Research

Already in the updated version of the list, which dates back to December 2021, we see that Georgia’s leading strategic partner, the United States, has blacklisted not only the Huawei divisions in different cities in China but also its other branches abroad. More precisely, the US has barred exports, reexports, and transfers coming from the Huawei subdivisions in Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, UK, Vietnam. According to the document, the main reason for their debar-ment is linked to the security vulnerabilities that Huawei items convey.

In our 2020 report “Who is in charge of the post-cold war world? Chinese influence operations in Academia, Media & CSOs,” we have thoroughly covered the controversies related to Huawei and its activities in the US, the UK, and different EU member states. We also reviewed the resilience strategies used by multiple countries, such as Japan, the US, or the UK, that effectively impose restrictions and sanctions against the Chinese tech giant to ensure their national security.

For more information, please visit the link ?

On January 20, 2022, Associated Press News featured an article “Security scanners across Europe tied to China govt, military,” raising alarms about the notorious Chinese “Nuctech Company Limited” and its dispersal throughout the European states.

Last year, Civic IDEA published a report about Nuctech Company Limited reviewing:

• its cooperation with the Georgian government,

• fraudulent activities related to Georgian and foreign tender procedures,

• malfunctions of its security equipment,

• corruption scandals worldwide.

Back then, our team has already stressed out the high-security risks threatening the national security of those states, where Nuctech has operated.

For more information, please visit the link ?

Civic IDEA’s 11th China Watch report discusses the controversies around China’s state-owned nuclear company China Nuclear Industry 23 Construction Co., Ltd., alternatively referred to as “CNNC No.23” or CNI23 operating since 1958. There is no record provided by internet sources about the misconduct related to particularly CNI23 and its representation in different states. Nevertheless, some problems and scandals are still associated with its founding investor firms: China National Nuclear Corporation and China General Nuclear Power Engineering Co., Ltd. China General Nuclear Power Engineering Co., Ltd. first appeared on the Georgian market in 2012 and since then has won several state procurements and made private investments.

For more information about the CNI23, see the attachment below: ?

Civic IDEA is pleased to share with you the 10th China Watch report related to another Chinese company operating in Georgia, China State Construction Engineering Corporation Ltd. (so-called CSCEC), and reviews its scandals and misconduct that occurred in Georgia and worldwide.

CSCEC is one of the largest Chinese state construction companies, founded in 1982. Since then, it has operated in more than 100 countries worldwide. The company’s main activities comprise real estate, construction financing, operation and engineering (housing and infrastructure), as well as design and survey. This company has been embroiled in numerous scandals in the past two decades. More precisely, the CSCEC and its subsidies have been exposed to corruption and fraud schemes in the US, Philippines, Pakistan, Hungary, and several other countries and have been blacklisted by different state and international institutions.

Read more about the company’s reputation and activities in our report: ?

Civic IDEA has the honor to share with the audience the second part of the series of Collection of Articles under the name “From Caspian to Black Sea: Economic, Academic and Digital Threats posed by the PRC”. Publication in front of you is the second edition of a collective effort by Civic IDEA and its partners and distinguished experts from the region to analyze and debate the Chinese activities in their respective countries in various fields, be it academia, business, politics, or other state matters. This time, the publication was inspired by the outstanding work of our Taiwanese partner Doublethink Lab about the Chinese influence operations assembled in China Index-2021, to be followed at https://china-index.io. This regularly updated web tracker allows all interested in monitoring and measuring PRC influence around the Globe.

The contributor authors to the second issue of the collection of articles are the following:

Tinatin Khidasheli – Chairperson, Civic IDEA

Ani Kintsurashvili – Senior Researcher, Civic IDEA

Vusal Guliyev – Fellow, the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University

Gubad Ibadoghlu – Senior Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Umedjon Majidi – Anti Corruption Expert, Sarajevo, BIH

Gia Jandieri – Director, New Economic School of Georgia

Danila Bekturganov – Director, NGO “Civil Expertise”

Denis Cenusa – Associated Expert, Think Tank EESC (Lithuania) / Think Tank Expert-Grup (Moldova)

Civic IDEA is also grateful to National Endowment for Democracy and the US Embassy for their immense support and contribution.

Civic IDEA published the second volume of the report “Chinese Leverage in Georgia’s Academic, CSO and Media Sectors: Post-Covid Reality”. The current paper reviews Georgia – Chinese cooperation in Academia, that is, among various universities, academic programs, scholarships, etc., analyzing realities created by Covid Pandemic and its consequences. Moreover, it gives a comparative analysis by evaluating foreign trends and policies toward Chinese malign academic activities. Mainly, the report focuses on the cases of the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, Hungary, Serbia, the US, and Sweden to demonstrate that, like other essential domains, Academia can be exploited by foreign actors.

The report is implemented with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy and the US Embassy in Tbilisi, in cooperation with the Central European Institute of Asian Studies.

Report ?

Civic IDEA started observing Georgia’s foreign debt policy after the Georgian Dream officially refused financial assistance from the European Union. It turns out that Georgia is still actively borrowing from various financial institutions or directly from other countries, and the two main creditors of the country are the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). On September 21, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which is highly affected by China, officially announced that it would provide the Georgian government with a USD 100 million loan, aiming to strengthen Georgia’s electricity sector. On September 24, ADB already approved a USD 15 million loan to assist Georgia in effectively implementing the vaccination programs. Three weeks before the debt approval from the ADB, the Georgian government publicly refrained from taking 75 million Euros worth of aid from the European Union. According to Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili’s official statement, Georgia has begun the reduction of its foreign debt, and therefore, no additional assistance from the EU was needed. 

Based on the information we have, the question naturally arises: Why does the Georgian government take debt from the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank when their services are twice as expensive as the EU’s? We will provide our readers with a consistent history of when, why and under what conditions the Government of Georgia decided to cooperate with the bank, which was established only recently, in 2016.

After our Central Asia publication “Can Russia find more Friends and supports in War against Ukraine?
Position and reactions of Central Asian Countries” we provide the interested audience with the compilation of tactical and strategic narratives coming from Beijing over the Russia-Ukraine war.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine found Central Asian states in surprise. Undoubtedly their attention was occupied by events in Kazakhstan beginning of 2022 and developments following widespread unrest when Russian military aggression against Ukraine shook the world.

As for the facts, all Central Asian states and their economies are intertwined with Russia. Some are members of the Eurasian Economic Union as well. The cooperation and interdependency are so high that the threat of Western sanctions over the Kremlin having an effect on them is very tangible and high.

Moreover, three countries of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, along with Armenia and Belarus, are members of the Russian-led security/military alliance – the CSTO. Therefore, Moscow’s expectation of demonstrated support, including military, was rather realistic and projected.

Despite relatively clear links and bondages to Moscow, the reactions and political statements of national governments from Central Asia differed from complete silence to support or concerns over the developments in Ukraine. President Putin’s recognition of breakaway regions and dismissal of Ukrainian statehood should’ve rung a bell in some Central Asian states, particularly those with significant Russian minorities.

With the support of the European Values Center for Security Policy, USAID and MFA of the Czech Republic, Civic IDEA, with the local partners (GRASS, DFR Lab, MDF), contributed to the second volume of the joint research “Russian and Chinese Influences in Georgia”.

This Report is the second edition of the study launched in 2020 – Mapping Research: Comparing foreign influence in Georgia. This year’s issue – Russian and Chinese influences in Georgia – 2021 update monitors the development of foreign country influences in Georgia in 2021, especially in state institutions, NGOs, media, political parties, or the Church. This paper aims to further analyze a broad spectrum of problems already introduced in the previous report, such as campaigns and activities implemented and sponsored by third countries, ranging from political infiltration to corrosive capital flows with political goals.

Report ?