Within the framework of the project “Georgia as a Multi-ethnic and Multi-faceted Country”, we present the second consecutive monitoring report on the Georgian languageand literature textbooks. When examining Georgian language and literature textbooks, our main task was to evaluate:
To what extent and how frequently are representatives of national or religious minorities living/active in Georgia found in literature textbooks;
To what extent do the creators of school textbooks realize that for a diverse Georgia, a Georgian does not exclusively refer to “Georgian Orthodox man” and the Georgian literature encompasses all those authors and figures who have contributed to making literature texts in our country;
To what extent the idea is implemented that the literary heritage of Georgia means everything created by writers living in Georgia, regardless of the language of the original text – considered and accommodated.
The main aim of the project is to promote the formation of the population of Georgia (regardless of people’s ethnic and religious backgrounds) into a unified civic nation. We believe this task is difficult to accomplish without integrating relevant views and philosophies into school education. Therefore, our project also serves to fundamentally analyze problems and find ways to eliminate them. To this end, we consider a thorough audit of school textbooks at the initial stage to be the most important task in order to find out to what extent school education helps people of different ethnicities and nations living in Georgia to feel a part of history, development, and statehood of Georgia.
On June 15, three organizations – Civic IDEA’s, Democracy Research Institute’s (DRI) and Democracy Index- Georgia’s jointly organized the conference – New Security Architecture in Europe and its impact on Georgia – one year since European Perspective.
The main aim of the conference has been supporting the dialogue and emboldening discussion over the upcoming 2 cornerstone events:
assessment from the European Union for Georgia in the fall to be followed by Council’s decision on the Candidate Status and
the upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius and expectations for Georgia.
The Conference was attended by various distinguished individuals, including the representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited in Georgia, heads of international organizations, representatives of political parties, as well as civil society representatives and members of academia.
The opening speech at the conference was delivered by Ms. Tinatin Khidasheli, the chairperson of Civic IDEA, which was followed by the keynote speech of Mr. Pawel Herczynski – Ambassador of the EU to Georgia.
As part of the conference, two panel discussions took place, providing a framework for in-depth discussions on important topics:
The Challenges of Georgia’s European Integration – Are the implemented reforms sufficient?
The panelists:
Marcos Granados Gomez – Charge’ d’Affaires at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Spain to Georgia, Presidency of Spain – 1 July – 31 December 2023;
David Usupashvili – Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia (2012-2016);
Tamar Khulordava – Chair of the EU Integration Committee of the Parliament of Georgia (2016-2019);
Sergi Kapanadze – former Deputy Chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia (2016-2020);
Vano Chkhikvadze – EU Integration Program Manager at the Open Society Georgia Foundation.
Moderator – Tamar Khidasheli Director, Democracy Research Institute (DRI)
Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic Aspirations and what to expect from the upcoming NATO Summit in Vilnius?
The panelists:
Andrius Kalindra – Ambassador of Lithuania to Georgia;
Riina Kaljurand – Ambassador of Estonia to Georgia;
Teona Akubardia – Deputy Chair of the Security Committee of the Parliament of Georgia;
Levan Dolidze – Ambassador of Georgia to NATO (2013-2014).
Moderator – Ekaterine Tsimakuridze, Democracy Index – Georgia.
Civic IDEA’s report “China’s “Wolf Warrior” Policy in the Media – the Case of Georgia”
Civic IDEA is happy to share with you a new report on the CCP’s influence activities in the Georgian media. The objective of the research is to analyze the degree of Chinese influence on the Georgian media, both traditional and so-called new media, in the context of the strategy of the Chinese Communist Party through both content and systemic analysis. The media report portrays how China is covered in the Georgian media and how the strategic mission of the Chinese Communist Party is fulfilled – with propaganda and tactical approaches on the “cultural front” to achieve the formation of public opinion in the form desired by the Chinese Communist Party and later, to use it for leverage over various stakeholders or establish control. At the same time, the systematic media analysis aimed to examine the share of the People’s Republic of China and its affiliated business actors in both media ownership and the advertising market.
The report was created in cooperation with the Journalism Resource Center.
For more information, you can download the report here ?
On April 24, Civic IDEA, in cooperation with the Kazakh partner organization “Zertteu Research Institute” organized a workshop, “Why China Matters? The Case of Georgia”, gathering 16 journalists, experts and researchers, and activists from CSOs in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The event covered the following topics:
Why China matters? – general context
Chinese leverage on Georgia’s economic, political, and academic sectors
Chinese Influence on Media (including fake news, methods to cope with Disinformation)
The main goal of the workshop was to encourage an active discussion and productive exchange of opinions and experiences between Georgian and Kazakhstani colleagues.
On April 13, Civic IDEA contributed to the National Endowment for Democracy’s roundtable on Georgia, current challenges, foreign policy trajectories and the role of civil society in a captured state: CSO as a Remnant of Democracy in a Captured State: The Case of Georgia
Georgia has struggled to create a modern, European sovereign state for 30 years. The journey was rough, full of well-crafted obstructions built by Russia through violent interference or by fueling domestic conflicts. Since Russia’s brutal aggression in Ukraine started, politics in Georgia have become even uglier. The government in Tbilisi proved to be absolutely unable to operate under pressure and gave up the fight. There is a general agreement that there is a Georgia blueprint modeled after the Kremlin used by the government in Tbilisi in dealing with media, NGOs, expert community, and, more generally, all active citizens aimed at discrediting them, thus neutralizing from vibrant public life. It is all happening parallel to unprecedented opportunities for EU integration. It looks as if the Georgian government does all for not allowing progress on the European path. Over the last year and a half, we have forced the government to change or withdraw multiple outrageous decisions due to the resilience of civil society and massive peaceful protests.
It is also essential to notice that Russia is not the only player in Georgia anymore, causing worries for civil society. Year after another, China emerged as a core partner and model friend of the Georgian government. All the warning signs are enshrined in dozens of MoU, decisions, and friendly exchanges. While Georgian civil society tried its best to navigate the rather tricky and frequently dangerous environment, we constantly seek expertise, advice, and discussion with our partners and friends in search of better choices and alternatives. Abandoned by the government for the third time, we search for an answer to whether Georgian civil society can change the course of developments in Georgia once again.
On April 11, “Hoover Institution On War, Revolution And Peace”, together with “Freemen Spogli Institute”, hosted a Roundtable at Stanford University, California, US, where the Civic IDEA team discussed the relevant topics related to the PRC’s influence strategies in Georgia: “PRC as an alternative to Russia in Georgia – Leverage on Investments and Academia”
China’s global influence has been increasing over the past few decades, driven by its rapidly growing economy, expanding diplomatic and cultural outreach, and ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Georgia is among those countries that see the PRC as an alternative to Russia, especially amid the war in Ukraine. It has been actively engaged in BRI, signed FTA with China and considers the further expansion of its role as a transit hub in the Middle Corridor initiative, which supposedly will attract more Chinese money to the country. Although Georgia is not yet the victim of PRC’s “debt trap diplomacy”, almost all the state’s critical infrastructure projects are led by notorious and internationally blacklisted companies, winning the state’s procurement bids. Thus, no ground is left for Western companies to firmly establish themselves in Georgia’s economic sector and attract further Western investments. This occasion limits the diversification of financial partners and puts the PRC state-operated and dubious companies in a priority position, hence making Georgia less attractive to the European market. The domination of Chinese companies within the BRI in Georgia’s infrastructure market has caused indignation among some EU member states’ ambassadors in Georgia. We remember Polish Ambassador in Georgia complaining about Georgia prioritizing Chinese companies over European ones. But in the end, everybody from the government again turns a blind eye to European criticism and stays ignorant about the Chinese firms continuously winning state procurements.
PRC has also been actively promoting cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries, establishing multiple Confucius institutes and classrooms in almost every university and higher education institution in Georgia, strengthening the role of the Georgia-China Friendship Association, providing generous scholarships to Georgian students, actively encouraging exchanges and funding in the fields of research and science and promoting dual partnerships between academic institutions. Within the framework of these academic exchanges, several shady characteristics have been identified, threatening Georgia’s national security in a broader context. Firstly, some of the Chinese universities that are involved in various international and dual partnerships with their Georgian counterparts are suspected of carrying very high, high and medium security risks due to their involvement with the PLA, cyber espionage, military research activities and engagement with other PRC’s defense entities. Secondly, the National Center for Educational Quality Enhancement (legal entity of the Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia) has no control over the study program and legal status of the Confucius Institutes mistrusted and shut by the Western societies. Thirdly, Georgian alumni with Chinese university degrees usually promote the PRC endeavors and vision of the world locally affecting the mindset and perception of Georgian society largely. At last, the National Academy of Sciences is blindly exchanging information and staff with Chinese entities on the basis of contracts that are regulated by the laws of the PRC and may be easily exploited by the Chinese authorities.
The Hoover Project on China’s Global Sharp Power – The China Index: Measuring PRC Influence Around the Globe on Tuesday, April 11, 2023 at 9:00 AM PT | 12:00 PM ET.
The China Index is the first cross-regional project to objectively measure and visualize China’s overseas influence through comparable data. This event brings together report contributors from Bogota, Berlin, Tblisi, and Taipei, who will analyze the PRC’s influence campaigns in their regions, from Latin America to Germany to Central Asia.
ABOUT THE SPEAKERS:
Puma Shen is an associate professor at National Taipei University, the chairperson of Doublethink Lab and vice president of the Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR), focusing heavily on disinformation and local tracking of privacy violations. He was a lawyer, and an expert in white-collar crime, including state crime, disinformation campaigns, and financial crime. His publications analyze Chinese information operations in Taiwan and the U.S., and he is now investigating United Front activities in Taiwan and Southeast Asia.
Didi Kirsten Tatlow is a sinologist and journalist. A graduate of the Beijing Language Institute (语言学院) and SOAS, University of London, she began her journalistic career in 1994 at the Hong Kong Standard, later moving to the Associated Press and the New York Times, among others, and winning multiple awards. After leaving China in 2017 she worked for think tanks in Berlin and Prague before returning to journalism in 2022 as a Senior Reporter for International Affairs at Newsweek magazine. She is an editor and author of Beyond Espionage: China’s Quest for Foreign Technology.
Parsifal D’Sola Alvarado is the founder and executive director of the Andres Bello Foundation—China Latin America Research Center in Bogotá, Colombia. He is a Chinese foreign policy analyst specializing in Sino-Latin American relations, and a non-resident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Between 2019 and 2020, he acted as Chinese foreign policy advisor to the foreign affairs minister of the Interim Government of Venezuela. He holds a BS in Telecommunications Engineering from Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, an MA in East Asian Studies from Columbia University, and an MSc in International Politics from SOAS, University of London.
Tinatin Khidasheli chairs Civic IDEA, a think-thank fighting the Soviet legacy in Georgia, confronting Russian propaganda, and advocating for sound defense and security policy. She served as the first female minister of defense of Georgia, and chaired the Parliamentary Committee for European Integration as well as the Inquiry Commission into Violations of Freedom of Speech and Telecommunication laws at the Parliament of Georgia. She holds a LLM in international law from Tbilisi State University and a MA in political science from Central European University.
Glenn Tiffert is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a historian of modern China. He co-chairs the Hoover project on China’s Global Sharp Power and works closely with government and civil society partners to document and build resilience against authoritarian interference with democratic institutions. Most recently, he co-authored and edited Global Engagement: Rethinking Risk in the Research Enterprise (2020).
Civic IDEA thoroughly researched CSCEC and the outrages related to its name worldwide. In the last few decades, the names of CSCEC and its subsidiary companies have been actively aired in numerous scandals in China, Pakistan, Kenya, the USA, the Philippines, Ethiopia and several other countries. In 2009, the World Bank blacklisted China State Construction Engineering Corporation Ltd. due to its involvement in collusive practices and corruption scandals in the Philippines concerning the Philippines National Roads Improvement and Management Program. In August 2020, the United States Department of Defense released a list of Chinese companies having close ties with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the CSCEC was among them. The Trump Administration accused the Chinese firm of cyber espionage and prohibited the US entities from becoming shareholders of the CSCEC. The latter’s involvement in malicious cyber activities is not a surprising discovery, since already in 2017, it was revealed that Beijing had bugged African Union HQ built by the CSCEC in Ethiopia and for five years, data from CPUs in the PRC-constructed building had been transferred to Chinese servers. In early 2022, a lawsuit was filed in a Kenyan court against the CSCEC due to corruption allegations. The court was requested to debar the company from continuing working in Kenya and violating Kenya’s laws and directives.
The most recent scandal erupted in Ukraine when in late March 2023, the Ukrainian anti-corruption agency NAZK added the name of the Chinese company to the list of international sponsors of the Russian war in Ukraine. The agency representatives claimed that despite Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, CSCEC had continued actively operating in a terrorist state, implementing the most critical infrastructure projects there and planning to expand its presence further by holding constant meetings with the Russian government.
Previously in Georgia, there have been two significant misconducts revealed in CSCEC works – 1) delays and postponement of the contract and 2) environmental damage. On August 21, 2019, the Roads Department signed a contract with China State Construction Engineering Corporation Limited regarding construction works of the Chumateleti-Khevi section of the E-60 highway (km 0.0 – km 11.6). The paradox is that the project partially financed by the World Bank was granted to the Chinese company once blacklisted by the same World Bank. But the Roads Department’s practice shows that this is not the only case when the notorious and blacklisted Chinese company wins the project funded by its blacklister organization. According to the contract, the period of implementation of the works is 3 years; therefore, the construction of the road should have been completed by the end of 2022. Nonetheless, the Chinese contractor was unable to finish the work in due time, and for reasons unknown to us, the completion of the project was delayed by seven months. Currently, August 31, 2023, is set as the deadline for the completion of the E-60 highway Chumateleti-Khevi (F1) construction project.
In 2020, local residents revealed through social media that the Chinese company CSCEC had installed a concrete-making plant on the river bank and it was causing pollution of the river. As the local media later found out,due to the leak of this information, the government was obliged to fine the local branch of CSCEC with 3000 GEL.
We are happy to share with you a discussion paper written by our chairwoman Tinatin Khidasheli about the expectations for the 2024 parliamentary elections. She argues that based on election data for the last 10 years, the “Georgian Dream” party (the ruling party in Georgia) as a single party has no chance of winning the proportional vote. This article contains facts and unmistakable data proving that, even by Georgian “normal” standards, winning an election and independently forming a government by the Georgian dream is impossible. She also provides some scenarios for the developments before the elections.
This is the first article in the series of discussion papers Civic IDEA will publish before the 2024 parliamentary vote.
