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1. Georgia Faces Constitutional Crisis as Ruling Party Loses Votes Necessary for Key Constitutional Issues 

2. New NGO and Media regulations were announced by the Georgian Dream as a response to Western pressure and sanctions.

Tbilisi, Georgia – The ruling Georgian Dream party faces an unprecedented constitutional crisis as the country’s parliament verges on losing its ability to function. Following the mass resignation and removal of opposition MPs, the legislature now risks falling below the threshold required for critical decision-making, rendering it effectively paralyzed.

Constitutional Gridlock and the 2/3 Majority Rule 

Under Georgia’s Constitution, certain critical decisions—including constitutional amendments, judicial appointments, impeachment procedures, and issues related to territorial integrity—require a supermajority of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the full Parliament.

Following the cancellation of 49 opposition MPs’ mandates of three opposition coalitions, Parliament has been reduced to just 101 active members. It is to be underlined that there is a fourth opposition party (for Georgia) with 12 mandates still legally represented. If the body loses two more members (very high probability), the ruling party will no longer be able to secure the required 2/3 threshold, rendering key governance functions inoperative.

The Constitution explicitly states:

• Article 19: Amendments concerning land ownership require a 2/3
• Article 35: The Public Defender of Georgia must be elected by a 3/5
• Article 45: Approval of constitutional agreements requires 3/5
• Article 47: Ratification and abrogation of international treaties require a full-majority vote, with treaties concerning territorial integrity requiring a 3/4 majority.
• Article 48: Impeachment of the President requires a 2/3
• Article 60: Constitutional Court judges must be appointed with a 3/5
• Article 64: Members of the High Council of Justice must also be elected with a 3/5
• Article 77: Constitutional amendments require a 2/3 majority for adoption and presidential submission.

The Immediate Crisis: Inability to Govern 

On February 5, 2025, Parliament effectively voted on its own incapacity by approving the removal of opposition MPs, further undermining its ability to function. If just two more MPs step down, the ruling party will no longer control the legislative process for constitutional matters, creating an unprecedented deadlock.

Several key areas will be directly impacted by this crisis:

• Territorial Integrity and Border Decisions: Parliament will be unable to make decisions related to Georgia’s territorial integrity, a crucial issue amid regional tensions.

• Judicial Appointments: The term of Constitutional Court Judge Merab Turava is set to expire on March 20, requiring 90 votes for a replacement. Without Gakharia’s faction entering Parliament, this threshold cannot be met, leaving the judiciary in limbo.

• Presidential Impeachment: Any attempt to remove the President would be constitutionally impossible without the required 2/3 majority.
• Lawmaking Paralysis: The ruling party will be unable to pass constitutional amendments, leaving critical governance matters unresolved.

Political Fallout and Financial Repercussions

Beyond the legal paralysis, the opposition’s resignation has financial consequences. Under Georgian law, parties maintaining a parliamentary presence are entitled to budgetary funding. By voluntarily surrendering their mandates, opposition parties—including the Coalition for Changes, Strong Georgia, and Unity-National Movement—will lose government financing, intensifying the political standoff.

Additionally, the opposition party “for Georgia” has so far refused to apply for mandate cancellation but remains outside the parliamentary process. Giorgi Gakharia, the party’s leader, has declared that he will not legitimize a one-party Parliament, further complicating legislative proceedings.

Path Forward: New Elections as the Only Solution?

The disintegration of Parliament into an ineffective body has raised urgent questions about the necessity of new elections. In established democracies, when a Parliament becomes functionally incapacitated due to a lack of quorum for decision-making, new elections are often called to restore governance. With the Georgian Dream already unable to push through constitutional amendments, territorial integrity or border issues (requires 113 votes), as well as significant legislative changes, the political pressure for a new electoral process is mounting.

The ruling party, which has spent the past three months moving from political delegitimization to legal incapacity, now finds itself trapped in a self-created crisis. With every additional mandate lost, the government edges closer to institutional collapse, making early elections increasingly only scenario for the country to function.

New regulations and laws accounted against NGOs and Media

 The Georgian Dream’s policies increasingly resemble reactive measures driven by frustration rather than strategic governance. With the majority of opposition figures now sidelined from Parliament, the ruling party has unveiled a new slew of measures targeting the bedrock of Georgian civil society. In a recent declaration, Mamuka Mdinadze, leader of the parliamentary majority, stated, “In the face of increased pressure, coercion, blackmail, and threats to our nation’s stability and sovereignty, our response will only grow firmer. We will continue to adopt both legal and political measures to ensure Georgia’s resilience against external manipulation, fortify our institutions, and safeguard our internal affairs from foreign interference.”

This rhetoric foreshadows the introduction of legislation aimed at further constricting the operating space for NGOs and the media. He said that Russian foreign agents’ law will be replaced by two new pieces of legislation, separate for NGOs and Media. He promised “translated US FARA and BBC regulation to be brought to parliament for approval.” However, given past attempts to equate Russian-style laws with American legal standards, the implications of such measures are troubling.

Moreover, Mdinadze has signaled significant alterations to the Grants Law, which has been a cornerstone of support for civil society in Georgia, surviving previous governmental efforts to curtail civic freedoms unscathed. Additionally, the government plans to withdraw from commitments made under the Open Government Partnership (OGP), including the elimination of statutory provisions that facilitate NGO participation in public decision-making processes.

While the government has left a window open for negotiation by scheduling these proposals for parliamentary consideration within the next two to three months, this appears to be a strategic move. By presenting such contentious policies, the Georgian Dream seems to be positioning itself to compel civil society leaders to engage in talks, potentially under duress, as a condition for acknowledging the legitimacy of the Parliament. Additionally, the government plans to establish a state-managed grant fund for public organizations, aiming to replace foreign funding sources with domestic alternatives.

The unfolding situation in Georgia underscores the fragility of democratic institutions when political maneuvering overrides constitutional stability. Whether this crisis results in renewed political legitimacy through elections or further governance paralysis remains to be seen.