Research

Dear readers

It is a great honor for us to share with you the first part of the publication initiated by “Civic IDEA” and prepared together with partners, which will tell you the story of the growing influence of foreign countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The second part of this edition is planned for 2022.

This publication is a collection of 8 analytical articles, which mainly introduce the dynamics of various projects, loans, and debts initiated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the South Caucasian and Central Asian countries, the growth and expansion of the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as the existing threats and most notable events. While much is being written today about the operations of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party by various research institutes and organizations worldwide, very little is said about region of our interest and even less about the dynamics and patterns that are unequivocally evident in these states.

“Civic IDEA” has been studying Chinese influence operations in our region for more than three years now. We are interested in the policies of the Chinese state, its universities, and other educational centers, companies, and financial institutions, etc. Accordingly, in our previous publications, you will find materials about the activities of the Confucius Institutes, student and scientific exchange programs, the so-called “debt trap” practices, and security risks for different countries, etc.

In this publication, you will get more detailed information and knowledge about seven countries: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Unfortunately, despite our numerous attempts, we could not find a suitable partner in Turkmenistan who would agree to participate in the joint study.

The work about Georgia was written by Ani Kintsurashvili, a senior researcher at the Civic IDEA. The paper summarizes the Civic IDEA’s China Watch reports and measures the growing Chinese influence in critical infrastructure and defense sectors of the country by reviewing the misconduct related to the notorious and blacklisted Chinese companies (CEFC, Sinohydro, Motor Sich, Nuctech, CRBC) actively operating in Georgia within the BRI. Moreover, the research stresses that these Chinese companies usually mediate the massive corruption schemes orchestrated by the Chinese state officials and local business and political elites. This occasion explains the ignorance of the Georgian government in failing to investigate the company’s reputation with which they are signing the
MoUs and handing the projects critical for Georgia’s natural security.

Artak Kyurumyan, an independent expert and a chairman of the board of Open Society Foundation, discusses Sino-Armenian political relations and the performance of Armenian investments in the People’s Republic of China. The paper highpoints the diversity of opinions in the experts’ community, as some believe that Armenia has working relations with China, while others think that Armenian-Chinese relations are in stagnation. Armenian authorities don’t have a vision or strategy on how to build ties with China. Russia had and has a significant impact on Armenian foreign policy and holds leverages to influence them. For several years different Armenian governments were optimistic about the Armenian-Chinese joint venture Shanxi-Nairit. Shanxi Nairit does not utilize its full capacity and could not cover its costs and accumulated huge losses. After 2018 the representatives of the Revolutionary government were also represented in the board of Shanxi Nairit and were assuring that they are doing important job. However, large parts of the Armenian community think that government officials use such opportunities to travel and don’t create any substantial
value added.

Gubad Ibadoghlu, a senior policy analyst of the Economic Research Center, covers China’s mounting interests and influence in Azerbaijan, emphasizing the boosted trade between China and Azerbaijan and between China and Europe through the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, which forms an integral part of the Belt and Road construction and serves as a critical bridge that connects the eastern and western ends of Eurasia. Moreover, Azerbaijan is devoted to building a new corridor for cross-border transportation designed to cut through the territory of Armenia to join up the Azerbaijan mainland and the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan. For China, this corridor will serve as the second South Caucasus route leading to Europe via Armenia, Nakhchivan, and Turkey. Azerbaijan’s economic diversification policy and China’s willingness to transfer industrial capacity facilitate more extensive economic cooperation between the two countries. Besides, China has failed to close several critical financial agreements at the governmental level to boost economic ties with Azerbaijan. There are currently no agreements on currency swaps, industrial transfer, or free trade between the two countries.

Research on informing the people of Kazakhstan about the activities of Chinese companies in the Kazakhstani extractive sector belongs to Danil Bekturganov, a political scientist and a Director of NGO “Civil Expertise” in Kazakhstan, who analyzes the coverage of activities of Chinese companies in the extractive sector of Kazakhstan by Kazakh media. In addition to analyzing the awareness of citizens, investigated the availability of statements and other documents issued by the government of Kazakhstan related to Chinese investments and BRI. The study examines specific cases related to the impact of the activities of Chinese extractive companies on local communities, and social, economic and environmental consequences of these activities. Mr. Bekturganov argues that Kazakhstan is one of the key places in the implementation of the BRI. Large Chinese extractive and construction companies operate on the territory of the country, railway and road routes, including the “Western Europe – Western China” corridor, pass through Kazakhstan’s territory. One of the important parts of the BRI implementation is the informing of Kazakhstani citizens about the initiative and about the opportunities, provided to businesses and local communities. The absence or lack of information gives rise to a large number of myths and phobias, and does not contribute to increasing public confidence in the presence of Chinese business in Kazakhstan. Another important aspect is the environmental impact of Chinese projects, which should be objectively and publicly assessed.

Bakytbek Satybekov, an expert and a co-chairperson of the National Open Government Forum in the Kyrgyz Republic explains China’s “debt trap” diplomacy in Kyrgyzstan by highlighting the obvious signs of the presence of such a policy in the country. Author starts with the description of a term China’s “debt trap” with examples of experience of other countries. After that mr, Satybekov describes history of Kyrgyz borrowings from China with details, such as purposes of loans, financial and other conditions and later emphasizes evolution of Kyrgyz debt management strategy with emphasis on limitation of share on a creditor in debt portfolio. At last, he provides the audience with the analysis of impact (outcome) the Chinese “debt trap” could bring to Kyrgyzstan.

Umedjon Majidi, political analyst and a postgraduate of the University of Sussex covers the topic of Corrosive inflows to the Republic of Tajikistan and how Chinese investments undermine good governance and transparency in Central Asian region. Corrosive capital coined by Center for International Private Enterprise based in Washington DC is defined the term “corrosive capital” to more clearly label financing that lacks transparency, accountability, and market orientation flowing from authoritarian regimes into new and transitioning democracies. It applies directly to big authoritarian countries which play a key role in Central Asia, they are Russia, China that lack true forms of transparency, accountability, good governance in their capital granting schemes. This paper based on wide variety of publications in various languages analyzes specifically how People’s Republic of China within its strategy of Belt and Road Initiative in Tajikistan brings bad governance schemes to Tajikistan local and national governance institutions in contrast of western countries when the capital and funds come usually with conditions to reform a local governance attached.

Farkhod Tolipov, a director of the non-governmental Research Institution “Bilim Karvoni” (“Caravan of Knowledge”) in Tashkent, finalizes the collection of articles with his input “China’s Power Projection in Central Asia and its Geopolitical Implications: The Case of Uzbekistan”. The state’s power projection capability means its ability to exert influence on other states by utilizing its real power. This utilization of power can take different forms from diplomatic communications and political pressure to open demonstration and application, separately or in combination, of elements of soft and hard power. So this paper is constructed around the main question as to what we know about China’s power projection undertakings in the Central Asian region with some more focus on Uzbekistan. Public and experts’ opinions in Central Asian countries are quite ambiguous about Chinese influence in the region; Sino-phobia and Sinophilia coexist among people, officials, and experts. In particular, Beijing’s repressive attitude towards Uighurs in Xingjian province also affected the perception of China by Central Asians. China as a great power cannot, but pursues great-power politics, which per se can bring with it opportunities and challenges for neighboring areas including the Central Asian region. Moreover, all great powers historically have always competed with each other and this competition, in turn, always caused significant geopolitical implications.

Civic IDEA’s work has been featured in the 2021 publication of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “China’s Influence in Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries”. Part of the research concerns the Chinese influence and the activities of the notorious Chinese companies in Georgia, as well as, the PRC academic initiatives and its Covid-19 diplomacy in the country. Civic IDEA’s research is attributed to well-demonstrated uncertainties associated with the Georgia-China economic cooperation. 
Below we provide an extract from the Carnegie research mentioning Civic IDEA:
“Georgian civil society organizations and experts—such as former defense minister Tinatin Khidasheli, now of Civic IDEA and Transparency International Georgia—enumerate multiple concerns about Sinohydro’s reputation, lack of transparency, and close relations with some government officials. The company has been blacklisted by the African Development Bank. The Georgian government’s transparency portal offered no record of how Sinohydro’s qualifications were assessed.

The China Railway 23rd Bureau Group is also controversial. The company has powerful backers in China. Initially the railway troops of the PLA, it became part of China’s Ministry of Railways. In 1989, the China Railway Construction Corporation was established as a stateowned enterprise. In June 2019, the World Bank announced “the nine-month debarment of China Railway Construction Corporation Ltd. (CRCC), a Chinese, state-owned construction and engineering company, and its wholly-owned subsidiaries, China Railway 23rd Bureau Group Co., Ltd. (CR23) and China Railway Construction Corporation (International) Limited (CRCC International), in connection with misconduct under the East-West Highway Corridor Improvement Project in Georgia.”This did not prevent the company from winning the contract for the new north-south bypass road shortly afterward.”

Check the full report below ?

In 2018-2020, “Civic IDEA” intensively published research concerning the shady links of Georgian political/business elite representatives with the notorious Chinese companies. Among them was a study named “Chkhartishvili Leads in China’s ”Closed Business Championship'”. According to our research and analysis of the materials found, the interests of CEFC China Energy, a company that has been exposed in many criminal cases in different countries of the world, were pursued by former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili and Vice Prime Minister of Eduard Shevardnadze’s government and Minister of Economy, Ivane Chkhartishvili.

The findings presented in the reports published by us over the years are fully corroborated by the Pandora documents published by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists in late September 2021, portraying the links between the former Prime Minister of Georgia and Brightstone Finance Limited registered in the Virgin Islands.

This report is a continuation of the studies published by us in 2018-2020. We will tell you how the judicial and the executive branches of government handed over one of the most important strategic assets of Georgia – the Poti Free Industrial Zone, to the bankrupt Chinese company CEFC China Energy. The report will also evaluate how Poti FIZ was brought under the total control of Bidzina Ivanishvili and Ivane Chkhartishvili after the bankruptcy of the Chinese CEFC. The court decision, which can not withstand any criticism, serves the sole purpose of retaining complete control of the former prime minister on Poti FIZ and preventing the return of property to the state.

Download report from here ?

https://www.facebook.com/tvpirveli/videos/209319291288503

https://www.facebook.com/tvpirveli/videos/2362796507187165

https://www.facebook.com/TvMtavari/videos/200362635500407

Civic IDEA’s China Watch Report N7 deals with misconduct related to the activities of the Chinese company “China Road and Bridge Corporation” (CRBC) in Georgia, tenders won illegally, violations related to labor rights, and shady practices in various countries worldwide. The company is collaborating with the Georgian Roads Department on two major infrastructure projects. Like other Chinese companies in Georgia, it was blacklisted by the World Bank in 2009 for fraudulent conduct in the tender of the first phase of the Philippine National Road Improvement and Management Program (NRIMP 1). CRBC was banned from participating in all World Bank-funded infrastructure projects for eight years. The mismanagement of the Chinese company in Georgia is mainly related to the violation of labor safety rules. In particular, China Road and Bridge Corporation did not adhere to minimum sanitary norms in the workplace, forced employees to work overtime and, most importantly, did not create labor safety conditions in the area, which endangered the health of local workers. The local Labor Inspectorate gave only a few recommendations to China Road and Bridge Corporation, and in fact, no sanctions were imposed on the company. Controversial activities of China Road and Bridge Corporation are also observed in Kenya, Uganda, Kyrgyzstan, Croatia and Ukraine. However, despite the shortcomings in other countries, the Georgian government continues to actively cooperate with the representatives of the Chinese company and sign new contracts with them.

More information about the activities of China Road and Bridge Corporation can be found at the following link ?

Annual-Report-ENG-1

Civic IDEA has published the 6th China Watch report “Nuctech Company Ltd. in Georgia”, which evaluates the controversies over the Chinese biggest security scanner distributor “Nuctech Company Ltd”. The latter covers the company’s cooperation with the Georgian government, fraudulent activities related to Georgian and foreign tender procedures, malfunctions of its security equipment, and corruption scandals worldwide. More specifically, the report discusses the cases of Georgia, Namibia, Taiwan, and Europe, reveals Nuctech’s military ties with the Russian Federation, and reviews the US adversarial policies towards it.

Chinese company Nuctech company limited first appeared on the Georgian market in March 2008. At that time, The Minister of Finance of Georgia, Nika Gilauri, signed an agreement with Nuctech Company Limited on behalf of the Government of Georgia. The contract was on the implementation of the project for the supply of inspection complexes to the Government of Georgia. According to the 2014 report of the State Audit Office, in 2012, within the framework of simplified procurements, two contracts were signed with Nuctech Company Limited for the purchase of stationary X-ray scanners (NUCTECH MB1215DE). The X-ray inspection system was to be delivered at the Kazbegi customs checkpoint. The total value of the procurement was 4,566,775 USD. Within the tenders announced by the Revenue Service in 2011-2013, participating suppliers filed several claims against the National Procurement Agency over the fact that the Revenue Service adapted required technical specification to the Nuctech Company Limited catalogs; also, they were so complicated that many suppliers were barred from participating. In 2018-2020, the Revenue Service purchased a total of 5,870,722.48 USD goods from Nuctech Company Limited through simplified procurement. The objects of procurements were the preventive and corrective maintenance service of the X-ray scanners owned by the Revenue Service. One of the countries that properly resist Nuctech and restricts its access to critical domestic industries is the United States. The US Transport Security Administration (TSA) banned Nuctech installations in 2014 and provided a detailed review of the company’s misconduct leaning on its international experiences in the classified document. Furthermore, the US government is calling on its European allies to restrict Nuctech’s access to public tenders and disregard the baggage screening equipment it provides. Moreover, the US government is calling on its European allies to restrict Nuctech’s access to public tenders and abandon its baggage screening equipment. However, today European states respond individually to the allegations against Nuctech and its activities. For example, while Nuctech has successfully won tenders in Estonia, Finland, and Croatia, the Lithuanian government has officially banned equipment manufactured by this company. We are often asked about the specific damage Nuctech can bring to the country. For instance, in Ukraine, Nuctech not only supplied incomplete and defective equipment to the Ukrainian customs checkpoints but even won the case against the State Security Bureau and the Ministry of Finance in court. Namibia also has a painful experience, as Beijing removed it from China’s internet search engines and imposed all kinds of media censorship on it all over the country just because the latter had launched an investigation regarding the Nuctech-related corruption scandal. The Chinese authorities removed Namibia because Hu Haifeng, the son of the Chinese Communist Party leader Hu Jintao, was involved in the corruption scandal there. Despite the global technological development, the Chinese Communist Party still effectively manages to ban undesirable internet searches from its population. It is noteworthy that in addition to expanding economic influence and participating in corrupt and fraudulent activities, Nuctech and its owner, Tsinghua University, also seek to spread influence through the academic sphere. The company works closely with St. Petersburg State University to develop high-energy X-ray machines, anti-terrorist equipment, and other technologies that have the potential of being used for military purposes.

Download link ?

Report-6

On January 23, 2021, based on the information spread by the Ministry of Defense of Georgia , it became known that through the active involvement of the State Defense Ministry, the above-mentioned Ukrainian company signed a trilateral memorandum with the Georgian State Military Scientific-Technical Center DELTA and Tbilisi Aircraft Manufacturing (TAM), also known as „JSC Tbilaviamsheni“.

In the official statement, we read that the cooperation and, consequently, the memorandum „aims to develop the military industry and modernize aircraft belonging to the defense forces.” The same disclosure announces that „the company is already repairing helicopter engines and gears owned by the defense forces.” However, previously, nothing was publicly known about the existing cooperation between the “JSC Tbilaviamsheni” and the Ukrainian company, disguised to strengthen Georgia’s defense capabilities. Information about the current contractual relations was later confirmed by the Ministry of Defense in a statement issued on January 31, 2021: „”The contract between the company “Motor Sich” and JSC “Tbilaviamsheni”, concerning the engines and the reduction gears of the Mi-24 helicopter gunships, has already been signed. The cooperation envisages modernization and repair of the engines of the Mi-24 combat helicopters.”

It is noteworthy to find out exactly when a cooperation agreement was signed between JSC “Tbilaviamsheni” and “Motor Sich”, as, since 2017, the company has been under constant investigation by the security services and represents an object of attention of our strategic partner, the United States. Unfortunately, such information is not publicly sought, suggesting that the Georgian side was well aware of its relationship with a controversial company with a damaged reputation and under investigation in various countries. Consequently, the state authorities did not disclose information about the cooperation. In June 2020, while presenting the Minister’s report to the Parliament, Irakli Gharibashvili, then Minister of Defense of Georgia, mentioned aviation development, among other issues. During the speech, he focused on the joint events planned with the Georgian State Military Scientific-Technical Center DELTA and Tbilisi Aircraft Manufacturing (TAM) “Tbilaviamsheni”. “As a result of the joint cooperation of JSC “Tbilaviamsheni” and “DELTA”, the preparatory works for the restoration-rehabilitation-modernization of the existing aircraft are underway. In particular, we will start the rehabilitation and upgrade process of Su-25 and Mi-24 military helicopters in Delta hangars very soon.”– commented Irakli Gharibashvili. The Ministry also referred to the Mi-24 rehabilitation agreement in its statement of January 31, 2021, as an ongoing contractual obligation between “Motor Sich” and JSC “Tbilaviamsheni”. We can assume that in June 2020, this collaboration was already established. Moreover, we should not forget that in 2019, the world media outlets already aired the warning to avoid the danger of being caught in China’s “debt trap” policy, brought to Kyiv by the US President’s National Security Adviser John Bolton. Bolton’s messages referred to “Motor Sich” and its new Chinese owners. In 2020, the media reported the ongoing investigation concerning the “potential financing of terrorism” by the company “Motor Sich”. The statements of the world media outlets and the testimonies of various countries, are overwhelmed with the claims, accusations, and suspicions against the company mentioned above. Special mention should be made that the ambiguities and problems surrounding “Motor Sich” became known as early as in 2014, when, despite the Russian occupation of Crimea and the ongoing military confrontation in eastern Ukraine, “Motor Sich” together with other Ukrainian companies, continued to cooperate with the Russian Armed Forces providing them with military needs. This fact was reported by the Washington Post in 2014.

REPORT:

5-report

Within the frames of the BRIDGE initiative, Civic IDEA has contributed to the creation of the International Republican Institute’s 2021 report “A WORLD SAFE FOR THE PARTY, CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN INFLUENCE AND THE DEMOCRATIC RESPONSE”. The research includes the case studies of Nepal, Panama, Kenya, Montenegro, Georgia, and Greece and exposes the impact of CCP influence operations on fragile democracies around the world.

Georgia’s case focuses on its strategic geolocation, making it an essential part of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” in China’s BRI. However, Sino-Georgian economic cooperation boosted through the BRI, FTA, and various dual agreements have yielded mixed results. “BRI-related investments by Chinese state-owned or government-linked companies in Georgia have spurred infrastructure developments while fueling corruption and rent-seeking behavior among Georgian politicians. Many large projects undertaken by Chinese companies are left unfinished or are beset by financial and logistical problems.” 

Although China is more perceived as an economic partner of Georgia, the Sino-Georgian cooperation has gone beyond the economic sphere covering other areas such as media, CSO, culture, and academia. The various initiatives implemented through these domains influence Georgian public opinion about China and serve the CCP’s broader foreign policy goals.

For more information, please visit the following link 

https://www.iri.org/resource/china-expands-global-authoritarian-influence-efforts-some-fragile-democracies-show

Report:

bridge-ii_fullreport-r7-021221-1

The BRIDGE initiative, funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, works to bolster democratic resilience to foreign authoritarian influence. By increasing awareness of authoritarian tactics and equipping stakeholders with the tools and resources to overcome them, BRIDGE programming supports at-risk countries to safeguard democratic institutions and advance their democratic development. 

“Insights from Young Scholars and Peacebuilders from the Caucasus” is the collection of articles and research papers developed within the frames of Civic IDEA’s and Berlin-based Corridors – Dialogue through Cooperation’s joint workshop. Sixteen young experts from Abkhazia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Russia participated in the project, which combined academic input, practical training, and regional exchange. This publication consists of ten selected papers that have been developed, presented, discussed, and reviewed during the project. It provides the reader with first-hand insights, analysis, and opinions from young scholars and peacebuilders from the Caucasus region. In this way, the edited volume facilitates the exchange of knowledge both within the region and internationally.

Sincere gratitude to our engaged colleagues, inspiring and courageous participants, and the German Federal Foreign Office for its generous funding.

Corridors-Proceedings-Vol2-2020-1

COVID-19 pandemic and the lockdown of Marneuli and Bolnisi municipalities, the peripeteias associated with the Nariman Narimanov monument, and the events surrounding David Gareja, have uncovered a deep and veiled problem of decades of inequality and racism in society. Although the state legislation of Georgia has been trying to develop a policy of equality for minorities for years, the construction of a multi-religious and multiethnic state and the real integration of the minority community still remains a problem. From the 1990s to the present, Georgia has not been able to overcome the narrative of ethno-religious nationalism that ‘Being Georgian means being Christian’ and the rest is ‘a guest’ and ‘the other’. The discourse – ‘Us’ and ‘Others’, like other minorities, applies to the Azerbaijani community in Georgia, but in the conditions of the pandemic, it particularly affected them. The fact that the Azerbaijani community is considered a ‘foreigner’ by the public, along with belonging to a different ethnic group, is often facilitated by the lack of knowledge of the Georgian language and the adherence to Islam. In the eyes of the dominant ethnos, the Azerbaijani community was and is considered to be a stereotypically, backward and underdeveloped entity. According to Kamran Mammadli, one of the Azerbaijani activists, they were a tamed ‘sheep-breeder’ community. The low level of community integration, for many officials or politicians, is usually the fault of the Azerbaijani community and the line of accusation runs through ignorance of the state language. And the problem of language ignorance is presented as if the community itself does not want to learn the state language and integrate. The state views the minority community exclusively through the prism of security policy. The basis of such an approach is the narrative established in the 90s of the last century, as if there was a threat of separatism in the Azerbaijani community, just like in the Armenian community. It is fair to say that the Azerbaijani community has never given any specific, tangible reason to any of the authorities, and it would be perfectly legitimate to measure their loyalty to the Georgian state in exactly the same way as any other ethnic group living in Georgia, including Georgians.

The Georgian Orthodox Church plays an important role in deepening ethnic-religious nationalism. The Church’s designation of minority-populated areas as ‘Christian territory’ is indicated by the activity of local dioceses and clergy in Kvemo Kartli and the tendency to erect Christian crosses in Muslim villages.

Along with the xenophobic statements made against the Azerbaijani community during the pandemic, the continuation of the narrative of ethno-religious nationalism is the peripeteias associated with the Nariman Naromanov monument and the issue of David Gareji. Behind these issues, in addition with the cultural dimension, lies the issue of political representation, monoethnic and mono-religious domination.

VIRUS-OF-URGENCY-Part-2-1