countries in various fields, be it academia, business, politics, or other state matters. This time, the publication was inspired by the outstanding work of our Taiwanese partner Doublethink Lab about the Chinese influence operations assembled in China Index-2021, to be followed at https://china-index.io. This regularly updated web tracker allows all interested in monitoring and measuring PRC influence around the Globe.

The contributor authors to the second issue of the collection of articles are the following:

Tinatin Khidasheli – Chairperson, Civic IDEA

Ani Kintsurashvili – Senior Researcher, Civic IDEA

Vusal Guliyev – Fellow, the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University

Gubad Ibadoghlu – Senior Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Umedjon Majidi – Anti Corruption Expert, Sarajevo, BIH

Gia Jandieri – Director, New Economic School of Georgia

Danila Bekturganov – Director, NGO “Civil Expertise”

Denis Cenusa – Associated Expert, Think Tank EESC (Lithuania) / Think Tank Expert-Grup (Moldova)

Civic IDEA is also grateful to National Endowment for Democracy and the US Embassy for their immense support and contribution.

Civic IDEA published the second volume of the report “Chinese Leverage in Georgia’s Academic, CSO and Media Sectors: Post-Covid Reality”. The current paper reviews Georgia – Chinese cooperation in Academia, that is, among various universities, academic programs, scholarships, etc., analyzing realities created by Covid Pandemic and its consequences. Moreover, it gives a comparative analysis by evaluating foreign trends and policies toward Chinese malign academic activities. Mainly, the report focuses on the cases of the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, Hungary, Serbia, the US, and Sweden to demonstrate that, like other essential domains, Academia can be exploited by foreign actors.

The report is implemented with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy and the US Embassy in Tbilisi, in cooperation with the Central European Institute of Asian Studies.

Report ?